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Abstract
Today, across all major industries gaining insight from data is seen as an essential
part of business. However, while data gathering is becoming inexpensive and relatively
easy, analysis and ultimately deriving knowledge from it is increasingly difficult. In
many cases, there is the problem of too much data such that important insights are
hard to find. The problem is often not lack of data but whether knowledge derived from
it is trustworthy. This means distinguishing “good” from “bad” insights based on factors
such as context and reputation. Still, modeling trust and quality of data is complex
because of the various conditions and relationships in heterogeneous environments.
The new TrustKnowOne framework and architecture developed in this dissertation
addresses these issues by describing an approach to fully incorporate trust and quality of
data with all its aspects into the knowledge derivation process. This is based on Berlin,
an abstract graph model we developed that can be used to model various approaches
to trustworthiness and relationship assessment as well as decision making processes. In
particular, processing, assessment, and evaluation approaches are implemented as graph
expressions that are evaluated on graph components modeling the data.
We have implemented and applied our framework to three complex scenarios using
real data from public data repositories. As part of their evaluation we highlighted how
our approach exhibits both the formalization and flexibility necessary to model each of
the realistic scenarios. The implementation and evaluation of these scenarios confirms
the advantages of the TrustKnowOne framework over current approaches.
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1
Introduction
In this dissertation “A Framework for Knowledge Derivation Incorporating Trust
and Quality of Data” is introduced. The premise for this research is that existing
approaches to knowledge derivation can be significantly improved by incorporating the
assessments of data quality and trustworthiness.
Chapter 2 discusses the problems associated with current knowledge derivation pro-
cesses. In particular, it highlights our approach and contributions. Context for our
framework is provided in chapter 3 where we discuss related work and research areas.
The basis of our framework consists of an abstract graph model on which graph
expressions are evaluated. This model called Berlin is presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5
discusses in detail how our TrustKnowOne framework is able to incorporate trust and
quality of data aspects into knowledge derivation processes.
The application of our framework to specific scenarios is examined in chapter 6. The
focus lies on showcasing how TrustKnowOne provides a formal and flexible approach
to knowledge derivation in a variety of scenarios. The implementation of these realistic
scenarios is used to confirm our claims concerning the advantages of the TrustKnowOne
framework over the current state of the art.
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Our reference implementation of the framework is discussed in chapter 7. In chap-
ter 8 our TrustKnowOne framework is compared and evaluated against representative
frameworks and approaches from literature. The dissertation concludes with chapter 9
that also provides an outlook for future work.
2
2
Problem Statement and
Contributions
2.1 Motivation
All data is essentially used to make decisions. In general, these decisions are based
on the assumption that the data itself is valid and useful. However, how do we determine
the quality of this data, is it affected or influenced by other data, and does it change
over time? Furthermore, determining the usefulness of the data is also based on the
level of trust we put into the data source, especially when the data is confidential or
there is a potential conflict-of-interest when reporting the data. Since our decisions are
based on this data we need to understand what is correct and can be trusted, otherwise
we may make wrong decisions.
This research addresses the problem of systematically and formally incorporating
trust and data quality as well as time and other system dynamics into the knowledge
derivation process.
3
2.2 Approach
We create a new framework called TrustKnowOne where we associate every piece
of data with some model (probabilistic or deterministic) representing data quality and
trustworthiness. Furthermore, we provide formalized means for determining, describing
and combining these models and their parameters as well as functionality to challenge
them. We utilize relationships between pieces of data and data sources to assess trust
and opinions of them. Similar approaches can be found in intrusion detection and
computer and social networks. However, they are often not formalized and lack a com-
prehensive framework that is flexible enough to deal with a wide variety of realistic
scenarios. Moreover, the lack of a formal framework inhibits comparing different pro-
posed techniques.
The following provides an overview of our approach and its benefits.
2.2.1 A Knowledge Derivation Framework
Our TrustKnowOne framework is divided into three components to allow for a lay-
ered approach and increased flexibility. First, knowledge extraction allows us to formalize
a general description of data elements and their context (meta information) as measure-
ments. This knowledge extraction formalization is applicable to many realistic scenarios
as we will demonstrate in chapter 6. Second, knowledge processing deals with taking
these measurements and attaching additional relationship meta information in order to
provide beliefs and opinions about the measurements. Third, the measurements as well
as the beliefs and opinions are then used by the knowledge evaluation component to
make decisions.
One of the advantages of separating knowledge processing and evaluation is that there
may be various approaches to modeling data quality and trust/opinion relationships as
well as various decision engines. Current approaches [31, 54, 63, 65] often combine
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the trust modeling aspect with the decision problem they are trying to solve. Doing
so makes the comparison of individual approaches and further improvements to them
difficult.
The separation of functionality into a layered framework as presented here is a nec-
essary step towards gaining a better understanding of the advantages and disadvantages
of current methods. In some cases in literature [31, 54, 63] simply choosing a different
decision engine could yield completely different results but without a framework like the
one developed here it is too difficult to assess the potential improvement.
2.2.2 Formalization of Knowledge Derivation
The framework creates a new formalization approach to combining raw data with
meta information on a local level (e.g., time, space, how it was obtained, security fea-
tures) as well as a global level (context, attestation, expected behavior, history and
ownership data) using an abstract graph model that is suitable to assessing data qual-
ity and trustworthiness. The formalized and flexible nature of our approach allows for
addressing a variety of data types that may be required to support a wide range of
applications as will be confirmed by the application of our framework to several realis-
tic scenarios (chapter 6. For instance, determining the trustworthiness of Smartphone
Apps (section 6.1) requires extensive modeling of heterogeneous entities and relation-
ships which we demonstrate our framework is capable of.
2.2.3 Adaptable Quality and Trust Assessments
Our research derives quality and trust assessments for each measurement based on
a rich set of data and meta information from multiple resources and contexts. This
includes a rigorous process of how to derive confidence in measurements from data by
incorporating and evaluating local meta information, history, expected behavior, global
data, and context information. We provide a modular and extensible approach to incor-
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porate a variety of trust and quality assessment techniques using graph expressions. We
demonstrate this using the scenarios discussed in chapter 6: trustworthiness assessments
with heterogeneous entities (section 6.1), complex assessments on individual sensors as
well as groups of sensors (section 6.2), and assessments in dynamic environments (sec-
tion 6.3).
2.2.4 Dynamic Reassessment of Data
Our framework enables the request of additional data or challenge of existing data
when certain confidence thresholds are not reached. This approach supports weighted
decision processes where one part of the system to be analyzed is more critical than oth-
ers as well as time critical ones where the best decision needs to be made given certain
time and context constraints. Furthermore, in contrast to other frameworks the decision
engine is able to utilize both data and additional information such as trust and data
quality assessments when deciding on actions to take. We use an implementation of an
intrusion detection scenario to demonstrate this aspect of our framework (section 6.3).
Here, trustworthiness is based on the evaluation of test messages in a dynamic environ-
ment of hosts. Depending on the confidence of a particular assessments we can adjust
the difficulty as well as the rate of messages that are being sent.
2.2.5 Flexible Decision Processes
The framework incorporates a flexible decision engine which allows for estimat-
ing the trustworthiness of data based on the assessment and confidence of individual
measurements, their meta information, and context. This involves deriving a decision
confidence from the confidence of the measurements and particular data sources. Our
framework provides these trustworthiness assessments so that they can be directly in-
corporated into knowledge derivation and decisions (e.g., performing analysis only on
data above certain trustworthiness levels, discarding low quality data points, etc.). In
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order to allow for flexible comparison and evaluation, we formalize decision processes
as graph expressions that can be reused, modified, and extended as shown in the sce-
narios (chapter 6). This ranges from weighting schemes including ratings, reviews, and
permissions (section 6.1) to threshold-based trust classes and incorporating ownership
lineage (section 6.2 to evaluating model vulnerabilities (section 6.3).
2.2.6 Analysis of Data Attacks
Our developed framework is able to handle missing data, data in error, and purpose-
fully modified data (an information attack). The key is that we take into consideration
that there are always inherent operational system impairments present in data that may
not reflect an attack. However, when changes in data become correlated we are able
to detect these patterns and determine the presence of attacks. Because of the formal
nature of our approach using graph expressions we are able to assess the robustness
of the individual techniques and algorithms (i.e., belief engines and decision processes)
against specific attack scenarios. An implementation of an intrusion detection scenario
(section 6.3) is used to demonstrate this aspect.
2.2.7 Application to Diverse Scenarios
As part of the discussion we will highlight how our approach exhibits both the formal-
ization and flexibility necessary to model each of the realistic scenarios. These scenarios
discussed in chapter 6 are used to confirm the advantages of the TrustKnowOne frame-
work over current approaches. We focus our analysis on the following representative
and realistic scenarios. The selected scenarios and their implementations are realistic
in terms of being geographically distributed, exhibiting time dynamics, and consisting
of large and diverse data sets.
First, we discuss how we can evaluate the trustworthiness of Smartphone Apps by
incorporating a variety of relationship and context assessments (section 6.1). We show
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that this approach yields a significant improvement over current methods that are based
on basic App attributes [95]. Our data set for this scenario contains a total 11326 Apps,
790940 reviews (651801 with text, 139139 without) as well as 134 different kinds of
permissions captured in July 2012. For this purpose we developed a web crawler to pull
the real and rich App attributes out of Google Play (Android Market). As such, our data
is a diverse representation of realistic data with complex attributes and relationships.
Second, we apply our framework to distributed collaborative sensing in the domain
of radiation detection (section 6.2). Here, we deal with changes in sensor values over
time as well as complex relationships between them. In particular, we combine data
from three data sources amounting to ≈ 2.5 million time stamped data points over the
course of nine months which are geographically distributed across Japan. Two of the
data sets were provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency [75] whereas the
third data set from Safecast [144] represents measurements taken from thousands of
people in a collaborative sensing effort. As such, the Safecast [144] data represents a
challenging data set in terms of correlating related measurements, a common challenge
in collaborative sensing environments. Thus, the measurements captured in the three
data sets provide a realistic basis for evaluating our framework.
Third, intrusion detection provides a dynamic and challenging environment for
knowledge derivation because there exist a wide variety of approaches to determine
trustworthiness of system nodes. We discuss how our framework is able to formalize
one approach [54] in order to be able to compare and evaluate it against a number of
attacks (section 6.3). Our evaluation involves simulation of several dynamic systems
with up to 60 nodes generating ≈ 9000 time stamped test messages over 75 days. The
scope of this scenario is realistic for demonstrating the effects of a variety of attacks and
evaluating trust assessment approaches on intrusion detection systems.
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2.3 Contributions
The establishment of formal definitions for trust, quality, and other metrics as well as
the manner in which they are derived from individual data elements and measurements
has been mostly ignored in previous research. One intellectual merit of our framework
is the formal description of these metrics using an abstract data and relationship graph
model. For the first time the proposed formalization enables the comparison and eval-
uation of different metrics, algorithms, and approaches proposed in literature. The
research establishes a unique formalized and comprehensive model for trust, reputation,
and opinion approaches that is based on the metrics derived from data. This enables
the analysis and comparison of models in a way that is not currently possible due to dif-
ferences in the definitions of metrics and modeling aspects of the individual approaches
(in particular how data is combined to derive trust, reputation and opinions). Since we
establish a direct link between the metrics and models we can compare and evaluate
the usefulness and impact of individual metrics, data elements, and data sources.
The structure of the framework enables better decision processes because it combines
data and relationships between data with notions of quality, trust, reputation, and
opinions. Furthermore, as demonstrated in this dissertation the developed framework
allows for more realistic modeling of application scenarios since it incorporates context,
history, and expected behavior of data. In particular, with our framework we provide a
method to select the best belief and decision engines among several for specific real world
cases. In addition, the formalization of the entire framework allows direct comparison
of not only current but future approaches to various metrics (e.g., trust, data quality),
models (e.g., trust, reputation, opinions) and decision processes (e.g., trustworthiness
of resources, measurement impact, and usefulness).
The major contributions of this dissertation are:
• A new abstract graph modeling approach that allows the management of hetero-
geneous data with dynamic aspects (e.g., time, location) in a variety of application
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scenarios while inherently incorporating trustworthiness and data quality assess-
ments
• A new formalization approach to describing belief engines and decision processes
in the form of graph expressions
• A new framework for knowledge derivation that provides a flexible and extensible
approach using clearly defined extraction, processing, and evaluation components
• The means to evaluate and compare different belief, trustworthiness, and decision
making techniques in a variety of application scenarios using a formal approach
Today, across all major industries gaining insight from data is seen as an essential
part of business. However, while data gathering is becoming inexpensive and relatively
easy, data analysis and ultimately deriving trustworthy knowledge from it is increasingly
difficult. In many cases, there is the problem of too much data such that important
insights are hard to find. As we discuss in chapter 3, several frameworks have been
developed that deal with large-scale data processing and analysis. Yet, the problem is
often not lack of data but whether the knowledge derived from it is trustworthy. This
means distinguishing “good” insights from “bad” ones based on factors such as context
and reputation. Still, modeling trust and quality of data is complex because of the
variety of conditions and relationships that exist in heterogeneous environments.
Table 2.1 shows how the TrustKnowOne framework provides significant benefits
over existing state-of-the-art frameworks with respect to major aspects of the knowledge
derivation process. A detailed discussion is presented in chapter 8 where the attributes of
the TrustKnowOne framework confirmed through the implementation of three realistic
scenarios are compared to the existing framework’s capabilities.
The research presented in this dissertation addresses these issues by describing an
approach to fully incorporate trust and quality of data with all its aspects into the
knowledge derivation process. Our abstract graph model can be used to model various
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Table 2.1: Comparison of major aspects in knowledge derivation processes
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heterogeneous systems
dynamic systems
formal representations
quality and trust assessments
flexibility in approaches
no support partial support full support
approaches to trustworthiness and relationship assessment as well as decision making
processes. Throughout this dissertation we describe in detail our approaches as well as
compare and evaluate them using a series of realistic application scenarios.
In addition, the TrustKnowOne framework provides the flexibility and performance
necessary for large-scale data processing. In particular, our abstract graph model can be
distributed as well as partitioned using a variety of approaches such that the storage of
data becomes scalable. Furthermore, processing, assessment, and evaluation approaches
are implemented using graph expressions which allows for inherent parallelization and
distributed computation.
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3
Related Work
The complexity of dealing with heterogeneous and dynamic environments in which
we want to incorporate trustworthiness and data quality assessments means that our
TrustKnowOne framework and graph modeling approaches intersect with a variety of
research areas (figure 3.1). In order to provide an overview, we focus our discussion on
the three major ones:
• Trust assessment and management
• Data modeling, integration, and fusion
• Large-scale data processing
In this section, we will discuss several research topics and frameworks in these areas
as proposed in literature. A detailed comparison and evaluation with respect to our ap-
proaches and in particular the TrustKnowOne framework described in this dissertation
will be performed in a chapter 8.
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Figure 3.1: Related Work Overview
3.1 Trust Assessment and Management
Gupta and Han [65] provide an overview of current developments as well as chal-
lenges in the field of heterogeneous network-based trust analysis. In particular, the
authors discuss the need for various types of information to be evaluated in terms of
trustworthiness and claims to be verified or dismissed based on that evaluation. They
identified several areas that are especially in need of incorporating trustworthiness.
Here, we discuss the most relevant with regards to our framework, fact finding
which deals with asserting the credibility of facts as well as their sources, reputation
management where trust is incorporating relationships and context, and data lineage
which provides trace information about where data originated and how it was processed.
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3.1.1 Fact Finding and Data Representation
Facts are statements which in the general context is considered to be true. However,
identifying facts in large and complex information systems is a difficult problem. For
example, news outlets may report a story slightly differently by knowingly (e.g., through
subjective opinions) or unknowingly (e.g., inaccuracies) changing facts. If we want to
utilize these facts in order to make decisions it becomes clear that we need to establish
the correctness of information as well as the trustworthiness of sources.
Fact finding in literature [101, 143, 185] is based on three entities that are modeled
as nodes in a graph. Providers are data sources that claim facts about certain objects.
The relationship between the entities can then be described using weighted edges that
provide positive (supporting facts) or negative (opposing facts) reinforcement.
In a homogeneous network, fact and objects types are the same and several basic
schemes such as voting or ranking can be used to determine which facts are best sup-
ported by the data. However, this approach is problematic in heterogeneous networks
because certain facts may be available for one object type but not others, aggregated
facts may be conflicting, and a single provider often describes a variety of different
objects. On the other hand, this variety of data elements and the more complex rela-
tionships they form is the main reason why heterogeneous networks tend to have more
useful information than homogeneous networks [65].
One of the main premises of our framework is its ability to incorporate heterogeneous
data. In particular, our framework utilizes a common abstract data model to address
this. Additionally, basic fact finding approaches only use binary indications of true or
false for facts which are not well suited for most scenarios. We incorporate degrees of
truth where probabilities and confidence assessments are assigned to facts that can then
be used to make decisions.
In addition, one of the disadvantages of using the three entity fact finding model is
that it is often too simplistic and therefore unable to describe realistic complex relation-
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ships. On the contrary, our framework allows for a formalized representation of data
which allows data transformation (i.e., creating derived facts) as well as relationships
which are often more complex (e.g. dependencies, correlations) than simple positive and
negative weights. Another important aspect we address is that data and relationships
are dynamic and may evolve over time which requires complex dynamic models that
incorporate ideas from dynamic Bayesian networks (DBN) [165] and Hidden Markov
Models (HMM) [43, 90]. Basic fact finding approaches ignore this and depend mostly
on Bayesian inference models.
3.1.2 Reputation Management
In heterogeneous environments where data may originate from a variety of sources,
it is important to assess their reputation. This is particularly interesting in sensor net-
works where sensors can be seen as independent agents that provide measurements to a
collection authority (centralized approach) or that form mesh networks and share mea-
surements as well as information about them with each other (distributed approach).
With the growing number of user generated content such as reviews on shopping web-
sites or collaborative radiation measurements using smartphones, effective reputation
and by extension trustworthiness management becomes a necessary component in the
knowledge derivation process.
A survey by Challa and Momani [26] describes a variety of approaches to managing
trust and reputation in different domains. We want to analyze two topics, security and
trust approaches, discussed in the survey in more detail. First, across all domains the
need for security is apparent. This includes secure communication protocols as well as
encryption to protect data. However, security always comes with a cost and in var-
ious environments, especially resource constrained ones, it is difficult to balance the
performance and security needs of applications. Furthermore, security techniques can
not change the fact that data may be inaccurate to begin with due to objective chal-
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lenges (e.g., environmental factors, calibration issues, time variance, etc.) and subjective
challenges (malicious sensor nodes, fabrication of data, impersonation, etc.). Thus, it
becomes necessary to build trust management techniques to deal with and efficiently
handle different trust, reputation, and opinion issues.
Second, Challa and Momani [26] present an overview of the various methodologies
used in the trust management approaches such as weighting, probabilities, Bayesian
networks, game theory, and graph theory. In fact, there exist different approaches for
trust management in a single domain such as sensor networks [54, 71, 80, 102] as well
as there are some approaches that span multiple domains [20, 89]. The problem is that
proper evaluation and comparison becomes difficult because techniques and methodolo-
gies often utilize custom and domain specific data structures as well as protocols that
are hard to adjust.
However, the evolution from basic approaches using linkage of data nodes (see
PageRank [20], HITS [89]) to more advanced ones in peer-to-peer networks (see Eigen-
Trust [85], PowerTrust [187]) has led to a variety of trust management approaches that
have been adapted to other, related domains, e.g., TrustRank [67] for websites, combat-
ing spam in Twitter [98], and secure code execution using commodity computers [122].
In order to improve this process our framework provides a formalization to model trust,
reputation, and opinion techniques as will be confirmed through the implementation of
three real-world scenarios.
3.1.3 Data Lineage
During any kind of data analysis or decision processes, we often encounter the fol-
lowing. We identified “good” data (i.e., accurate, recent, trustworthy, etc.) and may
assume that the source must have been “good” as well. Likewise, we may have found
data points that seem to be “bad” (i.e., high variance, old, not trustworthy, etc.) and
would like to utilize their sources less. In addition, we face the problem that incorpo-
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rating “bad” data into our decision is usually worse than missing some of the “good”
data.
Therefore, it is important to track the origin of data. While this is usually not a
problem in the early stages of data analysis, as the amount of data and the relationships
that are formed grows this becomes increasingly difficult [36, 152]. As such, we need
to enable the ability to trace individual data points at any stage of the knowledge
derivation process which in literature is referred to as providing data lineage.
This means that we need to attach tracing information which includes how data
is utilized throughout the entire knowledge derivation process, from the moment we
capture data through various forms of processing and ultimately to decisions. It is
particularly useful in cases where we have multiple conflicting data points where tracing
information could be essential and help us resolve these conflicts through weighting. The
problem that needs to be addressed is that by the time we perform decision processes
the data has often been preprocessed, transformed or aggregated [36].
An overview of data lineage research is provided by Simmhan et al. [152]. The au-
thors identified several areas of further research. In particular, tracing information is
usually added to data management systems instead of being an integral part of them.
Furthermore, many of the aspects of the data lineage systems discussed such as gran-
ularity, lineage representation, and scalability are domain specific. There is a need for
systems that are flexible enough to be applicable across domains, provide varying levels
of granularity, and store tracing information in a common, well-defined form. While
there has been research in terms of integrating uncertainty into databases and their
query systems [16, 36, 146] our framework provides a general approach that is applica-
ble across domains.
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3.2 Data Modeling, Integration, and Fusion
Data representation and subsequent processing needs to be flexible and extensible.
In order to achieve these goals we need to address formalization which provides the
ability to model different approaches within and across domains, trust and relationship
models that need to be fully integrated into data processing, and metrics that enable
us to evaluate and compare existing and future processes.
3.2.1 Formalization
Various formal approaches have been proposed to overcome problems with managing
heterogeneous data in dynamic (time and location variant) environments. Specifically,
“Protocol Buffers” [60] and “Thrift” [154] allow data to be structured and efficiently
serialized while generating custom interfaces for several programming languages. Still,
the primary goal of these approaches is to provide flexible data structures for specific
application scenarios. As such their use for describing large scale evolving environments
is limited.
The problem of describing data from a variety of sources and combining it is par-
tially addressed by the “Dataset Publishing Language” [62]. However, only one source
format (comma separated value text file) is specified. A more flexible approach is the
“Data Format Description Language” [135] which allows data formats to be formally
described. This formal description works well for structured data but is problematic
for unstructured data such as text. Furthermore, the description of meta information
is often limited and there is no formal approach that defines relationships between data
elements. However, as discussed above, meta information and relationships are impor-
tant for assessing trustworthiness and quality of data. They need to be incorporated
into any formal framework from the beginning instead of added later on.
For sensor networks, researchers [32] proposed a replicated dynamic probabilistic
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model approach where data produced at each sensor and data consumed at every data
collector is modeled probabilistically. The problem is that data collected in such a way
will only be bound by the accuracy of the probabilistic models used and hence we lose
the original raw data and the ability to assess its trustworthiness.
A similar approach [64] is performing a distributed regression in which the sensor
nodes model their local regions and together they fit a global function that represents
the sensor data. The authors [64] also point out that sensors which are close to each
other often show similar readings. Since the data collected by each sensor is modeled,
transmission can be reduced to cases where the actual data read exceeds the predicted
data by a certain threshold. Furthermore, each sensor node is able to detect data
outliers easily because of its local model. Guestrin et al. [64] also point out that in their
modeling approach a single sensor node actually stores the regression coefficients not
just for itself but for the entire network.
The basic problem with these modeling approaches is that the data is only approx-
imated and that adaptive data modeling is necessary [64] to deal with natural changes
in the environment. However, correctly distinguishing between natural model changes
and important events becomes increasingly difficult. Our research provides solutions to
these problems by incorporating exact data and relationships as well as changes over
time and space.
3.2.2 Trust and Relationship Models
The integration of trustworthiness assessments and relationship models into the data
processing component of knowledge derivation is essential. However, there is often a
balance that needs to be found between attaching meta information in order to enable
trust assessments and the need for high performance processing.
Gupta and Han [65] have identified the following trust analysis research problems
and while some of them have been addressed by others [31, 54, 63] we will discuss how
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our framework addresses important ones that remain [129, 176]. Non-cooperative data
sources may or may not provide the useful and trustworthy data that we are looking
for [74, 166] and some data sources provide better trust and relationship assessment
information about one class of data than others (cluster-based fact finding). Further-
more, a piece of data is usually associated with multiple trust and quality assessments
(consensus learning [55]) and individual assessments are often related to multiple data
pieces (generalization of facts).
Our framework identifies these relationships as complex but also extremely valuable
for trust analysis and incorporates them into the knowledge extraction component of
the framework. Note that, in order to reduce the increased complexity that comes with
heterogeneous relationships some approaches have focused on transforming heteroge-
neous information networks back into homogeneous networks [8, 183]. However, the
two techniques that are generally used have several problems. First, one could deter-
mine common attributes that every data pieces contains and only use them thus cutting
off information that is potentially valuable (intersection approach). Second, data ele-
ments could be extended to include other attributes even if they do not have values
for them which leads to both performance and complexity issues (union approach).
Since our framework is capable of dealing with heterogeneous data and relationships
this transformation is unnecessary thereby eliminating the problems that come with the
intersection and union approaches as will be confirmed through the implementation of
the TrustKnowOne framework.
The assessment of trust relationships is necessary in several areas such as sensor
networks [63], intrusion detection [54], and data mining [65]. Several research problems
have been stated in surveys [63, 65] which include assessing the correctness of informa-
tion and trustworthiness of data sources. However, one of the most prevalent issues that
arises in existing approaches is that there is no formal approach to specifying trust and
relationship models such that they can be compared and evaluated. Our framework
presents an approach that allows this formalization through the definition of metrics
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using expressions that are evaluated on standardized graph components. Specifically,
we provide means to implement algorithms that embody belief engines [124, 127] and
decision processes [134, 153].
3.2.3 Metrics
In order to evaluate and compare approaches we have different options. The most
commonly used one is to evaluate data processing, trust techniques, and decision en-
gines based on common data sets. However, there are several issues with this. First
and foremost, evaluating on common data sets and comparing the performance of re-
sults treats evaluation as black-box testing. Thus, the impact of specific components
such as trust approaches or decision engines cannot be determined. Furthermore, this
option is highly sensitive to implementation, data structures, and the combination of
trustworthiness techniques with decision processes.
As such, it is better to integrate mechanisms to evaluate individual components
separately. This can be seen as white-box testing where performance and complexity
metrics are intrinsic. Our framework implements this approach for various reasons.
First, it enables the evaluation of various trust assessment and relationship models (i.e.,
belief engines) as well as decision processes (i.e., decision engines) separately. Second,
specific combinations of belief engines with decision engines can be compared with each
other which overcomes one of the biggest problems seen in literature where the results
of good trust algorithms are decreased by bad decision engines. Likewise, this allows
us to identify bad belief engines whose results are skewed by good decision processes.
Therefore, implementing measurable aspects into data processing needs to be seen as an
integral part of the entire knowledge derivation process as it enables the performance
evaluation and comparison of different approaches effectively.
In addition, one of the main problems remains the variety of metrics for trust anal-
ysis. For instance, the most commonly used terms trustworthiness, reputation and
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opinion are often defined similarly yet utilized differently in literature [30, 31, 54, 63,
88, 114, 122]. Furthermore, researchers introduce additional complexity by breaking
down terms [23, 52] such as credibility into reputed credibility, surface credibility and
expected credibility. The same complexity issues exist for factors like context, popular-
ity, direct experience and others [58] that influence these trust metrics. How we define
all of these not just by using a textual description but actual data relationships is not
addressed in literature. Therefore, our proposed approach provides a formalized and
data-driven framework for defining trust metrics, how factors affect trust metrics, as
well as the computation of trust metrics.
3.3 Large-scale Data Processing
In general, there are two distinct data processing areas that are related to the re-
search performed in this dissertation: big data which deals with large-scale data pro-
cessing and analysis, and graph frameworks which model processing of data as directed
or undirected graphs. Only recently systems such as GraphLab [104] and Pregel [107]
have been proposed to combine these two areas, that is systems intended to perform
efficient large-scale graph processing in distributed environments. However, with re-
spect to our approach of integrating trust and quality assessments into the knowledge
derivation process, these systems often do not consider relationships, meta information,
and trustworthiness assessments. A third research area deals with the need for flexible
yet efficient large-scale query systems in order to determine relevant data, describe how
it should be processed, and provide mechanisms for evaluation.
3.3.1 Big Data
The area of “big data” refers to both distributed and cloud computing. In particular,
it aims to address several problems that are inherent in trying to derive knowledge from
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large amounts of data. These problems span across a multitude of areas and as such
often require complex solutions such as distributed file storage and bandwidth-efficient
data query systems that are not necessary for smaller data sets.
There are several systems that focus on highly scalable, distributed computing such
as Hadoop [169, 178] and Dryad [76] using various approaches. Hadoop is actually a
collection of several research areas (e.g., distributed file storage, job scheduling, etc.)
that provide an implementation of the MapReduce paradigm [37–39]. The basic idea is
that complex tasks are broken down into sub-tasks with each one mapped in form of key-
value pairs. These mappings can be hierarchical, non-hierarchical, and nested. A list of
these sub-tasks are then reduced with the results being associated with the respective
key. The advantage is that computations can easily be distributed and performed in
parallel. A detailed comparison of MapReduce to parallel database systems is also
provided by Pavlo et al. [123].
Dryad [76] takes a different approach and provides a distributed execution engine
that defines data flows where nodes represent computational processes and egdes com-
munication channels. It automatically deals with the scheduling of tasks in dynamic en-
vironments where resources may become available, unavailable or fail. Similar research
includes Orleans [22] which models computation in terms of distributed components.
While the described systems provide excellent approaches to dealing with large-scale
data processing, they do not integrate trustworthiness approaches and have problems
modeling graph structures and complex data dependencies. Note that this is primarily
because of the focus on scalability and performance. However, while our framework
emphasizes scalability to handle “big data”, it also focuses on aspects of flexibility,
extensibility, and reusability in order to provide mechanisms for trustworthiness and
quality of data assessments as well as decision processes.
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3.3.2 Graph Frameworks
There are various techniques for graph model processing, but all have their limi-
tations [25]. Pregel [107] represents a computational model that is based on message
passing between nodes of a graph. The focus is on sparse graphs and single types
of nodes. Therefore the approach is unsuited for trustworthiness assessments in het-
erogeneous environments that involve meta information and relationships. DEX [109]
describes an approach where data from multiple sources is incorporated into a graph
database querying system, but it does not address distributed processing.
Frameworks that focus on machine learning include GraphLab [104], Distributed
GraphLab [105], and Orleans [22]. In general, their approach is to provide abstrac-
tion layers for algorithms such that distributed processing, parallelism, and scheduling
are taken care of by the respective frameworks. Approaches such as Pegasus [86] and
SCOAL [40] exploit context knowledge (e.g., many graph mining algorithms can be
expressed as matrix multiplications) but are not flexible enough for applications across
different domains. Others are limited to a subset of machine learning areas such as the
correlation of time-stamped events [174] or provide custom implementations for paral-
lel data analysis (Green-Marl [70]). In general, these frameworks often do not address
scenarios with dynamic graphs as there is no easy way to add new data sources, extend
the graph model, or change computational processes.
There have also been extensions built on top of existing large-scale processing frame-
works such as Hadoop. In particular, Mahout [121] and GBASE [87] aim to provide
flexible and generic graph processing approaches. However, using Hadoop as a basis
makes it difficult to overcome its limitation when dealing with heterogeneous data, a
large number of interdependencies, and dynamic graphs. Furthermore, many of the
present graph frameworks focus on dealing with algorithms in homogeneous environ-
ments that can be easily scaled using large-scale processing approaches such as Hadoop
and parallel database systems. The implementation of complex graphical models like
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Bayesian networks [69, 157, 165], Markov models [4, 100, 130], and factor graphs [2, 92]
as well as probabilistic reasoning in graphs [44, 124, 179] remains problematic if the
underlying processing model (e.g., Hadoop) cannot be adapted or exchanged. Our
framework provides extensive flexibility in terms of enabling different input, output,
storage, and processing paradigms.
3.3.3 Query Systems
Efficient query systems are important when it comes to analyzing large amounts of
data. In general the focus is on performance and expressiveness. A number of higher
level query languages exist that run on top of Hadoop [169]. In particular, Pig Latin
[118, 172] is a domain specific language for performing queries in Hadoop. Extensions
have been developed to perform predictive analysis on Twitter [103]. The approach
here is to provide a higher level of abstraction than writing code but more control
than declarative languages such as SQL. However, Hive [170, 173] provides this exact
functionality where SQL-like queries are compiled into MapReduce instructions.
In similar fashion, several higher level query languages such as DryadLINQ [186] and
SCOPE [24] which use a SQL-like syntax have been developed for Dryad [76]. Note that
other frameworks have proposed integrated solutions (see Green-Marl [70]). However,
unless we choose the same underlying large-scale data processing framework some of
the query systems are not available. In addition, none of these existing query systems
supports any notion of trustworthiness and relationship assessment. As discussed be-
fore there is also no clear distinction between algorithmic modeling in terms of data
processing (i.e., belief engines) and decision processes.
Our approach provides a flexible and scalable query system by modeling queries,
data processing, and decision processes as graph expressions. These graph expressions
utilize relationships (i.e., mathematical, logical, etc.) between data elements that are
clearly defined as will be discussed in chapter 4. This formalizes the overall knowl-
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edge derivation process and in particular enables evaluation and comparison of different
methodologies. Furthermore, our framework allows these formalizations to be described
in a variety of ways. (e.g., low-level application programming interface (API), extensible
markup language (XML)).
3.4 Chapter Summary
The contribution of this effort is related to a variety of research areas. Here we fo-
cused our discussion on the most relevant ones. First, the main premise of our framework
is to incorporate trust assessments and management into the knowledge derivation pro-
cess. As such, a large part of the effort is related to extending fact finding approaches to
include properties like high accuracy, recency, and usefulness. This is not a trivial task
and becomes even more complex when considering that we need to factor in reputation
management which deals with assessing relationship and data context. Additionally, in
order to provide full transparency we also need to make sure that all components of
our framework fully incorporate data lineage. This means keeping track of where data
comes from and how it is processed.
Second, our framework focuses on flexibility rather than performance to be ap-
plicable to as many application scenarios as possible. Furthermore, we overcome the
common problem in literature of being unable to properly evaluate and compare dif-
ferent approaches through the formalization of trust and relationship models as well as
metrics. Our framework utilizes an abstract graph model on which graph expressions
are evaluated. Approaches for trust, reputation, and opinion (i.e., belief engines) will
be modeled using these expressions. Decision processes such as weighting schemes and
Bayesian inference (i.e., decision engines) are described in similar fashion.
Third, scalability as well as extensibility are becoming more and more important
in the era of large-scale data processing. Therefore, we need to make sure that our
framework meets these requirements to be able to deal with big data problems. In order
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to address this our framework uses a flexible, abstract graph model which allows it to
express complex heterogeneous data and their relationships. This leads us to relate our
approach to various other graph frameworks where data processing is modeled using
directed or undirected graphs. However, one of the biggest problems that often remains
is the ability to provide an scalable and expressive query systems.
This chapter discussed several approaches discussed in related literature. In partic-
ular, it highlighted some of their shortcomings. The main benefit of the TrustKnowOne
framework is that trustworthiness and relationship assessments are directly incorpo-
rated into a flexible and scalable knowledge derivation process. An in-depth evaluation
of our framework and a comparison to existing approaches described here is performed
in chapter 8.
27
4
Berlin - An Abstract Graph
Model for Knowledge Processing
Using Graph Expressions
The foundation of the framework developed here is Berlin, an abstract graph model
on which processing and inference is performed. There are several reasons for using an
abstract graph model. First, describing data in a uniform and standardized manner
allows for a systematic and clear approach to processing. Second, all processing, infer-
ence and decision making can be made using graph operations. Third, dynamic data is
managed simply by the addition or removal of nodes and edges.
We define our graph model as follows. A basic description of a piece of data and
its attributes is an element. A particular element with attribute values is an element
node. Each element node consists of multiple element instances which are timestamped.
In order to be able to deal with dynamic graphs, each piece of information needs to
be associated with a particular time instance. This allows for ordering of values in
time series data. We have several options for achieving this. First, we can designate
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a particular data attribute to be the time instance. Second, if there is no such data
attribute, we can choose the time of import into the graph model as the time instance.
Third, we can specify a certain time independently.
Because element instances may contain only values for specific attributes, an element
node can be seen as a sparse matrix that contains attribute values ordered by time where
values that do not change do not need to be stored. Furthermore, every element node
is uniquely identifiable through an identifier which may be an attribute of the element
node or explicitly assigned. This solves the problem of having to check the entire graph
whenever new information is added.
The connection between two elements is described through a relation which can
be defined implicitly or explicitly and may contain attributes, e.g., weights or location
information. A relation edge connects two element nodes and contains timestamped
relation instances in a similar manner to element instances.
As such, our framework deals with two types of graphs. The element description
graph keeps track of the basic descriptions of elements and relations as well as implicit
meta information (i.e., basic metrics and dimension models). The element instance
graph contains the actual element nodes and relation edges with all their values and
instances.
In order to incorporate local trust aspects for attribute values such as deteriorating
sensor accuracy over time, our approach associates dimension models with individual
attributes. These dimension models express confidence and trust assessments for at-
tributes in a probabilistic or deterministic manner. As such, we evaluate how, among
other dimensions, time and location can affect values in the abstract graph model.
Belief engines representing trust and quality of data assessments as well as deci-
sion processes are implemented using graph expressions. These expressions range from
straightforward mathematical computations to complex relationship-based techniques
and can be combined hierarchically to make them flexible and extensible.
In the following sections, we will discuss the use of all of these graph abstractions
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in more detail.
4.1 Graph Components
In this section, we will describe the basic components of our abstract graph model
Berlin. Specifically, we extend basic graph theoretical approaches in order to incorporate
the ability to model trust and relationship assessments.
4.1.1 Elements
name type attributes
name
id
Figure 4.1: An element description which includes a uniquely identifiable
name, an id reference, and a list of attributes and their types
Elements represent descriptions of the basic pieces of information that inference is
made upon. They can be thought of as different types or classes defining element node
objects. This means that we are able to deal with heterogeneous data fusion applications,
overcoming limitations of other homogeneous graph models that only consider one type
of node. Each element as shown in figure 4.1 is uniquely identifiable by its name and
contains an id reference and definitions of its attributes in the form of name-type pairs.
Definition 4.1 Attribute
We define an attribute as
a = {name, type, {ϕ1 . . . ϕn}}
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where name is the name of the attribute, type the class of possible at-
tribute values and {ϕ1 . . . ϕn} an optional set of dimension models de-
scribing the attribute’s value range, distribution, and constraints.
Our framework provides a flexible type system for these attributes in which a set of
common well-known types is provided but can be easily be extended by custom defini-
tions. Furthermore, we are able to attach time, location, and value dimension models
to attributes. These can be used by the belief engines to determine trustworthiness and
quality aspects of attribute values. Hence, we can formally define an element as follows.
Definition 4.2 Element
Let A = {ai, . . . , an|ai.name 6= aj .name ∀a ∈ A} be a set of attributes
then an element is defined as
E = {name, ID,A}
where ID is a function which is able to uniquely identify element nodes
derived from the element E.
Note that we need to specify how individual element nodes derived from an ele-
ment are identified. The reason is that meta data and additional information has to be
correctly correlated throughout the knowledge derivation process. This is especially im-
portant for handling dynamic graphs in our framework where we need to check whether
nodes that are being added already exist in the graph. Note that we provide several
options for performing this identification. It can be done explicitly through a serial id
that is assigned to each new element node or implicitly by having one or a combination
of attributes represent its identity.
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4.1.2 Element Nodes
name
@1
@2
attributes
id
@t
Figure 4.2: An element node consisting of a specified id reference and
timestamped attribute value instances
Particular objects in our graph model that contain data values are element nodes.
As shown in figure 4.2 they contain a sparse table of attribute values where each row is
an element instance that is identified by a particular time instance.
Definition 4.3 Attribute-value pair
Let a be an attribute and value the specified value for the attribute, then
their attribute-value pair is defined as:
av = a ∪ {value} = {name, type, {ϕ1 . . . ϕn}, value}
As we incorporate more information over time the table will grow. However, note
that we only need to store information that changes from one instance to another thus
saving space and inherently making the table sparse.
This sparse table approach has several advantages over creating new nodes for every
element instance. First, it makes time series analysis straightforwards as we keep related
information close together. Second, space complexity is reduced since values that do
not change do not require additional storage space. Third, we do not have to perform
any additional graph operations in order to perform time series analysis and correlation.
Furthermore, it simplifies the management of the abstract graph model since it keeps
the number of nodes and edges in a dynamic graph low (compared to a graph containing
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separate nodes for each element instance).
Note that, element instances may contain additional “non-descriptive” (not previ-
ously described) attributes such as derived information for which values can be added
on-the-fly. This gives our approach more flexibility and leaves room for enhancements
to the graph model in later stages.
Definition 4.4 Non-descriptive attribute-value pair
A “non-descriptive” attribute-value pair is a attribute-value pair without
a specified type and dimension models
av′ = {name, value}
We can combine the previously defined and the “non-descriptive” attribute-value
pairs to define an element instance.
Definition 4.5 Element instance
Let av be a particular attribute-value pair, e.A the set of attributes for
the element node e, and av′ an additional “non-descriptive” attribute of
the element instance, then an element instance is a collection of attribute
values at a specific time instance t defined as
et = {{av1 . . . avn|av ∈ e.A}, {av′1 . . . av′m}}
The collection of element instances makes up the sparse table of attribute values.
Definition 4.6 Element instance collection
The collection of element instances can be defined as
ei = {e1 . . . eT }
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where ei(t) = et acts as a mapping function from a time instance t to the
specific element instance et. Furthermore, we define the ordered set of
time instances eit as follows
eit = {t0 . . . tT |ti < ti+1}
Note that element nodes are derived from element descriptions. Thus they contain all
possible attributes specified in the respective element and the mandatory id follows from
the description as well (i.e., can be explicit or inferred attribute reference, combination
of attributes, auto generated).
Definition 4.7 Element node
Let E be a particular element, then an element node can be defined as
e = E ∪ {id, ei} = {name, ID,A, id, ei}
where id = ID(ei) is the result of the identification function applied
to all attribute values since the specific identifier of the element node is
either attribute based or explicitly defined and ei the collection of element
instances.
4.1.3 Relations
Two elements are connected if there exists a relation consisting of a defined source
and target element between them as shown in figure 4.3. Because elements may share
more than one relation it is necessary to group or organize them by defining unique
names. Furthermore, we are able to describe more complex relations by attaching
metrics to them. Formally, a relation is:
Definition 4.8 Relation
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source
attributes
target
name
name type
metric
Figure 4.3: A relation which is defined by a unique name, information
about the two elements that it connects, and a list of attributes and their
types. This may include an optional metric determining existence of the
relation.
Given the set of all element descriptions Ê = {E1 . . . EI} let S, T ∈ Ê be
source and target element definitions, A a set of attributes, and M an
optional metric, then a relation is defined as
R = {name, S, T,A,M}
In the case where we specify a relation without defining a metric, the derived relation
edges will always exist. In case there is a metric, a relation edge exists only if the metric
evaluates to true and does not exist if it evaluates to false.
Definition 4.9 Relation existence
The relation R always exists if the metric M does not exist since it rep-
resents an optional qualifier of existence for each relation. If a metric M
is specified, then the relation only exists if the application of the metric
to the relation, noted as M(R), yields true.
However, when we describe relations in the knowledge extraction phase of the frame-
work we need to take the following into consideration. Since there is no additional or
meta information available yet, we can define only basic relationships such as equality
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comparisons between attributes (e.g., same owner, same sensor type).
In the knowledge processing stage we have more information available. Therefore,
we can establish two additional types of relationships. First, there are explicit relations
that are defined based on context and meta information (e.g., temperature ranges,
rankings). Second, implicit relations can be derived during knowledge processing by
analyzing the data in the graph model using belief engines. For example, relationships
between element attributes may be discovered using correlation techniques [79, 127, 130].
4.1.4 Relation Edges
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metric
Figure 4.4: A relation edge consisting of a name, the element nodes it
connects which are identifiable by their type, and timestamped attribute
value instances. An optional metric may be attached to allow more complex
relationships to be defined.
Particular instances of relations are relation edges which describe the relationship
between two element nodes. As shown in figure 4.4 the source and the target element
nodes are specified by their id. Note that these element nodes are only valid if the
element type is the same as specified by the relation. Since relations have unique names
this allows us to easily group element node neighbors by “type” (similar, same owner,
etc.) based on the name of a relation. A relation edge also maintains attributes in the
form of a sparse table where each time instance refers to a specific relation instance.
This is similar to the way attribute values are stored in element instances which means
that the relation instances may contain additional “non-descriptive” attributes as well.
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Definition 4.10 Relation instance
Let av be a particular attribute-value pair, r.A the set of attributes for
the relation edge r, and av′ an additional “non-descriptive” attribute of
the relation instance, then an relation instance is a collection of attribute
values at a specific time instance t defined as
rt = {{av1 . . . avn|av ∈ r.A}, {av′1 . . . av′m}}
Thus, the sparse table of attribute values becomes
Definition 4.11 Relation instance collection
The collection of relation instances can be defined as
ri = {r1 . . . rT }
where ri(t) = rt acts as a mapping function from a time instance t to the
specific relation instance rt. Furthermore, we define the ordered set of
time instances rit as follows
rit = {t0 . . . tT |ti < ti+1}
The collection of relation instances makes up the relation edge. As such, it is derived
from the formal definition of a relation.
Definition 4.12 Relation edge
Let R be a particular relation, then a relation edge can be defined as
r = R ∪ {s, t, ri} = {name, S, T,A,M, s, t, ri}
where s and t are element nodes matching element descriptions S and T
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respectively and ri the collection of relation instances.
Because of the ability to model dynamic graphs we need to realize that a metric
specifying a particular relationship may yield true for some relation instances and
false for others. In our approach, we keep track of these time and location variant
relationships.
Definition 4.13 Relation edge existence
Let ri be the collection of relation instances for the relation edge r and
M(rt) the result of the metric M applied to the relation edge at time t
then we say that in general the relation edge exists if
∃rt ∈ ri|M(rt) = true
We can utilize this notion of a relationship to allow belief engines to infer properties
such as strength and connectivity in dynamic graphs where relationships may change
over time.
Definition 4.14 Relation edge strength
Let ri be the collection of relation instances for the relation edge r and
M(rt) the result of the metric M applied to the relation edge at time t
then the strength of the relation edge is defined as
rstrength =
|{rt|rt ∈ ri,M(rt) = true}|
|ri|
In general, we model relationships as edges between two element nodes. This ap-
proach balances the need for relationship detail with efficient computation and modeling
aspects. In particular, by using this approach we are able to incorporate the follow-
ing detailed relationships that would otherwise require more complex solutions (see
figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Relationship types that can be inherently modeled using ele-
ment node to element node definitions.
Element node - element node Two element nodes are related (as connected by a
relation edge) by some definition that incorporates their element types and attribute
values as well as potentially other relations (figure 4.5a). This is the most general type
of relationship and can, for example, be used to determine that two sensors tend to
have similar temperature readings by defining a metric that incorporates both tem-
perature attributes and a specific range (an example of such a metric is discussed in
expression 4.9).
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Attribute - element node A particular attribute of an element node can be related
to another element node (figure 4.5b). For example, if ownership of a sensor is modeled
as an attribute of a sensor element then we could define a relationship “same owner”
between sensors with the same ownership attribute value. Note that this aspect can be
modeled on an element node to element node basis using a metric that determines if the
ownership attributes are the same.
Attribute - attribute Correlations between two attributes are often of interest (fig-
ure 4.5c). In the case of a sensor, we may be interested to know if there is a relationship
between a sensor’s location and radiation level measurements. Furthermore, attributes
of two different elements, e.g., different sensor types (one measures only temperature
and the other measures only rainfall) can be correlated as well. By using the element
node to element node approach we are able to determine these relationships by defining
metrics that incorporate attribute values from a variety of element nodes at different
levels of detail.
Value - value A specific value may be the result of a sequence of circumstances
(figure 4.5d) such as when sensors tasked with the monitoring of cargo can cause an
event chain of alerts. In this case, it is important to be able to model data provenance
(lineage) which, in our abstract graph model, can be achieved using metrics that take
into consideration attribute values across time instances.
The key here is that inference is primarily made on the element nodes and that
particular relationships types such as attribute - element node, attribute - attribute and
value - value can be seen as describing certain aspects of relationships between element
nodes. Doing so decreases the complexity of the abstract graph model while maintaining
the ability to model complex relationships between various pieces of diverse data.
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4.2 Graph Types
As part of our framework we distinguish between two types of graphs. On the
one hand, the element description graph represents a blueprint of all the elements and
relations that need to be modeled for a specific application scenario. On the other hand,
the element instance graph contains the actual element nodes and relation edges with
their respective data. Note that while both types of graphs can be dynamic, usually only
the element instance graph encounters changes in values, element nodes, and relation
edges.
4.2.1 Element Description Graph
The first step in our framework is the formal description of elements and their
relations that make up the abstract graph model. This information is stored in the
element description graph.
Definition 4.15 Element description graph
Let E be an element, R a relation, M a metric, and Φ a dimension model
then the element description graph is defined as
EDG = {{E1 . . . EI}, {R1 . . . RJ}, {M1 . . .MK}, {Φ1 . . .ΦL}}
4.2.2 Element Instance Graph
Particular values and graph element instances are stored in the element instance
graph. This graph can be augmented and extended as more information becomes avail-
able and is incorporated into the knowledge derivation process.
Definition 4.16 Element instance graph
Let e be an element node, r a relation edge, m a metric instance, and ϕ
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a dimension model instance then the element instance graph is
eig = {{e1 . . . ei}, {r1 . . . rj}, {m1 . . .mk}, {ϕ1 . . . ϕl}}
This element instance graph is fully dynamic where every data value is timestamped
as described earlier.
4.2.3 Graph Transformations
While the topic of graph transformations has been extensively covered by [6, 91, 164],
we briefly discuss one possible approach using our framework here. In particular, a
transformation consists of two main parts, a pattern and a replacement. We can utilize
a set of metrics to determine if a certain part of the graph matches a particular pattern.
Furthermore, since metrics are expressions describing information in a graph we can
apply them to the matched pattern forming a respective replacement sub-graph.
Definition 4.17 Graph transformation
Given the set of all metrics M̂ = {M1 . . .MK} let P,RE ∈ M̂ be a pattern
and replacement then a transformation can be defined as
T = {P,R}
Note that because metrics can be nested we can essentially replace a pattern with
multiple replacements as well, which means that we can apply a transformation as
follows.
Definition 4.18 Graph transformation application
Let P = {M1 . . .Mn} be a pattern consisting of a set of metrics then a
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particular subgraph G matches the pattern if
P (G) = M1(G) ∧ · · · ∧Mn(G) = true
Let RE = {M1 . . .Mm} be a replacement consisting of a set of metrics
such that
RE(G) = {M1(G), . . . ,Mm(G)|M ∈ RE}
then the transformation T = {P,RE} is applied to the subgraph G as
T (G) =

RE(G) if P (G) = true
G if P (G) = false
In the following, we discuss two possible applications of graph transformations in
our framework.
Elements of Interest Note that while all relevant elements are stored in the element
description graph, instead of considering all elements and relations in a graph for infer-
ence purposes, we may choose to select a subset within a domain or application scenario.
This can be achieved by designating elements of interest and using graph transforma-
tions to convert attributes to elements as well as to fold elements that are not of interest
into attributes. In particular, additional data not of interest to the application can be
treated as an attribute of an element. For example, if we are interested in sensor values
but not ownership, we may relegate owner to be an attribute of the element sensor as
shown in figure 4.6. In addition, if elements have been “reorganized” into elements of
interest, the element instance graph will reflect this as well.
Element Nodes of Interest Furthermore, other subgraphs that can be extracted
by similar graph transformations include time specific graphs (by slicing across groups
of particular instances with a specific time instance) and hierarchical graphs (logical or
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Figure 4.6: An example of defining “sensors” as elements of interest and
relegating “owner” elements to attributes using a graph transformation.
physical groupings of element nodes).
4.3 Dimension Models
As discussed above, attributes can be associated with a set of dimension models
describing the attribute’s value range, distribution, and constraints. The purpose of
dimension models is to provide belief engines with information to assess trustworthiness
and data quality on a “local” attribute level. They may be probabilistic (e.g., values
following certain distributions) or deterministic (e.g., at a specific times of the day the
location is “office” and otherwise “home” or “in transit”) as well as time and location
variant. This allows us to model applications where the meaning of values is different
depending on some dimension.
There exist a variety of dimensions such as time, location, and other attribute values
that could affect the trustworthiness assessment of an individual attribute. For instance,
we can assess slowly degrading sensors where the accuracy of measurements taken is
reduced over time dynamically. Within a dimension, we describe particular instances
as contexts, e.g., specific dates for time dimensions and places for location dimensions.
This approach has the advantage that we do not have to rely on static error models.
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Here, we discuss the definition of a dimension model.
Definition 4.19 Dimension model
Let θ be a specific context within a dimension Θ then a dimension model
is defined as the mapping function
Φ(value|θ) = ϑ
where the value ϑ is derived for the specific attribute value given the
context θ.
In general, we can categorize dimension models into the following types. First,
consider cases where the context is drawn from a finite set of contexts (e.g., specific
locations, sensor types, owners).
Definition 4.20 Discrete dimension model
Let Θ be the set of contexts θ within a dimension defined as
Θ = {θ1 . . . θd}
then we can define the mapping functions ϕ
ϕi(value|θi) = ϑ
where the value ϑ is derived for the attribute value given the specific
context θi. One option is to define a discrete dimension model Φdiscrete
as the set of such mapping functions and a default function ϕ(value) = ϑ
which does not require any context
Φ = {{ϕ1 . . . ϕl}, ϕ}
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such that its application to a particular attribute value is defined as
Φdiscrete(value|θ) =

ϕi(value|θ = θi) if θ ∈ Θ
ϕ(value) otherwise
The other options is to specify a discrete mapping function ϕ in the form
of
ϕ(value|θ) = ϑ
where the value ϑ is derived for the specific attribute value given the
discrete context variable θ. The discrete dimension model Φdiscrete in
this case is
Φdiscrete(value|θ) = ϕ(value|θ)
Second, there are models such as range constraints that are independent of the
context. Our approach is to treat this as a special case of the discrete dimension model.
Definition 4.21 Static dimension model
The special case of a dimension model for an attribute value that does not
depend on any particular context θ concerns a single mapping function.
Thus, given the general definition of a discrete dimension model Φdiscrete
we only need to specify the default function ϕ such that
Φstatic(value) = ϕ(value)
Third, instead of specifying a discrete set of contexts, we can define a continuous
model for all context values. There are two options for doing so. On the one hand, we
can extend the discrete dimension model to include an interpolation (i.e., smoothing or
regression) function which allows us to derive values in between contexts. On the other
hand we can simply ignore discrete contexts and define a specific mapping function that
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incorporates all contexts.
Definition 4.22 Continuous dimension model
Given a discrete dimension model Φdiscrete we need to carefully define the
range of contexts Θ. We require that the set of contexts Θ be ordered
in the manner θi < θi+1. This aspect allows us to interpolate between
different contexts for which we require an additional parameter Ξ, the
interpolation (i.e., smoothing or regression) function. Furthermore, the
first element θ1 and the last element θd represent boundaries for the range
of the continuous dimension model, i.e., [θ1, θd]. A such, a continuous
dimension model can then be defined as
Φcontinuous(value|θ) =

Ξ(value|θ) if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θd
ϕ(value) otherwise
If we choose not to base our continuous dimension model off a discrete
dimension model then we must define the mapping function ϕ in the form
of
ϕ(value|θ) = ϑ
where the value ϑ is derived for the specific attribute value given the con-
tinuous context variable θ. The continuous dimension model Φcontinuous
is then defined as
Φcontinuous(value|θ) = ϕ(value|θ)
In the following, we focus our discussion on some of the major dimensions and
provide example dimension models accordingly. Note that since the static dimension
models are independent of the particular context we provide a separate example here.
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Figure 4.7: The confidence in a temperature measurement based on a
specified range of valid temperatures, i.e., Tmin = 20 and Tmax = 90
Static Constraint This reflects the most general case where trustworthiness aspects
are “local” but do not change over time and are not dependent on other context. An
example would be to constrain the range of valid temperature measurements as shown
in figure 4.7 which we could define as follows.
Let Tmin be the minimum and Tmax the maximum temperature a particular sensor
is designed for then the confidence (from 0% to 100%) in the temperature range can be
defined in terms of the default function ϕ
ϕ(value) =

0% if value < Tmin
100% if Tmin ≤ value ≤ Tmax
0% if value > Tmax
where value represents a particular attribute value. Note that in this case there is no
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Figure 4.8: The accuracy of a sensor’s measurements based on the number
of days deployed
context θ necessary.
4.3.1 Time
The accuracy and by extension trustworthiness of an attribute value may depend
on the time context at which it is evaluated. Here, we choose as an example a sensor
scenario and describe several use cases for particular time dimension models.
Discrete Time We can model a sensor with slowly degrading accuracy using a dis-
crete dimension model. For example, consider sensors that report temperature values
once a day. Furthermore, let us assume the quality of the sensors is low such that each
day their accuracy decreases by 5%. This means that on the first day accuracy is 100%
and 0% on the 21st day and beyond (figure 4.8).
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Hence, the set of contexts Θ can be defined as the number of days deployed
Θ = {θ1 = 0, θ2 = 1, . . . θ20 = 19}
where the mapping functions ϕ follow the pattern
ϕi(value|θi) = 100%− 5%× θi
accordingly. We then express the default function for the remainder of the days as
ϕ(value) = 0%.
Continuous Time As the number of contexts to be modeled grows it is often a better
approach to choose a continuous dimension model. For example, if we wanted to extend
the simple accuracy model from above to be able to determine accuracy for particular
temperature values gathered throughout a day instead of only daily (figure 4.9).
This would require us to specify a large number of contexts and mapping functions.
Here, we use the continuous dimension model that solves the problem by defining a
mapping function ϕ for a continuous context variable θ
ϕ(value|θ) = max
(
0%, 100%− 5%× θ60× 60× 24
)
where θ represents the time a sensor has been deployed in seconds.
4.3.2 Location
The location of sensors has a direct impact on the accuracy of measurements. For
instance, consider a radiation detection sensor as will be discussed in section 6.2.
Discrete Location In order to be able to compare radiation levels of two sensors
we need to establish common measurement parameters. Safecast [144] (as used in
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Figure 4.9: The accuracy of a sensor’s measurements based on a slowly
degrading continuous function
section 6.2) discusses the problem of inaccuracies based on the height of the sensor
during measurements. In particular, radiation levels are different at various heights.
For instance, Safecast [144] suggests 1m above the ground instead of ground level to
determine radiation levels. Furthermore, there are differences depending on whether
measurements are taken inside or outside of buildings.
Hence, let the set of contexts Θ represent the approximate height in meters at which
the sensor took measurements
Θ = {θ1 = 0m, θ2 = 1m}
then we can define the following mapping functions ϕ to determine accuracy of the
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Figure 4.10: The accuracy of a sensor’s measurements based on the ap-
proximate height in meters
measurements
ϕ1(value|θ1) = 50%
ϕ2(value|θ2) = 100%
accordingly. We then express the default function for other possible heights as ϕ(value) =
25%. The resulting discrete dimension model is shown in figure 4.10
Continuous Location Some sensors are very sensitive to environmental factors.
While many stationary sensors can be calibrated in a way that reduces noise from
these factors, mobile sensors need to continuously adapt. Therefore, the accuracy of
measurements of mobile sensors should carefully evaluated. Here, assume that we are
tracking cargo that is transported by rail (a scenario described in [53, 93, 94]). We could
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Figure 4.11: The accuracy of a sensor’s location based on the estimated
distance from tracks
define a location accuracy assessment by determining how far measurements coordinates
are from train tracks (figure 4.11).
In this case we would employ a continuous dimension model with a context variable
θ representing measurement coordinates such as
ϕ(value|θ) = max (0%, 100%− 1%× distance from tracks in meters)
4.3.3 Value
Dimensions other than time and location can be chosen as well. For example, the
trustworthiness of a particular attribute may depend on other related attributes. In the
following we give some examples for this case.
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Discrete Value There exist various sensor types with a variety of advantages and
disadvantages. Furthermore, sensors are often deployed by different entities for appli-
cation specific scenarios. Here, we want to model the level of confidence we have in a
particular sensor’s measurements based on the owner.
Let Θ represent several potential owners
Θ = {θ1 = government, θ2 = public, θ3 = private}
and define confidence as a set of the following mapping functions ϕ
ϕ1(value|θ1) = 90%
ϕ2(value|θ2) = 50%
ϕ3(value|θ3) = 70%
Furthermore, let the default function for all other owners be ϕ(value) = 50%. The
resulting discrete dimension model represents an example of a deterministic model for
“local” trust assessment.
If we are interested in assessing confidence in temperature measurements and have
other information available such as a basic description of the conditions (e.g., sunny,
cloudy, rainy, snowing), we can express this confidence using a fuzzy approach [15, 126,
141]. As such, we associate every weather condition with a particular temperature range
model (see figure 4.12).
Hence, we could define the context Θ as the set of possible weather conditions
Θ = {θ1 = snowing, θ2 = rainy, θ3 = cloudy, θ4 = sunny}
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Figure 4.12: The confidence in a temperature measurement based on the
observed condition
and the mapping functions ϕ
ϕ1(value|θ1) = Nratio(value|20)
ϕ2(value|θ2) = Nratio(value|40)
ϕ3(value|θ3) = Nratio(value|60)
ϕ4(value|θ4) = Nratio(value|80)
where Nratio(value|µ) is the ratio of probability densities
Nratio(value|µ) =
N(s|µ, 15)
N(µ|µ, 15)
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Figure 4.13: An example of a temperature cycle that can be used to model
temperature confidence using a dimension model
of the Normal distribution defined as
N(x|µ, σ2) = 1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
Continuous Value Context can be very useful in determining trustworthiness. An-
other example would be knowing something about the temperature cycle in a given
region. The measurements of a sensor should roughly reflect a daily pattern such as the
one shown in figure 4.13.
In particular, it should be cooler during the night than it is during the day. Hence
we can compare actual temperature measurements against expected ones in order to
determine confidence. Here, we would use a continuous dimension model with a context
variable θ for the expected temperature during a particular time of day and define a
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continuous mapping function ϕ similar to
ϕ(value|θ) = max (0%, 100%− 1%× difference to expected temperature in degrees)
4.4 Graph Expressions
Given elements, element nodes, relations and relation edges in the abstract graph
model described above, we can perform a variety of computations on them. We call
these computations graph expressions. During the knowledge extraction phase, we do
not have additional meta information which means that graph expressions can only
perform a limited number of actions. However, they can be used to describe relationships
between elements using comparison operations. For example, we are able to define a
graph expression that limits the source and target to be sensor elements and checks
whether both of the owner attributes are the same.
In the knowledge processing phase, we are able to include specific values, context,
dimensions, relationships and external information which allows the graph expressions
to become far more powerful. This means that we are able to specify ranges (e.g.,
temperatures, critical values, etc.) and incorporate time or location specific information
(e.g., trends using time series analysis, no received heartbeat from sensor in 5 mins,
sensor is within 1km of other sensors, etc.) as well as meta data (e.g., rankings, third-
party assessments, etc.). Furthermore, utilizing graph expressions we are able to perform
various aspects of data transformations such as conversion (e.g., smoothing, scaling),
combination (e.g., aggregation) and filtering (e.g., outlier detection).
In order to maintain flexibility and reusability, we identify graph expressions by a
unique name that can be referenced throughout the entire knowledge derivation process.
A metric formally represents a computable value derived from the abstract graph model
which consists of an expression tree and one or more graph references on which the
expression is evaluated on. These references may refer to any of the graph components
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described above. Here, we discuss the parts that make up graph expressions and provide
formal definitions for them.
4.4.1 Expressions
The most basic computational aspects within our framework can be captured using
expressions. For example, determining whether two attribute values are the same is rep-
resented by the equal expression. These expressions include basic mathematical, logical,
and comparison functionality that do not require context or additional information. In
our framework, more complex expressions are defined as model expressions.
In order to achieve computational flexibility while allowing a formal definition of in-
dividual metrics, we define expression trees which describe the necessary computations.
expression
expression metric reference value model expression
Figure 4.14: An expression tree node consisting of any number of optional
child elements such as expressions, metrics, references, values and model
expressions
As such, an expression may have any number of child elements (figure 4.14):
• other expressions representing a basic computation
• metric references to enable reusable computational definitions
• references to another graph components such as particular element nodes or lists
thereof
• specific values which can be used for constants, scenario parameters, and critical
values
• model expression references that enable the incorporation of more complex belief
engines and trust assessments
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Hence, we define an expression as follows.
Definition 4.23 Expression
Let m be a metric, ref a reference to a graph component, v a specific
value and mexp a model expression then an expression exp is recursively
defined as the collection
exp = {{exp1 . . . expI}, {m1 . . .mJ},
{ref1 . . . refK}, {v1 . . . vn}, {mexp1 . . .mexpL}}
The key here is that by formalizing every expression we can reduce the number of
ambiguous or biased interpretations of trustworthiness assessment approaches suggested
in literature. Furthermore, this allows us to analytically evaluate the impact of param-
eter choices in trust models as part of our framework as we can adjust elements of the
expression tree while keeping the rest unchanged.
An expression consists of a particular tree structure where all child nodes are fully
specified. As such, all tree nodes need to be fully resolved which means that they refer
to specific expressions, metrics, references, values and model expressions. In particular,
• expressions refer to specific operations such as addition, summation, etc.
• referenced metrics consist of fully defined expression trees
• references are resolved to particular element nodes and relation edges or described
as relative such as the source and target element nodes of a relation edge
• model expressions have all their parameters specified
In order to describe expression trees we introduce the following graphical represen-
tation.
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Expression 4.1 Expression
We represent an expression as1
name
where name is the type of expression (e.g., add, subtract, equal, etc.).
Note that since there are a variety of operations with a different number
of operands we choose the following convention
unary
a
binary
ba
list operation
...cba
where expressions are operations which are performed on the particular
child expressions (i.e., unary operation evaluates a, binary operation eval-
uates a and b, etc.). A special type of the basic expression is a constraint.
We can use it to limit the types of element nodes and relation edges by
their unique type name. For example, this can be used to restrict the
application of an expression to only the sensor type. We note this special
expression as
is name type
where name refers to a particular element or relation name.
4.4.2 Values
For every computation there may be values necessary that need to be incorpo-
rated. For instance, many formulas require constants, function factors, and probability
distributions critical values. Furthermore, our framework facilitates the analysis and
1Note that expressions always have some graphical representation which we will not denote by a
separate figure number. A list of the expressions is part of the table of contents.
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simulation of a variety of scenarios. Specifically, in our approach expressions are able to
include system parameters which are defined by simulation configurations (e.g., weights,
model expression parameters) such that the same scenario can be evaluated in a variety
of ways using a different parameters.
Definition 4.24 Value
A value is a term that can be used within an expression tree. There are
two types of values, constants that do not change (e.g., factors, scales,
mathematical constants) and system parameters that depend on the con-
figuration of a particular scenario.
Within our graphical representation we express these concepts as follows.
Expression 4.2 Value
We represent a constant value as
value
where value is the term of the constant. On the other hand, system
parameters are specified as
name
where name refers to a scenario configuration variable which actual value
will be determined during a particular simulation run. Note that both of
these values are usually leaf nodes in the expression trees.
We are now at a point where we can define a variety of basic computations such as
expressing formulas. Here, we briefly discuss how the Euclidean distance between two
points in a two dimension coordinate system could be modeled using only expressions
and values.
61
Expression 4.3 Euclidean distance
The Euclidean distance between two points is defined as
distance =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2
where x1 and y1 are the coordinates for the first point and x2 and y2 for
the second one. Since there are only basic computations involved the ex-
pression tree is a direct representation of the mathematical computations
required for the solution.
square root
add
power
2
subtract
y2y1
power
2
subtract
x2x1
4.4.3 References
In order to incorporate components of the graph model into expressions trees we need
to specify what can be referenced and how. In particular, element nodes and relation
edges contain attribute values that we need to be able to refer to because they form the
value basis of our trustworthiness assessments. Furthermore, there are cases when we
need to distinguish between what a reference applies to. For instance, an expression that
yields related graph components of a particular element node could yield the connected
element node or relation edges.
Definition 4.25 Reference
We define reference as an item that expresses the notion of a particular
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graph component. This component could be a particular attribute of an
element node or relation edge. However, a reference can also express a
specific subset or list of element nodes and relation edges. Furthermore,
we utilize reference to distinguish between the source and target nodes
of a relation edge. As such, since we apply an expression tree to graph
components a reference represents the variable part that is different de-
pending on the actual graph component.
In terms of a graphical representation, we introduce the following.
Expression 4.4 Reference
We represent a reference as
name
where name is the particular graph component referred to. For attributes
of graph components we need to distinguish between several cases. First,
we need to be able to reference the most recent attribute value. Second,
for certain computations it is necessary to deal with the entire time series
of attribute values. Third, in order to uniquely identify a particular graph
component we have to be able to relate to its derived id attribute.
attribute attribute series id
In order to express a subset of graph components we can use a list refer-
ence
name list
where name could represent a subset or list of graph components. Fur-
thermore, since relation edges consist of two element nodes we need to be
able to distinguish between in expression trees. As discussed earlier, our
approach is to refer to one as the source and the other as the target node.
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source node target node
Together with the expressions and values discussed above we can formalize compu-
tations that depend on graph components and attributes thereof. As an example, we
showcase the conversion of the temperature attribute for a particular sensor.
Expression 4.5 Temperature conversion
We can convert degrees Celcius to Fahrenheit using the following formula.
F =
(
C × 95
)
+ 32
where C is the temperature in degrees Celcius to be converted. Apply-
ing this conversion formula to a particular sensor element node with a
temperature attribute is then represented as
add
32
multiply
divide
5.09.0
temperature series
which would convert all values in the temperature attribute time series
accordingly.
4.4.4 Model Expressions
In order to provide flexibility for implementing complex belief engines and decision
processes our framework provides model expressions. These can be use within an ex-
pression tree to model complex algorithms and approaches that require parameters. In
particular, without model expressions complex expressions would require specific imple-
mentations for each parameter value. This is clearly not feasible.
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name value
parameters
name
value
...
expression
name value
value
...
expression
name value
value
...
expression
inputs outputs
Figure 4.15: A model expression consisting of a unique name and sets of
inputs and outputs as well as model parameters. Note that all values could
be specified as either value or expression.
Definition 4.26 Model expression
Let I = {i1 . . . in} be a set of inputs, O = {o1 . . . om} a set of outputs,
and P = {p1 . . . pk} a set of parameters where each i, o, and p could be a
particular value or an expression then a model expression is defined as
mexp = {name, I,O, P}
where name is a unique identifier such that the model expression can be
properly referenced in expression trees. Here, we include all potential
inputs and outputs in the sets. However, this does not mean that give
a specific set of parameters all inputs are used and all outputs will be
created by the model expression. The mapping from inputs to outputs is
based on the parameters.
Note that the distinction between expressions and model expressions allows us to
define flexible and reusable models that can be applied in various application scenarios.
Model expressions can be graphically represented as follows.
Expression 4.6 Model expression
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We represent a model expression as
name
where name is the unique identifier for a specific model expression. We
follow the same convention that we use for the expressions such that
child nodes of the model expression represent input. However, in order to
specify parameters and differentiate them from inputs we label the edges
accordingly. Hence, model expressions follow the format
name
...
i2i1
...
expressionvalue
p1
p2 pk
where the edge labels p1 . . . pk lead to parameters and the inputs i1 . . . in
do not contain an edge label. Note that both can be specified as values
or expressions.
We can utilizemodel expressions to describe complex algorithms and approaches that
require parameters. Here we show an example of incorporating a probability distribution
into an expression tree to model the relative likelihood of a particular temperature value.
Expression 4.7 Temperature likelihood
Let the expected temperature follow a Normal distribution where the
probability density is defined as
N(x|µ, σ2) = 1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
The model expression requires a set of parameters, in particular, mean,
standard deviation, and type. Here, the type refers to the probability
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density function but others are possible (e.g., cumulative distribution
function, sample, etc.).
Gaussian
temperaturepdf
multiply
ε10
70
mean
standardDeviation type
Note that the Gaussian model expression follows the convention described
above where parameters are marked with edge labels and the inputs are
not. The ε shown in the mean expression represents the possibility of
including system parameters in a variety of graph expressions.
4.4.5 Metrics
A metric represents a computable value that can be derived from the abstract graph
model by evaluating an expression on a particular graph component. These metrics
are referenced by a unique name and can be utilized in other expressions as discussed
above.
name
expression
name
expression
reference
reference
reference
reference
reference
Figure 4.16: A metric consisting of a uniquely identifiable name, an ex-
pression and one or more references.
As shown in figure 4.16 metrics can be applied to single element nodes or relation
edges as well as lists of them. It is important to note that specific metrics only exist
if they are applicable. Therefore, when a metric is applied to a graph component it
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will only yield a result if all components of the expression can be evaluated on it. For
instance, if we try to determine the average temperature over the last 24 hours but the
sensor being evaluated has no measurements in the time period it would not result in
a metric. An advantage of this approach is that the metric acts as both a filter (exists
only if prerequisites are fulfilled) and processing instruction (compute a value based on
the information referenced in the expression) at the same time thus simplifying query
processing.
Using the flexible definitions of expression trees we are able to derive computable
values from graph components which we refer to as metrics. It could be argued that
the notion of metrics could be incorporated into expressions. However, the purpose of
an expression is to define computational processes much like formulas whereas a metric
embodies the application of expressions on various graph components.
Definition 4.27 Metric
Let ref be a reference to a graph component and exp an expression then
a metric is defined as
m = {name, exp, {ref1, . . . , refk}}
where name is the unique identifier of the metrics, exp the root of the ex-
pression tree, and ref1, . . . , refk the referenced graph components the ex-
pression is applied to. As such,m(ref1, . . . , refk) = {exp(ref1) . . . exp(refk)}
is the application of the metric on the references performed by evaluating
the expression on each individually.
The graphical representation includes the expression and the references accordingly.
Expression 4.8 Metric
We represent a metric as
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name
where name uniquely identifies the metric within our framework. There
are several ways we represent the application of an expression to a par-
ticular graph component. The main difference is between the application
of an expression on a element node and a relation edge where we need to
specify source and target nodes.
reference
apply to
name
expression
reference
target node
reference
source node
apply to
name
expression
Furthermore, references can be single graph components as well as lists
of graph components which are represented as
name list
apply to
name
expression
where the name of the list needs to be specified (e.g., all sensor element
nodes).
With all graph expressions formally defined we will show some examples of how
metrics are fully specified and utilized within the framework.
Expression 4.9 Similar temperature metric
The process of determining whether two sensors have similar temperatures
based on a threshold temperature difference can be defined as
similar temperature =

true if abs(t1 − t2) ≤ threshold
false otherwise
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where t1 and t2 are two temperatures accordingly. We model the metric
using a combination of expressions, values, and references and apply it to
a relation edge consisting of two sensor element nodes as
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
similar temperature
less or equal
threshold
absolute value
subtract
target node
temperature
source node
temperature
where the temperature difference threshold is modeled as a system pa-
rameter. This allows the metric to be as flexible and reusable as possible.
We can then utilize this metric in a variety of ways. For instance, given a particular
sensor we can determine all related sensors based on whether or not they have a similar
temperature.
Expression 4.10 Similar temperature neighbors metric
In order to determine related element nodes we can use the neighbors
model expression. It takes two parameters. First, an include expression
that filters existing relationships based on whether the specified expression
yields true. Second, an evaluating expression which is applied to the
remaining graph components that were not filtered out. Here, we express
a metric that when applied to a sensor element node gives a list of ids for
the related neighbor element node for which the relation edge determined
a similar temperature.
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Sensor
apply to
similar temperature neighbors
Neighbors
RelationEdge
similar temperature
ElementNode
id
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented our approach to modeling heterogeneous data as well
as belief engines and trustworthiness assessments using an abstract graph model called
Berlin. Specifically, we discussed how to formalize data and express it in terms of
flexible and extensible graph components. These graph components consist of elements
and relations which provide the descriptions for data used in our framework. The actual
data is then stored and processed in element nodes and relation edges that keep track
of values in terms of time instances.
This leads to two different types of graphs. First, the element description graph
contains elements and relations but no actual data. Second, the element instance graph
contains data instances in the form of element nodes and relation edges. Furthermore,
we discussed how we can utilize graph expressions to transform the graphs such that
they model particular application scenarios better by specifying elements and element
nodes of interest.
Attributes can be associated associated with dimension models that enable to mod-
eling of “local” trust aspects such as accuracy and confidence. Dimension models may
be probabilistic or deterministic representations of trustworthiness. They depend on the
context within a dimension such as days within the time dimension or particular areas
within the location dimension. Note that, while time and location variant dimension
models are most prevalent, we show that dimension models are flexible enough to model
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other dimensions as well (e.g., ownership, set of weather conditions, etc.).
Implementations for knowledge processing that incorporate belief engines and knowl-
edge evaluation through decision processes are formally modeled using graph expres-
sions. These expressions are evaluated on graph components which forms the basis for
the knowledge processing and knowledge evaluation phases of our framework. We use
metrics to express computable values that apply specific expressions to a single or a set
of graph components. These expressions are organized in a recursive tree hierarchy that
may include other expressions (i.e., basic computations like add, subtract, and count),
model expressions (i.e., complex computations that require parameters), references (i.e.,
to graph components), values (i.e., constants or system parameters, and metrics (i.e.,
named references to other expression trees).
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5
The TrustKnowOne Framework
for Incorporating Trust
and Quality of Data into
Knowledge Derivation
Most decision processes operate by evaluating available information and deriving
knowledge or insight from it. While this seems straightforward, in reality we face a
variety of problems which make knowledge derivation and decision making complex and
difficult.
In particular, decisions are often influenced by factors such as past experience with
similar or related problems. This causes decision processes to exhibit subjective rather
than objective and reproducible behaviors. Furthermore, depending on the situation
or context, given the same information different decisions could be made. Constraints
also impact decision processes. Specifically, there are always resource constraints which
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Figure 5.1: Knowledge Derivation framework
require trade-offs. A classic example of this is the need to balance time (i.e., speed,
performance) and space complexity (i.e., storage space, memory, network bandwidth,
etc.) found in almost all applications that require extensive computational power.
It is important to realize that decisions are based on the assumption that the data
we are evaluating is useful and trustworthy. Data quality refers to properties such as
accuracy, completeness, validity, and timeliness which are often assumed to be inherent
[84, 117, 133, 175]. However, these assumptions may not be correct and as such could
have a dramatic impact on decisions being made. Furthermore, pieces of data are
often related or dependent on each other. We need to consider these dependencies,
correlations, and trust relationships between data elements. Trustworthiness represents
the perceived level of confidence we have that a particular data source is collaborative
and behaves according to specification [31, 33, 54, 63, 88, 114, 122, 184]. The problem is
that determining trustworthiness is hard for reasons such as dependencies between pieces
of data, changes in data and resources over time, and resources potentially conspiring
with each other [17, 57, 114].
The TrustKnowOne framework presented as part of this dissertation addresses these
issues as will be described in this chapter. The main focus of our framework is to provide
a formalization of approaches to quantify trust and data quality aspects throughout the
knowledge derivation process and provide a variety of confidence and trustworthiness
assessments for decisions. Figure 5.1 shows an overview of the main components of our
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layered framework.
5.1 Architectural Principles
In order to fully utilize available knowledge for making decisions, we present a layered
architecture with models for various aspects of trust and quality of data. We will discuss
how among others things, context, expected behavior, and relationships of data can be
incorporated to improve knowledge derivation and to allow for better decisions to be
made. In this section, we present an overview of the framework components and discuss
the architectural design principles governing our framework.
At the core, we deal with three different entities that form the basis for decisions:
data, data quality, and trust. Here the term data refers to the structured or unstruc-
tured information we gather from various sources. To achieve our goal of improving
knowledge derivation several challenges must be addressed. Data may be incomplete
or inaccurate, or even worse, someone might have intentionally altered it, i.e., attacked
the data. For some of these problems there are solutions (e.g., digital signatures to
prevent modification) while for others there are not (e.g., how do we know we received
all data?). A further complication is the fact that decisions must usually be made in a
finite amount of time which means we often need to make a decision before all data has
been obtained. The point is that we need to account for these factors when we process
and utilize data.
To overcome these challenges it is critical to determine the quality of data using
auxiliary knowledge such as the information source, historical data, and location infor-
mation. Hence, quality is not something that is absolute but rather relative, changing
over time, and dependent on our knowledge of the context at a particular point in
time. Furthermore, data quality and data trustworthiness are two distinct things. We
may determine that the quality of data is high enough (e.g., based on evaluating the
context and the dimension models), but it might come from an untrustworthy source.
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Sometimes, low quality data that we can trust might prove to be more useful in our
decision making process than perceived high quality data that may be tampered with
some probability. A premise of the our approach is that the combination of the data
itself, its perceived quality, and the trust we put into it and its source will allow us to
make better decisions.
Decision making processes vary in complexity depending on the application scenario.
The reason is that there are essentially two components, the approach on how a decision
is made (decision engine) and the techniques used to process the data and its context
on which the decisions are based (belief engines). Note that our approach makes this
important distinction which is often ignored in literature. Furthermore, we enhance the
overall decision making process by incorporating perceived quality and trust of data into
these belief and decision engines. While this increases the complexity of the framework,
it has the advantage of making the framework more flexible and useful. In particular,
with the same data being available, we can employ different decision methods ranging
from simple (e.g. voting, ranking) to the more complex ones (e.g. Bayesian inference
[44, 69, 100, 126, 128, 158], Dempster-Shafer theory [59, 108, 147, 148, 155], weighting
schemes [63, 108, 113, 146, 182]) to arrive at a decision. In addition, the separation
allows us to evaluate multiple belief and decision engines in order to determine the best
possible decision given all available knowledge. Based on this evaluation process we can
improve on our decision making process in the future.
To address the complex problems described above we break down our framework
into three layers or phases. Each of the phases represents a model of a specific set of
tasks that need to be accomplished throughout the knowledge derivation process.
• The knowledge extraction phase models data sources and their integration
• The knowledge processing phase models data processes and incorporating quality
and trust relationship aspects
• The knowledge evaluation phase models decision making processes
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The focus of these models lies on the development of measurable factors that can
be used to determine the effectiveness and performance of different techniques and
approaches given certain application scenarios. These factors are especially important
for evaluating how these models are affected by knowledge attacks that attempt to
modify data, belief engines, and decisions processes.
Our approach to provide a formalization of the entire knowledge derivation process
and incorporate data quality and trust aspects is based on the abstract graph model
Berlin discussed in chapter 4. In particular, we model every piece of information as a
graph component in order to allow for a flexible, standardized, modifiable, and interop-
erable data management foundation of the framework. Furthermore, data processing
approaches, quality and trust assessments in terms of belief engines, and decision pro-
cesses are also represented by graph expressions. As such, our TrustKnowOne frame-
work provides a formal and flexible approach to knowledge derivation where each layer
addresses specific aspects of the overall process.
Knowledge extraction models the task of formally describing how data is transformed
from data source into graph components of the abstract graph model. In addition, it
considers meta information and context in order to provide “local” quality and trust
assessments. The resulting abstract graph model and these assessments serve as input
to the knowledge processing component where we incorporate more complex quality and
trust assessments that take into consideration context and relationships. Specifically, we
evaluate “global” meta information that depends on aspects such as scenario specifics
(e.g., temperature ranges, dangerous radiation levels) and trust relationships (e.g., sen-
sors in the same location should have similar measurements). Knowledge evaluation
has access to all knowledge modeled in the first two phases. The knowledge evaluation
phase then models decision making as decision processes that are also represented by
graph expressions.
Note that this separation of “local” and “global” information is important for several
reasons. First, it clearly separates what type of context is incorporated in the knowledge
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extraction and knowledge processing components. Second, the process of transforming
data from data sources into graph components needs to be very specific due to constraints
(i.e., type, format). By incorporating “local” assessment into this transformation we are
able to derive meta information in a more meaningful manner. Third, complex quality
and trust assessments should not depend on how data is incorporated into application
scenarios. In particular, our framework provides an abstract graph model as the basis
on which these assessments are derived in terms of belief engines. This avoids imple-
menting techniques that depend on subjective interpretations of the raw data. Finally,
while there exist various quality and trust assessment approaches it is often difficult
to improve them or apply them to a different application scenario. In our framework,
approaches modeled as belief engines are represented by formal graph expression defi-
nitions. Because they are all evaluated on the formal abstract graph model provided by
knowledge extraction component it makes it easy to modify, exchange, and reuse them
in a various scenarios and not just the application scenario they were originally defined
for.
An important benefit of the TrustKnowOne framework is the separation of the pro-
cess of performing quality and trust assessments from the process of making decisions.
Current trust assessment approaches often combine these two which makes their evalua-
tion, comparison, and improvement difficult. Furthermore, our framework allows for fast
prototyping of new approaches as well as evaluating them against existing approaches
because of the formalized nature of the abstract graph model. Another problem seen
in existing literature results from the coupling of assessment approaches with decision
processes. By merging the two, you become tied to particular approaches which may
result in a good assessment technique being paired with sub-optimal decision making
or vice versa. Instead, our framework decouples belief engines from decision processes.
This allows for the evaluation of various combinations of assessment and decision mak-
ing approaches as well as a more detailed analysis to find the optimal pair resulting in
an overall better knowledge derivation processes.
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In general, our framework derives multiple decision options for every scenario. These
decisions include representations of confidence and trustworthiness assessments. Specifi-
cally, the framework provides an assessment of how confident it is in a particular decision
given the knowledge derived from data as well as “local” and “global” assessments of
the knowledge utilized in arriving at the decision. Furthermore, based on user de-
fined thresholds (e.g., in case confidence in a decision it deemed to low) the knowledge
evaluation component can either try to incorporate additional data by requesting it
from knowledge extraction or attempt to improve existing assessments by reevaluating
knowledge and context.
An additional benefit of the TrustKnowOne framework lies in its ability to analyze
and evaluate knowledge attack scenarios. Because our framework incorporates trust
and quality of data as well as formalizes knowledge derivation, we are able to assess
the impact of attacks on data and meta information. For instance, malicious nodes in
sensor networks could provide incorrect measurements (i.e., attacks data) and collab-
orate in an attempt to give other malicious nodes higher trustworthiness (i.e., attacks
meta information). We can evaluate the robustness of trust assessment approaches and
decision processes using several techniques. First, we can simulate scenarios with in-
creasing levels of particular attack activity (e.g., percentage of data compromised) and
compare the assessment results of the trust approaches to a baseline. Second, since
attacks materialize themselves in terms of changes in data and context we are able to
define graph expressions capable of determining the existence of these changes.
In the following sections, we discuss in detail the three components of the framework.
5.2 Knowledge Extraction
The first of the three stages of our TrustKnowOne framework is knowledge extraction.
While this phase is the most straightforward one should not overlook its importance.
Data is often captured in order to be utilized as a basis for decision processes. However,
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when dealing with data we often face problems such as what kind of data is available
or what format is my original data in and does it need to be converted or transformed?
These questions can often be trivially answered if the amount of the data and conse-
quently the amount of knowledge derived from that data is small. However, the need
for a framework like the one developed here arises when we have to deal with large and
complex data as is the case in the radiation detection scenario discussed in section 6.2.
In order to address issues with managing dynamic heterogeneous data, we developed
a framework that is capable of dealing with the various aspects of data modeling and in
particular knowledge extraction from data. Our framework provides a common abstract
data model based on graph theory with nodes representing elements of the data model
and edges the relationships between them as described in chapter 4. Hence, this graph-
ical data representation is able to store information and allows for knowledge extraction
through the definition of patterns that can be matched onto the data graph.
As a first step in the overall knowledge derivation process, we need to clearly define
how data and meta information about the data can be incorporated into our framework.
For this purpose the knowledge extraction component utilizes data adapters which are
responsible for extracting knowledge from data sources as well as providing the frame-
work with the information necessary to assess its trustworthiness and quality. It is
important to note that at the knowledge extraction stage only “local” meta information
is available. In particular, aspects such as context and expected behavior used to assess
quality and trustworthiness are limited to considering meta information about individ-
ual data elements and sources but not their relationships to each other. This clearly
distinguishes the knowledge extraction stage from the knowledge processing stage.
The main purpose knowledge extraction is the extraction of data elements from the
data source and their transformation into equivalent graph components. This compo-
nent also performs “local” assessments by incorporating “local” context and expected
behavior through the use of dimension models and “local” belief engines. The input to
the knowledge extraction component consists of information about the raw data as well
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as its data sources. The result of the knowledge extraction phase is the data modeled
as graph components as well as “local” quality and trust assessments of data and their
sources.
To keep knowledge extraction flexible and abstract we want to be able to incorpo-
rate the implementation of a variety of algorithms and techniques. Hence, we discuss
the following aspects of the knowledge extraction component in detail throughout this
section.
• Providing a formal description of data elements, data sources and their mapping
onto graph components
• Formally describing “local” quality and trust assessments in terms of dimension
models and belief engines
• Maintaining flexibility for a variety of data acquisition approaches
• Providing the ability of incorporate structured and unstructured data into the
knowledge derivation process
• Incorporating dynamic context such as time and location into trust assessments
• Including data lineage by keeping track of how knowledge was derived from a
particular data source as well as how it is processed
• Determining the cost associated with data acquisition and transformation thereby
enabling evaluation and comparison
5.2.1 Knowledge Extraction: Architecture
Approaches such as [51, 62, 135] describe data and relations between data elements.
However, as discussed in chapter 3, they all lack the comprehensiveness to include var-
ious aspects of knowledge derivation necessary such as trust relationships, local value
models, as well as time and location dynamics. Furthermore, one of the goals of our
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Figure 5.2: Data element definition from data source via adapter
approach is to enable the combination of data with meta information such as context,
expected behavior, the process of how it was obtained, and security features (e.g, certifi-
cates, signatures) to further improve quality and trust assessments. Hence, we provide
a formal approach that enables the modeling of data and knowledge derivation in a
flexible and extensible way.
A key aspect of our approach is maintaining flexibility by enabling the addition of
new data and data formats. Therefore, we introduce a data element that represents
the notion of a basic piece of data and its context. This data element may have any
number of attributes. In order to become part of the data model, we define adapters
that capture the particular data and provide a common abstract view of it in terms of
graph components (see chapter 4). This part of the process is shown in figure 5.2.
As part of the knowledge extraction component we need to define the following.
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Data Elements The type of information which is being used in our framework needs
to be formally defined in terms of graph components. This means that data will be de-
scribed by a combination of elements and relations each with their respective attributes.
In addition, meta information such as “local” context, known expected behavior, and
known value constraints is incorporated in dimension models and associated with graph
components.
Data Sources We treat data sources as providers of information in its most basic
form. As such, they may provide values, “local” relationship information, as well as
context for graph components. Since there exist a multitude of data formats it is im-
portant to note that our framework does not provide implementations for each one of
them. Instead, our framework designates this task to be addressed by scenario specific
adapters. However, the key point to keep in mind here is that the main task of the
knowledge extraction component is to provide a unified and formalized representation
of information relevant to application scenarios in terms of the abstract graph model
discussed in chapter 4.
Knowledge Extraction Mapping With both descriptions available (data and data
source), the knowledge extraction phase comes down to establishing mappings from the
data source to the respective graph components in our abstract graph model. This task is
performed by adapters whose implementation can range from simple mappings of values
to more complex transformations and extraction approaches. Note that our framework
provides flexibility in this regard as extracted values can be transformed as part of the
knowledge extraction phase or by utilizing belief engines during the knowledge processing
phase which we will discuss later.
Consider the following example where temperature measurements are captured by
a set of sensors in a custom binary format. Let us assume we are only interested in
analyzing historical information for temperature trends. Hence, all time series temper-
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ature measurements are provided to us in a single file. First, we describe a new graph
component that contains time series information of temperatures. Seconds, we model
the format of the data stored in the file. Third, the transformational mapping is imple-
mented as the adapter which is defined specifically for this binary format and provides
an abstract view of the temperature values that were captured.
Many real work scenarios require an online (dynamic) as opposed to offline (static)
knowledge derivation process because of changes in data and relationships that need
to be incorporated in real time. As such, our framework and in particular the abstract
graph model supports the dynamic definition and extension of graph components as well
as adding, modifying, and removing data modeled as element nodes and relation edges.
By providing this dynamic graph model, we are able to address a variety of application
scenarios in which data and relationship structures are constantly changing as will be
shown in chapter 6. The advantage of our framework is that after this initial knowledge
extraction phase we are able to utilize data in a flexible and common manner within
our abstract graph model.
The second key task of the knowledge extraction component deals with performing
“local” quality and trustworthiness assessments. As the process of extracting knowledge
is only an early step in knowledge derivation, we only have limited information available.
While specific context such as possible temperature value ranges for sensors are available,
more complex relationships such as comparing sensors based on temperature similarity
requires additional “global” context. The main approach in this phase is to assess data
on a “local” level with no complex “global” context such as similarity ranges, distribution
parameters, and scenario specific meta information.
In our framework, there are two options for performing these “local” assessments.
First, we can associate graph components with dimension models that provide context
specific to the type, origin, and value range of data. Second, basic belief engines which
are discussed in more detail in the knowledge processing phase can be used to provide
aspects such as expected behavior assessments (based on analyzing time series infor-
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mation) and comparative information (e.g. same sensor location, lower temperature).
Note that everything that requires some sort of parameter requires “global” context and
thus needs to be part of the knowledge processing component.
5.2.2 Knowledge Extraction: Data Acquisition
Our framework supports a variety of data acquisition models. Here, data acquisition
refers to the process of making data available in the form of data sources. There are
two major types to consider. First, the most common knowledge derivation process
requires only a static data source where data and meta information made available does
not change. This makes knowledge extraction a one-time process. Second, in the case
where data changes within a data source, the acquisition and thus knowledge extraction
needs to be dynamic. Specifically, whenever new data becomes available, we allow
it to be incorporated into the abstract graph model (push approach). Furthermore,
there are cases, such as low confidence in trustworthiness assessments or decisions,
where we may require additional information to be acquired by the data source (e.g.,
sensor, monitoring process) (pull approach). These are important factors in making the
framework presented here flexible and extensible.
Note that a specific use case for dynamic data acquisition involves multi-agent sys-
tems that perform work independently of each other. This allows the framework to
be utilized in application scenarios such as mobile applications, sensor networks, and
intrusion detection systems which are discussed in detail in chapter 6.
5.2.3 Knowledge Extraction: Data Integration
The knowledge extraction component needs to be able to deal with structured and
unstructured data. While structured data may be mapped into graph components more
efficiently, our framework provide the means to effectively incorporate unstructured
data as well. In particular, we acknowledge the fact that data may be incomplete and
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incorrect. For instance, data collected by sensor networks is often clearly defined. How-
ever, free text such as reviews of mobile applications (as discussed in section 6.1), travel
experiences, and medical information often do not adhere to a specific structure but
rather consist of a subset of a large corpus of possible terms (i.e., look and feel, perfor-
mance, permissions; hotels, flights, food; medications, symptoms, diagnoses). Having
to completely define all these terms is impractical.
As such, our abstract graph model supports “non-descriptive” attributes to be dy-
namically added to graph components (chapter 4). This aspect makes our approach
flexible and extensible as will be demonstrated in various scenarios (chapter 6). Specifi-
cally, it allows the framework to model a data warehouse approach where “raw” unstruc-
tured data can be stored using a limited set of attributes and features can be derived
from them as part of belief engines during the knowledge processing stage. It should be
noted that for standardization and compatibility reasons, the focus should remain on
formalizing as much of the data and data sources as possible.
Since our abstract graph model approach provides a flexible solution to managing
heterogeneous data, TrustKnowOne is able to overcome issues that arise from data
integration and information fusion. For instance, we can model various sensor types
with different attributes without having to choose between modeling only common or
all possible attributes (see chapter 3). Furthermore, information fusion is performed
by formalized belief engines during the knowledge processing phase. This allows for a
better approach as meta information such as context and “local” relationships can be
incorporated into the knowledge derivation process.
5.2.4 Knowledge Extraction: Time and Location Dynamic
Data
One aspect that is considered secondary in many data processing frameworks (chap-
ter 3) is the fact that data and context is often dependent on some dimension such
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Data element
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Combination
Data source
Figure 5.3: Data model organizational hierarchy overview with different
layers of abstraction
as time or location. Take for instance the case where a temperature sensor’s accuracy
slowly degrades over time. Furthermore, the possible range of temperature values may
be impacted by the location of the sensor. Our framework enables the formalization of
dimension models that can be associated with graph components to model the impact
of dimensions such as time and location. This provides a more realistic approach to
evaluating data and assessing its quality and trustworthiness.
5.2.5 Knowledge Extraction: Data Lineage
We can group and organize various data elements into data sets by using tags.
The term tag here loosely refers to any type of grouping. This may be ordering data
elements by location or time but it could also be used to create logical groupings such
as correlations or dependencies.
Figure 5.3 shows that data elements can form relationships at various degrees of
abstraction. Specifically, data elements can be associated with particular data sets
which are provided by data sources. For example, a set of sensors provides temperature
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measurements. These measurements can be grouped into location data sets by some
weather monitoring authority. Note that in general, data will be organized hierarchically
as shown in Figure 5.3 because this allows clear levels of abstraction. However, since
the relationship between pieces of data can be quite complex, knowledge can also be
derived by combining data in non-hierarchical fashion.
All of this means that, providing data lineage is often a complex process. Neverthe-
less, our approach incorporates lineage throughout the knowledge derivation process by
associating data with the context of where it originated and how it has been processed.
As part of the knowledge extraction stage, data is automatically tagged by adding an
additional source attribute to each graph component. Because knowledge processing as
well as knowledge evaluation is formalized using graph expressions that are evaluated on
the graph components provided by the knowledge extraction component, our framework
enables the tracing of data lineage and processing.
5.2.6 Knowledge Extraction: Cost Assessments
One of the focus areas of TrustKnowOne is the trustworthiness assessment of data
sources. For this purpose, our framework maintains meta information about these
sources throughout the knowledge derivation process. First, we can associate data
sources with certain data acquisition costs. Here, cost reflects aspects such as timeliness,
completeness, and accuracy. Second, we need to incorporate the cost of the process of
adapting data from data sources into equivalent graph components performed by the
adapters. Third, while the process of “local” assessments is usually performed in parallel
with the transformation of data into graph components we need to account for it. Thus,
the total knowledge acquisition cost is thus a sum of the raw data acquisition costs, the
necessary transformations into graph components, and performing “local” assessments.
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costknowledgeextraction = costacquisition + costtransformation + costlocalassessment
Incorporating these cost factors into the knowledge derivation process has several
advantages. First, one may have a variety of options available to acquire the necessary
knowledge in order to come up with a decision for particular scenarios. Our frame-
work provides a formal mechanism for determining the cost of each of these options
and as such enables evaluation, optimization, and comparison. Second, sometimes it is
necessary for decisions to be made even with incomplete data (i.e., not all data being
available) due to time or resource constraints. By providing a cost context for data
and data sources we can incorporate data based on the best value or highest quality.
Third, in dynamic scenarios where over time more data is incorporated into the knowl-
edge derivation process, it is important to evaluate cost factors as well. Specifically, our
framework (i.e., knowledge evaluation component) allows for additional data collection
or reevaluation of existing data if certain confidence criteria are not met (figure 5.1).
This reinforcement learning [83, 163] approach of exploration and exploitation is inher-
ently cost-based since the decision of which steps to take depends on the ratio of their
expected return compared to the costs.
The output of the knowledge extraction phase is the data modeled as graph compo-
nents as well as “local” quality and trust assessments of data and their sources. This
becomes the input to the knowledge processing phase.
5.3 Knowledge Processing
When processing information we often encounter questions such as
• Are certain data pieces correlated?
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• How can one derive knowledge from individual pieces of data?
• Does the combination of multiple pieces of data lead to more knowledge?
In our framework, the knowledge processing component provides way of answering
these questions by formalizing data processing as well as quality and trustworthiness as-
sessments. In particular, we use various techniques to transform data modeled as graph
components and determine aspects such as perceived data quality and trustworthiness.
The abstract graph model discussed in chapter 4 provides a flexible and extensible ap-
proach to describing algorithms and techniques for knowledge processing.
The knowledge processing component provides the ability for processing graph com-
ponents using metrics represented by graph expressions. Furthermore, in this stage, we
incorporate “global” meta information such as expected behavior, history, and other
context to derive additional quality and trust assessments. The knowledge and “local”
assessments derived from knowledge extraction are taken to the knowledge processing
component. The result of the knowledge processing phase is that the graph model is
now augmented with the “processed knowledge”, such as the results of transformations
and the evaluation of graph expressions, as well as additional quality and trust assess-
ments based on “global” meta information, context, and relationships.
In this section, we discuss the following aspects of the knowledge processing compo-
nent. Note that these will also be demonstrated in detail in throughout the scenario
analysis (chapter 6).
• Providing a formal description of data processing techniques in terms of graph
expressions
• Describing “global” quality and trust assessment approaches formally using belief
engines
• Incorporating knowledge from sources with different trust aspects
• Assessing trust aspects from “global” context and relationships
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• Maintaining flexibility in terms of how to perform processing and assessment com-
putations
• Including processing lineage through the formal definition of processing and as-
sessments as graph expressions
• Determining costs for processing and assessment approaches thereby enabling eval-
uation and comparison
5.3.1 Knowledge Processing: Architecture
The second stage of the TrustKnowOne framework is knowledge processing. There is
often the need to transform data in order to derive the knowledge we seek. For instance,
individual sales transactions are grouped by product, time, or location which allows
strategic business decisions to be made on a higher level of abstraction. Our framework
enables the use of a wide array of processing approaches through the evaluation of
graph expressions on graph components. As such, simple mathematical approaches can
be incorporated in the same manner that more complex ones can. Furthermore, our
abstract graph model is flexible enough to support a large number of existing techniques
for a variety of application scenarios such as sensor networks and intrusion detection
systems as well as future ones because of its extensible graph expressions approach.
By modeling data and how it is processed as graph components and graph expres-
sions, we provide a unified view of knowledge derivation. The advantage here is that
instead of having one approach for data management and another one for processing,
our framework enables the use of a single paradigm, our abstract graph model. A de-
tailed description of how knowledge processing can be performed using our abstract graph
model is discussed in chapter 4.
In addition to providing an effective way to model the processing of data, we enable
the derivation of complex “global” quality and trust assessments. We can often associate
meta information with data elements. The framework is able to correlate information
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by using meta information (see [124, 147]). Specifically, we are interested in spatial and
time series data as well as information about the process by which the data was obtained
(expected behavior and context) and security features such as certificates and signatures.
One of the major tasks for the TrustKnowOne knowledge processing stage is to evaluate
data modeled by the knowledge extraction component and combine it with additional
meta information. In particular, we incorporate expected behavior [145] such as range,
mean, and variance by associating a distinct probabilistic or deterministic dimension
model with each data element as described in chapter 4.
It has been noted [12, 72, 97] that context awareness such as the semantic meaning
and distribution of data values can often enhance knowledge derivation. Hence, our
framework provides the possibility to evaluate surrounding data elements on tempo-
ral (similar changes over time, sliding windows [11, 27]) and spatial (co-located mea-
surement entities) as well as physical (same data source, dependencies) and logical
(ownership, groupings, signatures, vouchers) levels. Similar approaches discussed in
literature include local structure inference [4, 100] and Markov blankets [130]. Our
framework accommodates these techniques which can be implemented as graph ex-
pressions which enable their reuse, modification, and extension of them in a formal
manner. Furthermore, since trust assessment techniques such as Bayesian inference
[44, 69, 100, 126, 128, 142, 158], Dempster-Shafer theory [59, 108, 147, 148, 155] and
weighting schemes [63, 108, 113, 146, 182] can be described using graph theoretic con-
structs, we are able to map them directly onto our abstract graph model.
Given these approaches, the combination of data, meta information, and trust assess-
ments enables us to derive confidence levels for individual data elements that describe
attributes such as data quality, accuracy, and trustworthiness. Our framework estab-
lishes formalized belief engines to assess quality and trustworthiness aspects of data and
data sources that can be included in the knowledge processing of data. For example,
data below certain quality or accuracy thresholds could be ignored during processing.
Similarly, relationships among data elements (e.g., overlapping and conflicting data)
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can be used to determine trust aspects.
5.3.2 Knowledge Processing: Trust Aspects in Data Fu-
sion
Maintaining trust aspects during the combination of heterogeneous data, often re-
ferred to as data fusion, is a complex problem on its own. In order to derive meaningful
knowledge we not only need to consider the combination of data elements but also in-
corporate any trust aspects associated with them. In particular, Dalvi and Suciu [36]
discusses the problems related to data integration while also having to address trust
issues. First, integrating heterogeneous data with different trust levels means dealing
with potentially conflicting data and trust assessments. Second, trust approaches need
to be flexible enough to allows for future types of data where trust may not have been
clearly defined. We address both of these problems with our TrustKnowOne framework
through the use of graph expressions.
The flexibility of implementing trust approaches as graph expressions enables the
incorporation of a variety of approaches mentioned in literature such as trust level fu-
sion [114] and confidence levels of trust [141]. Note that, while there have been several
approaches [108, 113, 148] directly focused on assessing quality and trustworthiness, the
combination of homogeneous and heterogeneous data with trust aspects remains prob-
lematic. In our approach, processing approaches have direct access to trust assessments
since they part of the abstract graph model and vice versa. This allows for trust aspects
to be incorporated in a way that is not possible in other frameworks. For instance,
one could weight data differently when performing data fusion based on its assessed
trustworthiness.
We can incorporate existing as well as future approaches to trust assessments be-
cause of the flexibility of graph expressions. This allows us to perform fact finding in
“safe” environments where data sources are cooperative and data is of high quality and
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trustworthiness as well as in “dangerous” environments where data sources have diverg-
ing interests and provide incomplete and conflicting data. Data processing frameworks
found in literature can often only handle the first scenario since they do not incorporate
trust with data fusion. What distinguishes our TrustKnowOne framework is that it can
also handle the “dangerous” environments. Some of the application scenarios that our
framework is able to address are discussed in chapter 6.
5.3.3 Knowledge Processing: Trust Relationships Between
Data
While assessing quality and trust aspects “locally” can be difficult, considering re-
lationships between data elements is even more complicated due to interdependencies
and growing complexity. However, [10, 79, 156] make use of a social network approach
to determine trusted resources based on types of relationships and frequency of inter-
action. This provides a good basis for our framework on ways to adjust trust levels and
confidence intervals.
In particular, we formulate the idea to establish “checks and balances” between
the data elements on a global level that evaluate their relationships. One goal of the
knowledge processing component is then to model relationships between data elements
including “global” meta information while incorporating a variety of trust models. In
particular, graph expressions define how trust metrics are processed into data quality
and trust assessments. Because of our abstract graph model approach to managing data,
other potential data dependencies (causality) [15, 44, 125, 127, 128, 151, 158–160]) and
correlations [10, 78, 79, 128, 130, 156] that provide additional knowledge can be explored.
In addition, clustering often provides insight to the relationships between seemingly
disparate data elements. Given the flexibility in transforming element instance graphs
using transformations as discussed in section 4.2.3, we can employ a variety of clustering
[181] and biclustering [106] algorithms to discover these relationships. Note that we are
94
especially interested in temporal and spatial ones [28, 34, 73, 138] as will be used in
section 6.2. Another technique that we are able to directly map is pattern matching
[78]. In particular, graph expressions can be used to incorporate statistical (i.e., certain
amount of features match), syntactical (i.e., structural, hierarchical based) and template
matching (i.e., assign pattern to closest template that matches) approaches.
5.3.4 Knowledge Processing: Computational Aspects
Note that our framework in contrast to others does not dictate how processing and
assessment is performed (see chapter 3). We discuss our reference implementation in
chapter 7. Instead, the approaches are modeled as graph expressions that are evalu-
ated on graph components representing data. As such, our framework can work in a
distributed way based on the individual and parallel evaluation of graph expressions
hence overcoming limitations often seen in centralized systems. In the case where graph
expressions include relationships and interdependencies our abstract graph model basis
allows for various forms of clustering to be performed in terms of graph transformations
(see section 4.2.3) to provide clear definitions of computational boundaries.
Furthermore, dynamic application scenarios often require the ability to partially
reprocess and reassess knowledge. Since graph expressions provide formal computational
models they can be evaluated on any range of graph components. Therefore, in dynamic
application scenarios when new data is added or existing data is updated we only have to
reevaluate the graph expressions that are impacted. Note that this can be accomplished
without having to modify the overall knowledge derivation process. The distributed
aspect of our framework also lends itself to the modeling of heterogeneous multi-agent
systems such as radiation (section 6.2) and intrusion detection (section 6.3).
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5.3.5 Knowledge Processing: Processing Lineage
As discussed in the knowledge extraction phase, we associate meta information with
data elements. This includes lineage information on how it was extracted (i.e., data
source, time, “local” context) and how it was transformed into graph components. In
the knowledge processing component, we can attach additional lineage information that
describes how data is processed. Since processing approaches as well as quality and
trust assessment which provides “global” context are implemented as graph expressions,
they are formally defined and allow tracing of lineage.
As an example, consider the calculation of the average radiation level in a region
using several sensors with the following metric.
Expression 5.1 Average radiation level metric
In order to determine related element nodes we can use the neighbors
model expression. Here, we filter sensors based on a same location met-
ric (include expression) and retrieve the radiation values of the sensors
(evaluating expression). Finally, we average the resulting list of radiation
values using a math expression.
Sensor
apply to
average radiation level
average
Neighbors
ElementNode
same location
ElementNode
radiation
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
Let us assume we apply this metric to a list of 10 sensors in the same location where
5 sensors were provided radiation values from data source A, 3 from data source B, and
2 from data source C. We can then associate the resulting average radiation level with
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the appropriate lineage context in absolute (i.e., number of values incorporated from
particular data sources) as well as relative terms (i.e., percentage of impact of specific
data sources). The lineage meta information incorporated during the knowledge extrac-
tion phase is automatically propagated to the result of the metric. The combination of
this with the data source context allows us to weight meta information accordingly.
In addition, we are able to attach context about processing to the result of graph
expressions. This includes the metric that was used to produce the result as well as
the graph components on which the metric was evaluated. Note that, all processing
approaches and belief engines implemented as graph expressions can be annotated with
this type of lineage context. Therefore, our framework improves knowledge derivation by
providing formal definitions of knowledge processing techniques which allow for extensive
tracing of data lineage which results in better informed and more realistic decision
making.
5.3.6 Knowledge Processing: Cost Assessments
Determining cost aspects of knowledge processing is based on assessing the cost of
performing graph expression evaluations on graph components. Since these graph expres-
sions represent both processing and assessment approaches they provide a unified cost
modeling technique based on graph theory (see [15, 19, 127, 128, 157] graph metrics).
As such, the cost of knowledge processing can be expressed as the sum of the processing
and assessment costs.
costknowledgeprocessing = costprocessing + costglobalassessment
Our TrustKnowOne framework enables graph components to be associated with meta
information and context. For the abstract graph model we can use a similar approach
when determining the cost of graph expressions. In particular, every expression within
the expression tree can be annotated with a cost factor. Note that this cost factor can be
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either static (i.e., fixed cost) or dynamic (i.e., based on number inputs and parameters)
depending on the particular graph expresssion used. While static cost factors make
overall cost estimation straightforward, dealing with dynamic cost factors, especially
for model expressions, is more difficult. However, parameterizing those dynamic costs
allows our framework to incorporate them into cost assessments.
The following example shows one approach that can be used by our TrustKnowOne
framework to determine the cost of processing a particular graph expression.
Expression 5.2 Temperature within range metric
In order to determine whether a sensor’s temperature is within a specified
range, we can use a number of mathematical graph expresssions and two
system parameters, the temperature to compare against (threshold) and
the acceptable range.
Sensor
apply to
within range
less or equal
range
absolute value
subtract
thresholdtemperature
We need to associate cost factors with types of graph expressions. Here, we choose
1 for mathematical computations and 0 for retrieving attribute values from graph com-
ponents and using system parameters. In this specific example we apply the metric to
a set of 10 sensor element nodes.
As shown in figure 5.4, the cost of evaluating a particular expression depends on
the cost factors of its inputs and parameters (for model expressions) as well as its
own cost factor. Note that while we only discussed a limited example of performing
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10xcost of evaluating metric: 3× 10 = 30
1cost of evaluating expression: 3
01cost of evaluating expression: 2
1cost of evaluating expression: 1
00
Figure 5.4: Cost assessment for temperature within range metric evaluated
on 10 sensor element nodes
a cost assessment it works for both processing and assessment approaches because our
framework models them both as expression trees.
Since the evaluation of expression trees is performed hierarchically, determining the
cost of these expression trees can be achieved in a similar way as shown in figure 5.4.
This formalization of knowledge processing cost assessments provides a number of advan-
tages. First, it enables the analysis of different approaches found in literature. Second,
because of the modeling as graph expressions to which cost factors can be attached,
processing and assessment techniques can be compared to each other using a common
methodology. Third, one of the problems found in a variety of other approaches is the
lack of formalization which inhibits their modification, improvement, and reuse in other
application scenarios. Our TrustKnowOne framework provides a formal method for cost
assessment of knowledge processing approaches that is flexible and extensible.
The output of the knowledge processing phase is the graph model augmented with
the “processed knowledge” as well as additional quality and trust assessments based on
“global” meta information, context, and relationships. This becomes the input to the
knowledge evaluation phase.
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5.4 Knowledge Evaluation
The third and final layer of our TrustKnowOne framework is knowledge evaluation.
Making decisions is a difficult process. Furthermore, many decision processes do not
even consider quality and trust aspects because they are complicated and their inte-
gration is problematic. However, our TrustKnowOne framework provides the ability to
model various decision processes while incorporating trust and quality of data.
These decision processes are represented by graph expressions similar to the ones
used in the knowledge processing component. This allows one to operate directly on the
graph components and the assessment provided as input by the knowledge processing
phase to derive decisions. As a result of the knowledge evaluation phase, we have a
set of decision options derived by evaluating a decision process on the data provided
by the knowledge extraction and processing phases. These options include confidence
assessments that can be traced all the way back to individual data elements and data
sources as well as cost metrics of the entire decision process. Furthermore, the knowledge
evaluation component provides the ability to increase the confidence in a decision by
either requesting additional data or reevaluating existing data.
In order to provide the functionality described above, we discuss the following aspects
of the knowledge evaluation component.
• Providing a formal description of decision making techniques using decision pro-
cesses
• Incorporating quality and trust assessment aspects into decision making
• Requesting additional and challenging existing data if configurable confidence
thresholds are not reached
• Providing interfaces to other systems (e.g., notification, propagation)
• Including evaluation lineage through the formal definition of decision processes as
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graph expressions
• Determining cost for decision making approaches thereby enabling evaluation and
comparison
5.4.1 Knowledge Evaluation: Architecture
In our TrustKnowOne framework, we model decision processes as graph expressions.
The knowledge evaluation phase provides decision options based on the knowledge and
assessments derived from the previous phases. This includes knowledge in the form of
graph components and “local” assessments from the knowledge extraction component. In
addition, we are able incorporate additional processed knowledge (i.e., knowledge as the
result of processing of knowledge) and “global” assessments derived by the knowledge
processing component. Knowledge evaluation is able to utilize a variety of decisions
processes to evaluate this knowledge and determine the possible decision options.
Note that our evaluation approach follows the decision principles outlined by Pearl
[126] which we incorporated into our framework as follows.
Rational Criteria We provide measurable factors in terms of quality and trust as-
sessment metrics based on which a particular decision can be chosen over another.
Flexible Specification Our abstract graph model provides a unified and formal ap-
proach to modeling data, knowledge derived from data, and uncertainty (i.e., quality,
trust) assessments.
Efficient Algorithms The knowledge evaluation part is able to base decisions on the
rational criteria, data model, and assessments through the use of graph expressions.
Since decision processes are implemented using graph expressions we are able to
model various simple (e.g., voting, ranking, weighting) as well as complex decision
making (e.g., Markov decision processes [137], ensemble classifiers [153]). Note that
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this approach represents a natural extension of the processing techniques used in the
knowledge processing component.
It is important to point out that our framework does not require a decision to be
based on only a single quality or trust assessment approach. Instead, the TrustKnowOne
framework incorporates ideas from ensemble learning [119, 134, 165] and consensus
learning [12, 55, 116]. The former combines a set of topic specific techniques into
a larger decision engine while the latter deals with changes in time and topology as
found in dynamic scenarios. The flexibility of our abstract graph model allows decision
processes of any kind to be incorporated. Since they are graph-based, approaches such
as generic aspects [81], valuations [150], evidential networks [14] and expected outcome
[13] which are frequently used in business applications are a natural fit for our abstract
graph model.
Furthermore, knowledge evaluation incorporates trust and quality of data into the
decision options. In particular, our framework provides a flexible knowledge evaluation
approach that combines knowledge and assessments in ways ranging from simple voting
or quorum schemes to complicated formulas that require a large number of parameters.
Note that the knowledge evaluation component has access to all data managed in the
abstract graph model as well as meta information and assessment metrics provided by the
belief engines of the knowledge processing component. This allows us to enhance decision
processes significantly by enabling context and various quality and trust assessments to
affect decision making. For instance, decision processes have the ability to focus on high
quality data or ignore data with low trustworthiness. While the specifics may depend on
the particular decision engine used, our framework makes additional meta information
available to be incorporated.
By extension, the decision of whether a data source is providing high quality and
trustworthy data can be based on the assessment of data quality and trustworthiness
of the individual data elements used in the decision. Furthermore, the knowledge eval-
uation component is able to maintain a history of previous decision options thereby
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allowing iterative improvements of decision making approaches.
5.4.2 Knowledge Evaluation: Requesting Additional or Chal-
lenging Existing Data
An important aspect of our framework is its ability to deal with changes in dynamic
environments. Hence, the knowledge evaluation component needs to be flexible enough
to address these changes (see [54, 57]). In particular, we provide the ability to ask for
more data and perform challenges on existing data. As discussed earlier, this incorpo-
rates reinforcement learning [83, 163] into the TrustKnowOne framework. For instance,
requesting additional data can be performed selectively by evaluating cost metrics of
data sources and determining the one with the best estimated return. Furthermore,
there are often multiple approaches to combining available information and deriving
knowledge from it. Therefore, knowledge evaluation could also adjust which quality
and trust assessments it incorporates as part of the decision process. This means the
application of different or improved belief engines such as choosing more complex ones
to increase decision confidence.
Since we provide confidence assessments with every decision option, thresholds can
be used to determine which action to take. For example, within intrusion detection
systems one could apply our framework in a manner where additional data is requested
from the monitored resources until the decision of whether they are trustworthy or have
been compromised can be made with a certain level of confidence.
5.4.3 Knowledge Evaluation: Interfaces to Other Systems
Knowledge derivation processes are often part of a larger system designed to solve a
scenario specific problem. For instance, determining which resources have been compro-
mised in an intrusion detection system should trigger notifications to relevant parties
and countermeasures from the system administrators. Because of the flexibility of our
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abstract graph model where graph expressions are used to perform a variety of functions
(e.g., knowledge processing, belief engines, decision processes), one could associate cer-
tain administrative graph expressions with appropriate actions to be executed. Since
knowledge evaluation provides a set of decision options with confidence assessments,
these graph expressions can be used to trigger various notifications based on config-
urable confidence thresholds (e.g., anomaly detection, outlier notification). In addition,
this approach allows queries from other processes (i.e., control systems, business logic)
concerning decision confidence, processed knowledge, and trustworthiness of data in-
cluding its sources which enhances the usefulness of the TrustKnowOne framework.
5.4.4 Knowledge Evaluation: Evaluation Lineage
As discussed in the knowledge extraction and knowledge processing components,
it is important to keep track of meta information about where data originated and
how it was processed. Since decision processes are implemented as graph expressions
similar lineage information (i.e., metric, graph components used) can be attached to the
resulting decisions.
Lineage allows for a key aspect of knowledge evaluation which is the ability to de-
termine the impact and relevance of specific data elements. In particular, we will base
our approach on the idea of minimum redundancy where data should be reasonably
separated in terms of their contribution and maximum relevance which means that only
measurements with the highest relevance should be included [131].
This approach has several advantages. First, it allows the framework to perform
knowledge and assessment model reduction which reduces complexity and increases
performance by including only a subset of the original graph components in the knowl-
edge evaluation component. Note that similar approaches include principal component
analysis [111]. However, one of the problems with reducing the amount of knowledge and
assessments is that it can potentially decrease the overall quality of the decision. Second,
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knowledge evaluation is able to optimize decision processes. By providing the formal
descriptions of decision processes our framework enables evaluation and comparison of
decision approaches. In particular, techniques such as maximum likelihood estimation
[3] can be used on sample knowledge and assessment distributions to determine suitable
parameters for decision processes as well as overcoming problems with partial evidence
during the decision making. Third, given the extensive lineage information provided
by the knowledge extraction and knowledge processing components we can determine
the usefulness of certain data sources which in combination with cost assessments al-
lows them to be evaluated and compared. This aspect can prove extremely valuable in
resource constrained (i.e., cost, time, performance) as well as dynamic scenarios (i.e.,
determining from which data source to request additional data).
5.4.5 Knowledge Evaluation: Cost Assessments
Since decision processes are modeled as graph expressions we use a similar cost
assessment approach to the one performed by the knowledge processing component.
In particular, parts of the decision processes can be annotated to include cost factors
representing aspects such as resources and time required to arrive at a decision. As
discussed in the architecture, knowledge evaluation is able to incorporate requests for
additional and challenge existing data. Because both of these costs are usually dynamic
the resulting cost factors need to include parameters to reflect this. Hence, the cost of
the knowledge evaluation is the sum of the decision process as well as any addition data
requests or challenges that need to be performed as part of the decision making.
costknowledgeevaluation = costdecision + costadditionaldata + cost
challenge
data
The formal representation of decision processes using graph expressions provides
advantages similar to the ones discusses in the knowledge processing. First, we are
able to perform a detailed cost analysis of individual decision techniques. Second, the
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formalization as graph expressions allows for comparison based on cost factors. Third,
decision processes can be reused in different application scenarios and in order to improve
decision approaches, adjustments can be made by simply extending graph expressions
in order to achieve better cost factors.
The overall cost of performing knowledge derivation is the sum of the costs of the
individual framework components.
costknowledgederivation =
costknowledgeextraction +costknowledgeprocessing + costknowledgeevaluation
Note that our TrustKnowOne provides a complete cost assessment approach that
includes all aspects of knowledge derivation. Specifically, our formalization allows for in-
dividual approaches (i.e., extraction, transformation, “local” and “global” assessments,
processing, decision making) to be evaluated, compared, and improved. Since our Trust-
KnowOne framework provides a clear separation between individual phases, the com-
binations of different approaches, especially in terms of belief engines with decision
processes, can be evaluated in detail in order to find the best possible for a particu-
lar scenario. Furthermore, using parameters in cost factors enables our framework to
perform cost assessment in both static and dynamic environments.
5.5 Evaluation of Model Vulnerabilities
Our TrustKnowOne framework provides a formal approach for knowledge derivation
that incorporates trust and quality of data. Given the fact that there is an overabun-
dance of different decision and assessment techniques all with their specific strengths
and weaknesses, it becomes crucial to assess the impact of attack models (see [162, 180])
in order to choose a combination of approaches that is fair, reliable, and secure. There-
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fore, we need to distinguish between operational system impairments that are random
and the assumption that correlated changes (possibly across time and space) in data
are often part of an attack.
In general, attack scenarios can affect two parts of our framework, data and context.
In particular, within the knowledge extraction phase, we face the problem of malicious
or compromised data sources and incorrect “local” meta information. As the knowledge
processing phase depends on this data from knowledge extraction in terms of graph
components, it is indirectly affected by any attack scenario. Furthermore, malicious
“global” information could be incorporated at this phase. The knowledge evaluation
phase is also indirectly affected since its decision processes are based on the data as well
as assessments provided by the previous phases.
One of the advantages of our framework is that it enables the evaluation of different
attack models (see [162, 180]) on an individual approach (i.e., belief engine, decision
process) as well as the entire knowledge derivation process. In particular, we determine
the robustness of approaches based on their ability to perform their respective function
(i.e., processing, assessment) with and without an attack present. In case of an indi-
vidual approach we take the result of no attack as a baseline and compare it against
the results achieved during various attack scenarios. As for the evaluation of the en-
tire knowledge derivation the process is similar while the baseline is represented by the
decision options available when no attack is present.
Using the robustness metrics in combination with cost assessments we can compare
the relative value and robustness of different schemes in various scenarios (e.g., [54, 57,
99, 122]). Note that, since all the decisions are ultimately based on some data, we can
evaluate the impact of missing, inaccurate or purposefully modified information using
the approach discussed above.
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5.6 Chapter Summary
The value and novelty of the TrustKnowOne framework lies in its formal descrip-
tion of knowledge derivation and assessment. We utilize the flexibility of our abstract
graph model Berlin to manage heterogeneous data. Furthermore, processing as well as
performing assessments are formalized as graph expressions that are evaluated on the
abstract graph model.
Our framework is divided into three phases, each with their clear responsibilities and
boundaries. Knowledge extraction provides an adapter approach to data acquisition that
transforms raw data into graph component equivalents. Furthermore, it assesses data on
a “local” level that does not require additional context. Knowledge processing enables
the implementation of processing approaches as graph expressions in order to derive
additional derived knowledge. It also incorporates belief engines which purpose is to
model “global” assessments that includes relationships. Knowledge evaluation provides
the ability to arrive at decisions using decision processes with various data, processed
data, “local” and “global” assessments available as basis.
For each of the components there are a number of aspects that make the framework
stand out from regular processing approaches found in literature. TrustKnowOne is
capable of dealing with dynamic environments by allowing various data acquisition
models, requesting additional data from data source, and challenging existing data. In
addition, the framework provides formal means to integrate data from different sources
with varying levels of trust.
The use of graph expressions to model approaches enables the formal description of
belief engines for assessments and decision processes for decisions thus enabling eval-
uation and comparison. Furthermore, graph expressions can easily be computed in
parallel thereby ensuring scalability. One of the main benefits of our approach is the
way the framework provides lineage information and cost assessments by annotating
graph components. As such, our TrustKnowOne framework is able to improve knowl-
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edge derivation through the use of an abstract graph model on which graph expressions
representing knowledge and assessments are evaluated.
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6
Scenario Analysis
The proposed framework will be of value to many applications such as sensor net-
works, participatory sensing, smart grids, cloud computing, and health care. In each
of these cases data is obtained from geographically distributed heterogeneous sources,
data is then processed and decisions need to be made. However, managing and integrat-
ing data from distributed heterogeneous sources as needed in these types of scenarios
presents a variety of problems.
In the previous chapters we presented the TrustKnowOne framework which allows
trust and quality of data aspects to be incorporated into knowledge derivation processes.
Here we present its application to three distinct scenarios. As part of the discussion we
will highlight how our approach exhibits both the formalization and flexibility neces-
sary to model each of the realistic scenarios. These scenarios are used to confirm the
advantages of the TrustKnowOne framework over current approaches.
We focus our analysis on the following representative and realistic scenarios. The
selected scenarios and their implementations are realistic in terms of being geograph-
ically distributed, exhibiting time dynamics, and consisting of large and diverse data
sets. First, we discuss how we can evaluate the trustworthiness of Smartphone Apps
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by incorporating a variety of relationship and context assessments. We show that this
approach yields a significant improvement over current methods that are based on basic
App attributes [95]. Our data set for this scenario contains a total 11326 Apps, 790940
reviews (651801 with text, 139139 without) as well as 134 different kinds of permissions
captured in July 2012. For this purpose we developed a web crawler to pull the real
and rich App attributes out of Google Play (Android Market). As such, our data is a
diverse representation of realistic data with complex attributes and relationships.
Second, we apply our framework to distributed collaborative sensing in the domain
of radiation detection. Here, we deal with changes in sensor values over time as well as
complex relationships between them. In particular, we combine data from three data
sources amounting to ≈ 2.5 million time stamped data points over the course of nine
months which are geographically distributed across Japan. Two of the data sets were
provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency [75] whereas the third data set
from Safecast [144] represents measurements taken from thousands of people in a col-
laborative sensing effort. As such, the Safecast [144] data represents a challenging data
set in terms of correlating related measurements, a common challenge in collaborative
sensing environments. Thus, the measurements captured in the three data sets provide
a realistic basis for evaluating our framework.
Third, intrusion detection provides a dynamic and challenging environment for
knowledge derivation because there exist a wide variety of approaches to determine
trustworthiness of system nodes. We discuss how our framework is able to formalize
one approach [54] in order to be able to compare and evaluate it against a number of
attacks. Our evaluation involves simulation of several dynamic systems with up to 60
nodes generating ≈ 9000 time stamped test messages over 75 days. The scope of this
scenario is realistic for demonstrating the effects of a variety of attacks and evaluating
trust assessment approaches on intrusion detection systems.
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6.1 Trusting Smartphone Apps
Smartphones are becoming the mobile hubs of information for many people and
companies. What started as a way to provide users with the flexibility of installing
small software components called Apps to enhance the usability of their phone has grown
into a global market with hundreds of thousands of applications built by thousands of
developers. However, while there are plenty of well established companies developing
useful applications or entertaining games there is no easy way to differentiate them from
companies that put users at risk or worse are directly distributing malware or spyware.
One attribute that is often used in distinguishing “good” Apps from “bad” ones are
their ratings. Nevertheless, research has shown that this can prove to be an unreliable
metric, especially in cases with low rating counts. Reviews are also supposed to provide
the user with an assessment of an App’s trustworthiness by real people. However, fake
reviews written by collaborators of the developer or the developer himself are common
to boost an App’s ranking. How is the average user able to distinguish between real
and fake reviews? Finally, Apps run inside a security sandbox and need permissions to
interact with the smartphone and the data stored on it. The problem is that users are
usually not aware of what specific permissions mean or why they need to be granted.
In this scenario1 we present a trustworthiness assessment model for Apps that takes
into consideration these factors as well as others to provide the user with an indication
of whether an App can be trusted and if so why. Furthermore, the model incorporates
various relations between Apps and we discuss whether or not they should have an
impact on the individual App’s assessment. The research demonstrates that in order to
make a decision to install an App one has to consider more than just App information
and look into its associated meta data as well. The TrustKnowOne framework presented
in chapter 5 enables the modeling of the smartphone App trustworthiness scenario
1A version of this scenario was published in Martin Kuehnhausen and Victor S. Frost. Trusting
Smartphone Apps? To install or not to install, that is the question. In 2013 IEEE International Multi-
Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support, 2013
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discussed here.
6.1.1 Trusting Apps: Overview
Until recently personal information was stored on users’ home computers and busi-
ness information was stored on company servers. Each had developed certain mech-
anisms to secure their information. Users set up passwords, firewalls and antivirus
scanners on their machines and companies employed virtual private networks, sophisti-
cated access control and intrusion detection systems. While this has not changed much
over the past years, what has changed is that information has moved from these “pro-
tected” areas to mobile phones. Phones have made the transition into smart devices
that are powerful enough to perform various functions that used to be limited to per-
sonal computers, laptops or servers. Furthermore, what used to be separated, personal
and business information is now mostly merged on a single device which causes secu-
rity issues. While some solutions have been developed in order to protect personal and
business information, most notably virtualization of multiple systems on a single smart-
phone [7], other areas such as the protection [45] and control over cloud and mobile data
remain problematic [56]. Furthermore, there is a recent initiative to use smartphones
as payment methods replacing credit cards such as Google Wallet [61].
One of the major threats for information stored on a smartphone are Apps that the
user installs. While many of them are used to extend features of the phone and make
it more usable or efficient, others may be malicious and only interested in harvesting
information [48]. The problem is that there is often no clear distinction between the
two, e.g., some Apps provide useful features while also collecting a lot of information.
The domain of mobile phone applications is inherently dynamic with changing App
attributes, relations and trust assessments as well as external context in the form of
meta about the Apps from other sources. Thus the App domain is well matched to
our trust framework which was initially outlined in [96] and discussed in detail as part
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of this research that allows for knowledge extraction, processing, and evaluation while
incorporating quality of data and trust.
We use three common approaches to evaluating perceived trust in Apps – ratings,
reviews and permissions – that when taken into consideration on their own they are
flawed. Therefore, as part of this dissertation we propose several trust assessments for
the approaches and show that the evaluation of basic App properties in combination with
these assessments can be useful. In particular, we discuss why each of the assessments
is necessary and evaluate their impact on the trustworthiness of a Apps as perceived by
the user.
The goal here is to make the user aware of any trust issues related to an App by
providing confidence metrics for its attributes because it improves the overall decision
process of whether or not to install an App. It is out of the scope of this discussion to
determine if an App is malicious or spyware as discussed in [132]. This determination is
hard since, as stated earlier, many Apps provide useful functionality while also exposing
private information (requesting read access to contact lists, calendars and social network
accounts, etc.). However, we develop metrics that can be used to alert users to take a
closer look at questionable Apps.
6.1.2 Trusting Apps: Framework Modeling Approach
Determining if Apps are trustworthy or not is a large scale data mining problem
since the number of Apps available is large (>500,000) and relationships between them
complex (similar set of permissions, one person reviewing multiple Apps, etc.). How-
ever, we propose to utilize a graph modeling approach where Apps and other related
information such as reviews and permissions are represented as nodes which allows us
to describe the various relationships as edges in a graph. This approach makes it easy
to traverse and correlate information by choosing a particular App and limiting the
number of related items (hops in graph terms) to consider.
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As stated above it is important to look at the information available directly such
as average rating and the number of reviews. However, also evaluating meta data like
whether a review is positive or negative or whether the App’s permissions requested are
reasonable may yield a better overall trustworthiness assessment. The problem is that
retrieving and utilizing this information is more complicated. For example, we could
assess the perceived sentiment of a review by the appearance of keywords (e.g., good,
great, bad) and the risks of a set of permissions by comparing them against other App’s
within the same category. However, in order to do this we need a flexible framework
that allows us to incorporate relationships between Apps, reviews and permissions as
well as meta information such as sentiment and rankings (position in Top Free, Top
Paid, etc.) into trustworthiness assessments.
Here, we have applied the TrustKnowOne framework which is able to extract, pro-
cess and evaluate knowledge and complex relationships from data that incorporates trust
and data quality assessments. First, we describe all relevant elements and relations to
be included in a graph model. Second, one or more belief engines modeling trustwor-
thiness are defined. They are able to utilize data from the graph model as well as meta
information to provide confidence assessments. Third, one or more decision processes
can use data from the graph model as well as incorporate confidence assessments from
the belief engines. Here, we show its application to determine the trustworthiness of
Apps.
A key element of the framework is the definition of metrics which can be thought
of as “computable” items derived from the graph model and meta information. Belief
engines and decision processes can be described using such metrics, which allows us to
abstract processing and evaluating knowledge in a formal way that avoids having to
deal with domain specific models. However, we need to be aware that sometimes data
is incomplete. Hence, we can only compute metrics for data values that exist. In the
case that values used to compute a metric do not exist, the metric itself does not exist
for these values. It is important for the decision engine to factor in those missing values
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and the existence of metrics as they could potentially skew the overall assessment.
We developed a web crawler to retrieve information about Apps from Google Play
(Android Market). In particular, we extracted the top 100 Apps in each of the 30
categories and their respective collections (Top Free, Top Paid, Top Grossing, etc.) in
July 2012. Because of some overlap (the same App could appear in multiple collections)
our data set contains a total 11326 Apps, 790940 reviews (651801 with text, 139139
without). There are 10444 Apps with permissions and we discovered 134 different kinds
of permissions overall.
Using this data set combined with a goal of trust assessment we will demonstrate
the following aspects of the TrustKnowOne framework for this scenario:
• Modeling heterogeneous data (Apps, categories, reviews, permissions) and rela-
tionships in our abstract graph model (section 4.1)
• Formalizing confidence assessments for App attributes using context and expected
behavior as belief engines (section 5.3.1)
• Representing decision making as formal decision processes with the option of
whether or not to incorporate confidence assessments (section 5.4.1)
An overview of how the scenario relates to individual components of our framework
is shown in figure 6.1.1. Here, we introduce these components which we will discuss in
detail throughout this section.
Knowledge Extraction In this scenario we model relevant smartphone entities such
as Apps, categories, reviews, and permissions. Here, we utilize the web crawler described
above to create a data set at a particular time instance. While it is possible to run the
crawler at different times thus creating time series information for Apps we focus our
discussion on one particular instance. As such the element instance graph is a static
representation of Google Play (Android Market).
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Figure 6.1.1: Framework overview for the trusting smartphone Apps sce-
nario
Knowledge Processing We take into consideration context and expected behavior
(e.g., ratings distributions, word dictionary, sentiment database, permission knowledge
base) in order to derive confidence assessments for the App’s rating value, reviews
and permissions. In particular, belief engines showcase deterministic and probabilistic
approaches in determining trustworthiness and quality of data. As a result we provide
a variety of assessment that can be combined with basic App information to make
decisions about trusting smartphone Apps.
Knowledge Evaluation Using the confidence assessments derived by the knowledge
processing phase we have various options to incorporate them into the decision making
process. Here, we compare two approaches. The first one, does not utilize confidence
assessments and yields a trustworthiness assessment based only on the App attributes.
However, the second approach relates them to the respective attributes thus enabling
decision engines to form better decisions. We compare these approaches and discuss why
the latter provides a better representation of the state of trusting smartphone Apps.
Next, we present a detailed analysis in which aspects of the scenario are related to
the TrustKnowOne framework.
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Figure 6.1.2: App element description graph
6.1.3 Trusting Apps: Knowledge Extraction
Smartphone Apps have a variety of properties and while most users are aware of basic
ones such as the average rating or number of downloads they pay less attention to others
(e.g., number of ratings, number of one star ratings, etc.). In addition Apps can form
complex relationships with other Apps as well as categories, permissions, and reviews.
This needs to be modeled accordingly if one is to derive trustworthiness assessments for
Apps.
The abstract graph model we propose is shown in figure 6.1.2 where the key com-
ponent is the individual App element. The App domain there are a variety of attributes
which we can broadly classify into
informative author name, description, name
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less relevant date published, number of downloads, price
relevant rating count, average rating value, number of one to five star ratings
Specifically, we will focus our trustworthiness assessment on the relevant attributes
and will incorporate only those into our discussion of this scenario. Package names
(e.g., com.google.android.apps.maps for Google Maps) are used to uniquely identify
Apps. Categories are used to group Apps and we model them as elements that are
identified by a name. The relationship between an App and its Category is expressed
by the app-category relation.
Every App has some extended information associated with it. In particular, the
Permissions it requires and the Reviews that were made of it. Permissions contain a
label used to identify it, a description providing additional information, and a level which
can either be safe or dangerous. The user installing an App needs to specifically request
seeing safe permissions whereas dangerous permissions are automatically prominently
displayed. Reviews describe user feedback for an App. It is actually a combination
of rating and textual review. Thus, every Review has a rating but not every Review
contains text. While there are a number of other attributes such as author, date, device,
title, and version our focus is on the rating and text attributes. Since a Review is always
associated with an App its unique identifier is a composite of a review id and the App’s
id. We model relationships accordingly by introducing app-review and app-permissions
relations.
Note that here we only discuss elements and relations relevant to our trustworthiness
approach (figure 6.1.2). Other components of the abstract graph model such as other
elements (e.g., Badge, PermissionGroup, Collection), additional attributes (e.g., file
size, software version), and more complex relationships (e.g., also installed, also viewed,
same developer) are present but not considered in the initial trustworthiness approach
we present here. However, the flexibility of the proposed framework facilitates their
inclusion in the future.
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Figure 6.1.3: App element instance graph example for Google Maps
Figure 6.1.3 shows a subset of the data that is being modeled. For clarity’s sake
we have chosen only a few relevant attributes to be displayed. In particular, we have
a Google Maps Android App element node with the rating count (number of ratings)
and rating value (average rating) attributes. We show two Review element nodes with
their rating attributes. Note that these element nodes make use of a composite id as
specified above. They are connected to the App using the app-reviews relation edge
accordingly. Furthermore, two example Permission element nodes with varying level
states are shown. We express their relationship with the App as app-permissions relation
edges. The Travel & Local category element node is interesting as it only has the name
attribute. It is connected via the app-category relation edge.
6.1.4 Trusting Apps: Knowledge Processing
As part of this dissertation we propose a number of trustworthiness assessments
ranging from 0% to 100% for App attributes. In particular, we consider assessments of
ratings, reviews and permissions as well as relationships between Apps. We will discuss
how they can be utilized and why they are necessary in determining an App’s trust.
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6.1.4.1 App Ratings
Of the several attributes that users look at when considering installing an App is
its rating (on a 1 to 5 star scale). However, the often used average rating score is not
necessarily a good indicator [29] because it is usually large, in our data set the average
rating is 4.2 with a standard deviation of 0.64. Here, we discuss two ways of measuring
the confidence a user should have in the average rating.
Number of Ratings As the number of ratings grows so should our confidence in the
meaning of the average value. We have two options to derive at such a measure. On
the one hand, we can compute the sample standard deviation s of the 1 through 5 star
ratings and use this estimate to determine the standard error SEx̄. On the other hand,
we propose to use the Student’s t-distribution which does not require a known standard
deviation and approximates a normal distribution as the degrees of freedom approach
infinity. This allows us to propose a confidence metric using only the number of ratings
n as
c#rating(n) =

0 if n ≤ 6
1− ST (n)√
n− 1
if n > 6
(6.1.1)
where
ST (n) = CDF−1T∼(n−1)(0.975) (6.1.2)
is the value of the inverse cumulative distribution function of the Student’s t-distribution
with n− 1 degrees of freedom at a two-sided 95% confidence interval with
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lim
n→∞
CDF−1ST∼(n−1)(0.975) = 1.96 (6.1.3)
representing a sample estimation of the standard deviation approaching normal distri-
bution. Hence, for very large n the proposed metric can be related to the standard error
as
lim
n→∞
ST (n)√
n− 1
≈ s√
n
= SEx̄ (6.1.4)
One can easily see that using the Student’s t-distribution is preferable because the
standard deviation for a low number of biased ratings would yield an undesired high
confidence. For example, 10 five star ratings give s = 0 and ST (10) = 2.262 which
results in a confidence indicator of 1− s√10 = 100% for s and a confidence indicator of
1 − ST (10)√10−1 = 24.6% for the proposed approach. Note that the Bayesian rating in [29]
could also be used to adjust the value of the rating. In terms of our abstract graph
model we have:
Expression 6.1.1 c#rating
The confidence in the number of ratings c#rating is expressed using the
sample size confidence model expression. It is based on equation 6.1.1
and here we apply it to the rating count attribute of an App.
App
apply to
c#rating
SampleSizeConfidence
ratingCount
122
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(a) Skew left: trend is towards high
ratings
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(b) Skew right: trend is towards low
ratings
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(c) Unimodal constant: ratings are
leaning heavily towards a constant
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(d) Normal: ratings are distributed
around one mean
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(e) Uniform: ratings do not have a
meaningful separation
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(f) Bimodal constant: ratings are
leaning heavily towards to the ex-
tremes
1 2 3 4 5
Stars
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f R
a
tin
g
s
(g) Bimodal normal: ratings are
distributed around two means
Figure 6.1.4: Examples of rating distribution types
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Ratings Distribution Type Figure 6.1.4 shows a variety of distribution types pos-
sible for App ratings. They are important in determining the meaning of the average
rating for an App. In particular, we need to consider the following cases:
Unimodal The average rating is a reasonable reflection of the App’s quality where
the majority of ratings fall within the range of the average rating (Figures 6.1.4a-6.1.4d).
Uniform The ratings do not have a meaningful separation (trending towards good
or bad) and hence, the average is not an accurate interpretation of the overall ratings
(Figure 6.1.4e).
Bimodal The ratings fall into two extreme categories (usually really good and
really bad). This is troublesome since the average rating is a deceiving reflection of the
App’s quality (Figures 6.1.4f and 6.1.4g).
We propose the following weighted means difference algorithm to discover bimodal
trends in these distributions. The result is a metric of how close the distribution is
to either one or two constants. Note that, since we are only interested in discovering
a trend we do not need to separate uniform and symmetrical bimodal distributions.
However, in order to make this distinction one could use Shannon’s information entropy
[149].
Here, we develop a weighted means difference algorithm to ratings distributions but
it can easily be generalized to other discrete or continuous distributions. Some resulting
measures are shown in table 6.1.1.
First, we separate the n ratings into the following sets
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Table 6.1.1: Result of the weighted means difference algorithm for ratings
distributions (number of 1-5 stars)
Difference Distribution
→ 0.0 constant
≈ 0.25 unimodal
1.0 uniform or bimodal
≈ 1.5 bimodal
→ 2.0 two constants
R = {r0, . . . , rn} (6.1.5)
Rs = {r0, . . . , rn|r = s} (6.1.6)
Rlow = {r0, . . . , rn|r ∈ {1, 2, 3}} (6.1.7)
Rhigh = {r0, . . . , rn|r ∈ {3, 4, 5}} (6.1.8)
where ri is the ith rating in stars and |R| = n. The average rating is calculated as
R = 1
n
∑
ri∈R
ri (6.1.9)
Second, we consider the following special cases:
|Rlow| = 0 There are only high ratings (four and five stars) and the distribution
is either skewed left normal or a constant. Hence the weighted means difference only
depends on the high ratings
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wmd(R) =
|R4| × abs
(
R− 4
)
n
+
|R5| × abs
(
R− 5
)
n
(6.1.10)
|Rhigh| = 0 There are only low ratings (one and two stars) and the distribution
is either skewed right normal or a constant. Hence the weighted means difference only
depends on the low ratings
wmd(R) =
|R1| × abs
(
R− 1
)
n
+
|R2| × abs
(
R− 2
)
n
(6.1.11)
Third, we calculate the average of the lower and upper ratings sets
Rlow =
1
|Rlow|
∑
ri∈Rlow
ri (6.1.12)
Rhigh =
1
|Rhigh|
∑
ri∈Rhigh
ri (6.1.13)
and factor in the number of ratings in each of them
wlow =
|Rlow|
|Rlow|+ |Rhigh|
(6.1.14)
whigh =
|Rhigh|
|Rlow|+ |Rhigh|
(6.1.15)
to derive a weighted means difference with respect to the overall average rating
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wmd(R) = wlow × abs
(
R−Rlow
)
+ whigh × abs
(
R−Rhigh
)
(6.1.16)
Therefore, another confidence metric in the average rating is
crating(R) = 1−
wmd(R)
2 (6.1.17)
Expression 6.1.2 crating
The confidence in the ratings distribution crating is based on the described
weigted means difference algorithm which is implemented in the distribu-
tion type model expression. As input we use the distribution of rating
stars. Furthermore, we normalize the result to yield a confidence metric
between 0% and 100% accordingly.
App
apply to
c
rating
subtract
divide
2.0
DistributionType
fiveStarsfourStarsthreeStarstwoStarsoneStars
1.0
6.1.4.2 Reviews
Since users associate a review with a “recommendation” by real people, it is a valu-
able resource for evaluating an App. However, there are a number of problems associated
with evaluating reviews. Influential fake and bad reviews can dominate over interesting
127
and useful ones [112, 120]. Furthermore, users review Apps differently when they can
keep their identity anonymous [41]. Identifying fake reviews is beyond the scope of
this discussion. Here, we focus on two other metrics that typically influence a user’s
perception of a review. Let us consider the text of a review as a collection of words
T = {w0, . . . , wn} (6.1.18)
where wi is the ith word of text in the review.
Spelling Correct spelling can be an indicator of professionalism. Therefore, when
looking at reviews we need to factor in the number of misspelled words. The proposed
confidence metric in terms of spelling is defined as
cspelling(T ) = 1−
|Tms|
|T |
if |T | ≥ 1 (6.1.19)
where
Tms = {w0, . . . , wn|w ∈ T,w misspelled} (6.1.20)
is the set of misspelled words. Note that for our spell checking purposes we use [1].
As part of our framework we can define this confidence as follows.
Expression 6.1.3 cspelling
The confidence in spelling cspelling can be defined using the spellcheck
model expression which implements equation 6.1.19. In this case we apply
it to the text attribute of a Review.
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Review
apply to
cspelling
SpellCheck
text
Sentiment Analysis Whether a review is positive or negative can be evaluated using
sentiment analysis. One approach is to describe the overall sentiment of a review is by
finding words in the review that represent a positive or negative sentiment for the set
Ts = {w0, . . . , wn|w ∈ T, ∃ sentiment for w} (6.1.21)
with the overall sentiment defined as
sent(T ) =
∑
wi∈Ts
sent(wi) (6.1.22)
where sent(wi) is the sentiment of a word and sent(T ) of the entire review. Because
more text does not necessarily imply more words with sentiments we propose to make
the sentiment proportional to the number of words in the review and bound it by the
number of words with sentiments.
sentp(T ) =
sent(T )
max(
√
|T |, |Ts|)
if |T | ≥ 1 (6.1.23)
This means that the same number of words with sentiments have more impact the
shorter the review is. Furthermore, sentiment analysis is based on positive or negative
values associated with specific words. Here, we use a word list by Nielsen [115]. There-
fore, we need to normalize them to a common scale between 0 representing negative,
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0.5 neutral and 1 positive overall sentiments which yields
sentscaled(T ) =
sentp(T ) + abs (0− sentmin)
sentmax − sentmin
(6.1.24)
where sentmin and sentmax represent the minimum and maximum possible sentiment
values used. This sentiment is a good additional indirect indicator of the App’s quality.
However, here we are interested in how closely the sentiment of the review text reflects
the review’s star rating. Discrepancies lower the confidence in a review which we leads
us to define a confidence metric as
csentiment(T ) = 1− abs
(
r − 1
4 − sentscaled(T )
)
(6.1.25)
where r−14 is the rating given in connection with the review adjusted to range from
1 star (0% confidence) to 5 stars (100% confidence) and the overall confidence the
difference between this rating and the review’s sentiment. This approach is reflected in
the following graph model representation.
Expression 6.1.4 csentiment
The confidence in the sentiment csentiment is modeled as an expression
tree that uses a series of mathematical operations compute the difference
between the sentiment and its rating. In particular, the sentiment model
expression reflects equation 6.1.24. We then combine the sentiment anal-
ysis result with several math expressions as discussed in equation 6.1.25.
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Review
apply to
csentiment
subtract
absolute value
subtract
Sentiment
text
divide
4.0
subtract
1.0rating
1.0
6.1.4.3 Permissions
Apps require permissions to utilize smartphone system functionality as well as to
read and write user data. Users are often overwhelmed by the complexity of permis-
sions and even developers generally lack a thorough understanding of which ones are
necessary and which ones are too invasive [47, 49]. However, permissions are like keys
to information stored on the smartphone. We present several approaches to determine
the trustworthiness of Apps based on the sets of permissions they require but focus on
the dangerous ones.
Number of Permissions The number of permissions used within a particular cate-
gory can be a good indication of how many permissions are adequate for an App in the
specific category. Given the sets
C = {c0, . . . , cn} (6.1.26)
Ac = {a0, . . . , an} (6.1.27)
W = {A0 ∪ · · · ∪An|∀c ∈ C} (6.1.28)
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where ci is the ith category, ai is the ith App in category c and Ac the set of Apps for a
particular category c consider the following sets of permissions
P = {p0, . . . , pn} (6.1.29)
Pa = {p0, . . . , pn|App a has p} (6.1.30)
P c = {P0 ∪ · · · ∪ Pn|a ∈ Ac} (6.1.31)
where pi is the ith permission, Pa the set of permissions for the App a, and P c the
permissions for the category c. We can define the average number of permissions for a
category
P c =
∑
a∈Ac |Pa|
|Ac|
(6.1.32)
and overall
P =
∑
c∈C
∑
a∈Ac |Pa|
|W |
(6.1.33)
This allows us to propose a model for the permission confidence using the following
ratios for categories
ccategory#permissions(n) =
P c!
n! × P
cn−P c (6.1.34)
and
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Figure 6.1.5: Distribution of App permissions
c#permissions(n) =
P !
n! × P
n−P (6.1.35)
overall where n is the App’s number of permissions as well as P c and P the rounded
averages described above. Note that this confidence is based on the ratio of Poisson
probabilities. We use the Poisson distribution here as it has the advantage of being
displaying tail characteristics that are more suitable to describing the distribution of
permissions as shown in Figure 6.1.5 where most Apps have only few permissions. As
for our evaluation we focus on dangerous App permissions.
Expression 6.1.5 dangerous App permissions
Since permissions are always associated with an App we retrieve all its
neighbors that match the Permission type and are dangerous.
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App
apply to
dangerous App permissions
Neighbors
ElementNode
and
equal
dangerouslevel
is Permission type
ElementNode
label
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
Expression 6.1.6 overall dangerous App permissions
The overall dangerous App permission metric retrieves dangerous per-
missions from all element nodes that are part of the App list. Two list
model expression are used here. For each repeats the evaluating expres-
sion for all Apps while ungroup converts the lists of App permissions into
one combined list of permissions.
overall dangerous App permissions
UnGroup
ForEach
App list
dangerous app permissions
evaluatingExpression
Expression 6.1.7 Pdangerous
The average number of dangerous App permission Pdangerous then be-
comes a straightforward ratio of the number of all dangerous App per-
missions and the number of Apps.
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Pdangerous
divide
count
App list
count
overall dangerous App permissions
Expression 6.1.8 c#permissions
The confidence in the number of dangerous permissions c#permissions can
be expressed using a combination of basic expressions and the Poisson
model expression. Note that we utilize the average number of dangerous
permissions Pdangerous both, as mean for the Poisson distribution and as
best case for the resulting probability density.
App
apply to
c#permissions
divide
Poisson
PdangerouspmfPdangerous
lambda
type
Poisson
count
Neighbors
ElementNode
and
equal
dangerouslevel
is Permission type
includeExpression
pmfPdangerous
lambda
type
Type of Permissions Because some permissions are more common than others (see
table 6.1.2) we also consider the different types of permissions used by a particular
135
Table 6.1.2: Most used permissions across 30 categories from our data set
of 11326 Apps with 134 different kinds of permissions as of July 2012
Permission Apps with Average
permission rank
full Internet access 80.83% 1.03
view network state 54.88% 2.57
modify/delete USB storage contents
modify/delete SD card contents 53.88% 2.67
read phone state and identity 39.63% 4.13
control vibrator 27.62% 5.43
prevent tablet from sleeping
prevent phone from sleeping 22.38% 7.30
coarse (network-based) location 16.54% 8.10
automatically start at boot 14.13% 9.53
fine (GPS) location 11.38% 12.60
Market billing service 10.44% 13.40
discover known accounts 9.96% 12.30
take pictures and videos 8.29% 16.47
read contact data 7.97% 14.13
view Wi-Fi state 7.79% 13.13
Market license check 7.58% 13.33
App. Most used permissions are also reported in [47, 132]. We adapt the Jaccard
set similarity [77] and propose the following for bags of permissions to compare an
App’s set of permissions with the weighted set of average permissions required by other
Apps in the same category and overall. Note that a bag is a set of items where each
particular item can occur multiple times. Hence, we normalize the confidence in a set
of permissions by treating 75% similarity and above as 100% confidence for categories
as
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ccategorypermissions(Pa) = min
(
4
3 ×
|P̂a|
|P̂ |
, 1
)
(6.1.36)
where P̂ c is the bag of all permissions {P0 ] · · · ] Pn|a ∈ Ac} for a particular category
and P̂a is the bag of permissions {p0, . . . , pn|p ∈ Pa} ⊆ P̂ c of an App. Similarly, for all
Apps we define the confidence metric as
cpermissions(Pa) = min
(
4
3 ×
|P̂a|
|P̂ |
, 1
)
(6.1.37)
where P̂ is the bag of all permissions {P0 ] · · · ] Pn|a ∈ W} overall and P̂a is the
bag of permissions {p0, . . . , pn|p ∈ Pa} ⊆ P̂ of an App.
Expression 6.1.9 cpermissions
The confidence in the type of dangerous permissions cpermissions is mod-
eled using the Jaccard index model expression applied to the set of dan-
gerous permissions of the particular App and the bag of dangerous per-
missions of all Apps. The similarity level above which the confidence
results in 100% confidence can be adjusted using the system parameter
similarity.
App
apply to
cpermissions
min
1.0
divide
similarity
JaccardIndex
bagsoverall dangerous App permissionsdangerous App permissions
A
B
type
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6.1.5 Trusting Apps: Knowledge Evaluation
In order to assess the trustworthiness of an App we consider the three basic at-
tributes – average rating, average review score, and number of permissions – and their
trustworthiness assessments as described above. We compare a decision process based
only on these attributes with one that includes confidences for the attributes. We pro-
pose a basic decision process (more sophisticated decision engines are a topic for future
research) as a weighted sum of the scaled attributes
trust(App) =
∑
wi ×mi (6.1.38)
where wi is the assigned weight with
∑
wi = 1 and mi one of the following metrics:
m1 = r−14 the scaled average rating with r being the App’s rating
m2 = 1|reviews|
∑
ri∈reviews
ri−1
4 the scaled average review rating with ri as the re-
view’s rating
m3 = max(ϕ−pϕ , 0) the scaled number of dangerous permissions with p as the
number of dangerous permissions and ϕ a scaling parameter (10 by default)
We can model these metrics as the following expressions.
Expression 6.1.10 m1
The scaled average ratingm1 can be modeled using basic math expressions
which are performed on an App’s rating value.
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App
apply to
m1
divide
4.0
subtract
1.0ratingValue
Expression 6.1.11 m2
The scaled average review rating m2 can be expressed using the neighbors
model expression where the rating of each Review is scaled using math
expressions.
App
apply to
m2
average
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Review type
ElementNode
divide
4.0
subtract
1.0rating
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
Expression 6.1.12 m3
The scaled number of dangerous permissions m3 is modeled by using the
neighbors model expression to determine the set of dangerous permissions
and math expressions. The scaling factor is expressed as an adjustable
system parameter ϕ.
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App
apply to
m3
max
0
divide
ϕ
subtract
count
Neighbors
ElementNode
and
equal
dangerouslevel
is Permission type
includeExpression
ϕ
Given the metrics discussed above we can then define equation 6.1.38.
Expression 6.1.13 trust
The trustworthiness of an App considering only the basic attribute met-
rics scaled average rating, scaled average review rating, and scaled num-
ber of dangerous permissions is modeled using a weighted sum model ex-
pression on the previously defined metrics as specified by equation 6.1.38.
We provide the ability to change the weighting scheme by adjusting the
system parameters w1, w2 and w3.
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App
apply to
trust
WeightedSum
List
w3w2w1
List
m3m2m1
values weights
As shown in figure 6.1.6, each of the trustworthiness assessments ranges from 0%
to 100% confidence and allows for a reasonable separation between “good” and “bad”
Apps. Factoring these into our decision process we adjust each metric by the confidence
in it. This means that if a metric is trusted 100% it does not change but that overall
the lower the confidence is the lower the metric score will be. Note that, we associate
the fact that a metric does not exist with 0% confidence. The proposed decision process
becomes
trust+(App) =
∑
wi ×mi ×
(
∆m1i ×∆m2i
)
(6.1.39)
where wi and mi are the weights and metrics defined above which we adjust using
the respective assessments ∆m1i and ∆m2i for each of the metrics. In particular:
∆m11 = c#rating(n) the confidence in the number of ratings
∆m21 = crating(R) the confidence in average rating considering the distribution of
ratings
∆m12 = 1|reviews|
∑
T∈reviews cspelling(T ) the average confidence in the reviews con-
sidering their spelling
∆m22 = 1|reviews|
∑
T∈reviews csentiment(T ) the average confidence in the reviews con-
sidering the difference between their rating and sentiment
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(a) Confidence in number of ratings,
µ = 63.88% and σ = 37.54%
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(b) Confidence in average rating con-
sidering distribution of ratings, µ =
67.46% and σ = 23.59%
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(c) Confidence in a review considering
spelling, µ = 91.84% and σ = 15.86%
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(d) Confidence in a review considering
sentiment rating difference, µ = 63.54%
and σ = 16.04%
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(e) Confidence in number of danger-
ous permissions, µ = 68.13% and σ =
31.52%
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(f) Confidence in set of dangerous per-
missions using 75% set similarity as
100% confidence, µ = 56.97% and σ =
29.81%
Figure 6.1.6: Trustworthiness assessments overview
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∆m13 = c#permissions(n) the confidence in the number of dangerous permissions
∆m23 = cpermissions(Pa) the confidence in the set of dangerous permissions
While some of the metrics have been discussed as part of the knowledge processing
component the other ones can be defined using the following expressions.
Expression 6.1.14 ∆m12
The average confidence in the spelling of reviews ∆m12 can be expressed
using the neighbors model expression where we evaluate the cspelling metric
on each Review.
App
apply to
∆m12
average
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Review type
ElementNode
cspelling
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
Expression 6.1.15 ∆m22
The average confidence in the sentiment of reviews ∆m22 is modeled in
a similar fashion. Hence, the neighbors model expression is used to eval-
uate the csentiment metric for each Review accordingly and the results
subsequently averaged.
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App
apply to
∆m22
average
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Review type
ElementNode
csentiment
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
As a result the enhanced version of determining App trustworthiness which incor-
porates confidence assessments is defined as:
Expression 6.1.16 trust+
The trustworthiness of an App considering factoring in confidence assess-
ments for the basic attribute metrics scaled average rating, scaled average
review rating, and scaled number of dangerous permissions is modeled us-
ing a weighted sum model expression on the previously definedmetrics and
the confidences as specified by equation 6.1.39. Here, we provide the abil-
ity to change the weighting scheme by adjusting the system parameters
w1, w2 and w3 as well.
App
apply to
trust+
WeightedSum
List
w3w2w1
List
multiply
multiply
cpermissionsc#permissions
m3
multiply
multiply
∆m22∆m12
m2
multiply
multiply
c
rating
c#rating
m1
values weights
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(a) only average app rating: w1 =
1, w2 = 0, w3 = 0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
attributes only with confidences
trust assessment
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f a
p
p
s
(b) only average review ratings: w1 =
0, w2 = 1, w3 = 0. Note that 58.52%
of the Apps in the data set do not have
any reviews.
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(c) only dangerous permissions: w1 =
0, w2 = 0, w3 = 1
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(d) all attributes equally: w1 = 13 , w2 =
1
3 , w3 =
1
3
Figure 6.1.7: Comparison of App trustworthiness assessments between
using only metrics (equation 6.1.38) and including confidence assessments
(equation 6.1.39) for a variety of different weights.
The results for the Apps in the data set using different weights are shown in fig-
ure 6.1.7. It is notable that factoring in confidences results in a significant difference in
the trust assessments. Whenever we include the confidences we generally lower the over-
all trust in an App. However, the overall trustworthiness distribution of the Apps with
confidences seems far more reasonable than without. Especially for often artificially
inflated ratings we notice a more evenly spaced distribution with a lot fewer “good”
Apps (Figure 6.1.7a).
Furthermore, most of the distributions noticeably change which impacts the number
of Apps above certain trust thresholds. For example, considering all attributes with
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equal weights (Figure 6.1.7d) without the confidence metrics about 5% of the Apps
have a trust level above 90% but including the confidence metrics leads to the top 5% of
Apps having trustworthiness assessments between 55% and 65%. This shows that there
is no clear threshold available that could be used by a user to determine trustworthiness
of Apps. However, the results describe overall trends and relative rankings which in
combination with the individual confidence metrics allow the user to perform a more
detailed analysis of an App.
The trustworthiness assessments shown in Figure 6.1.6 make it clear that individual
attributes of Apps have various levels of trust and that this should be considered when
using these attributes to determine trust. Hence, incorporating these assessments into
the overall decision process using a weighted approach such as trust+ (Equation 6.1.39)
or more sophisticated methods is a necessary step towards improving the overall trust
assessment of Apps as shown in Figure 6.1.7.
It is important to note that some App attributes as well as trustworthiness assess-
ments may be better suited to the needs of one decision process than another. One
also needs to consider the fact that some confidence metrics yield contrasting results for
the same App attribute. This means that the ultimate decision on how to utilize these
attributes and their confidences is up to the user. However, as part of this disserta-
tion we proposed potential trustworthiness assessments and showed that it is necessary
to incorporate them into the overall decision process because even though two Apps
may have similar attribute values such as average ratings their “true” value may be far
different.
6.1.6 Trusting Apps: Summary
Trust assessment of Apps is necessary and important since smartphones are becom-
ing the new information hubs for people and companies but their security is generally
lacking (rooting is common, malware and spyware widely circulated) such that there is
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no guarantee that information is safe. In addition, even App stores (Google Play, Apple
App store) often contain unsafe Apps.
In this scenario we discussed the application of our formal but flexible framework
to the domain of smartphone Apps. In particular, we modeled a heterogeneous system
using the abstract graph model described in chapter 4. Furthermore, we proposed several
metrics that can be utilized to determine confidence in App attributes such as average
rating, average reviews rating and number of dangerous permissions and provided formal
representations of them using graph expressions (section 4.4). Most importantly we
showed that incorporating these confidence metrics using our approach described in
chapter 5 is helpful in determining trustworthiness and ultimately whether to install
an App or not. As such, we developed two decision processes and described them in
detail using graph expressions. Furthermore, the entire scenario shows how flexible our
framework since every computation and assessment is simply based on evaluating formal
graph expressions on formal graph components.
Future research will focus on evaluating the quality of the recommendation based
on the proposed techniques and refining the decision engines. For instance, one could
easily extend the current decision process to only consider Apps as trustworthy where
no confidence metric falls below a certain threshold.
Furthermore, even though we proposed trustworthiness assessments that take into
consideration relationships between Apps we need to investigate assessments of Apps
at various levels:
local looking only at the attributes of a single App without considering its relation to
other Apps (rating but not compared to average rating of all Apps, etc.)
similar comparing Apps with “similar” attributes (similar rating, similar number of
reviews, etc.)
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related comparing Apps that share relationships among each other (same developer,
also installed, also viewed, etc.)
category comparing Apps in the same category as they should have similar attributes
but may be unrelated and hence potentially leads to Apps forming clusters
global comparing a single App to all other Apps
external meta data using information from outside the primary source (i.e., Google
Play) and correlating it with the existing Apps attributes and relationships.
By using the TrustKnowOne framework described here we provide an approach based
on graph expressions that allows existing as well as future belief engines and decision
processes to be implemented. In particular, these graph expressions can be associated
with metrics and cost assessments thereby enabling approaches to be evaluated and
compared formally.
6.2 Radiation Detection in Heterogeneous Sen-
sor Networks
Here a radiation detection scenario will be used to illustrate the kind of data and
processes our TrustKnowOne framework will be able to consider. Imagine the following;
a set of sensors are available to measure levels of radiation. These sensors could be
privately owned (connected to or part of a smart phone) or part of a government sensor
network. The goal is to use geographically distributed radiation readings from a set of
heterogeneous sensors to decide if the environment is safe. In general, the groups of
radiation detectors shown in table 6.2.1 may be present.
Note that cost could be an indicator of the accuracy and capabilities of the radiation
sensors; more expensive sensors could not only detect the presence but the type of
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Table 6.2.1: Radiation sensor groups
Type Trustworthiness Security Cost
public not verified not signed low
non-government/private varying varying varying
government verified signed high or medium
radiation, e.g., Alpha, Beta and Gamma radiation. These groups possess sensors of
varying cost, accuracy and trust which means the resulting observations need to have a
differentiated influence on the decision making process of telling whether or not there
is radiation present.
Furthermore, the entire set of heterogeneous sensors forms various physical (geo-
graphically close) and logical (e.g., same owner, same class of sensor, or same age of
sensor) relationships that we are able to utilize in our framework to determine the accu-
racy of the radiation detection and the trust we have in specific sensors. In the decision
making process we may want to trust readings from government sources more than
from public or private sensors because they are signed and verified. In addition, mobile
sensors move and their readings from previous locations are not necessarily accurate
anymore but we could still use the data to a certain degree when determining radiation,
thus making the measurements also time varying.
The use of a network of geographically distributed heterogeneous sensors combined
with the our framework could have proved useful to detect the radiation levels at Japan’s
earthquake-stricken Fukushima nuclear power plant and contributed to decisions con-
cerning the safety of the surrounding environment. We chose this scenario to showcase
how our framework is able to model the heterogeneous system of sensors and its com-
plex relationships necessary to improve the knowledge derivation process for radiation
detection.
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6.2.1 Radiation Detection: Overview
Radiation detection is a natural application of sensor networks. In this section, we
discuss how our framework can be applied to what is referred to as collaborative sensing.
Sensor networks and in particular radiation detection networks used to be expensive to
set up, difficult to maintain and often under the authority of a government agency.
However, the cost of sensors has decreased to the point where consumers are able to
purchase them. Furthermore, the capabilities of sensors have improved dramatically.
This means that both application-specific sensors (e.g., for radiation detection) as well
as multi-purpose sensors (e.g., GPS, temperature, and humidity combined) can now be
utilized more efficiently (i.e., using one multi-purpose sensor instead of multiple specific
ones) and effectively (i.e., higher accuracy with lower cost).
Nevertheless, several problems remain to be solved. For instance, the availability of
a various sensor types is prone to create heterogeneous environments in which data in-
tegration and fusion become necessary preprocessing steps before data can be analyzed.
Specifically for the radiation detection there are several different types of detectors for
individual radiation sources (e.g., cosmic, terrestrial, nuclear), elements (e.g., Caesium,
Plutonium, Uranium), and emissions (e.g., alpha, beta, gamma rays). Furthermore,
detecting radiation is sensitive to several factors such as location (e.g., inside buildings,
open field) as well as measurement inaccuracies (i.e., ground level, at 1 meter height,
sensor calibration).
These physical aspects then need to be considered with respect to logical context
such as ownership and trustworthiness, all of which makes radiation detection one of the
most complex sensor network application scenarios. In particular, during the Fukushima
nuclear incident in 2011 Safecast [144] reported that there were problems with commu-
nicating radiation level measurements in a timely manner because of bureaucracy and
political pressure. When data was released it was often incomplete or inaccurate. While
most of the data was later adjusted after public protest this led to a decrease in trust
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of official government authorities. Hence, activists turned to collaborative sensing ap-
proaches in order to alleviate these issues. In this scenario we will discuss how our
framework can be applied to model knowledge derivation that incorporates trust and
quality of data in this kind of heterogeneous sensor network environment.
6.2.2 Radiation Detection: Framework Modeling Approach
Our TrustKnowOne framework is able to model heterogeneous systems as well as
deal with the dynamic environment often found in sensor networks. Furthermore, many
of the problems described can be solved through the various aspects of our framework.
In particular, the abstract graph model allows us to model different types of sensors
and define relationships between them. Additionally, dimension models can be used to
express notions of the accuracy and constraints of sensors (see section 4.3). As trust
becomes an even more important component of being able to derive knowledge from the
vast amount of data provided by sensor networks, our framework can describe trust and
quality assessments of data in a uniform and flexible manner using graph expressions.
As a case study we will focus on collaborative sensing in the context of Japan’s
Fukushima nuclear incident in 2011. The incident caused the establishment of Safecast
[144] where users can submit radiation measurements they have taken. Furthermore,
there exists an official government database of radiation measurements by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency [75]. Here, we analyze the combined data sets from both
sources and discuss approaches to assess the confidence in individual measurements as
well as the trustworthiness of sensors and their sources.
In the following sections we will discuss how the TrustKnowOne framework is able
to model data processing from multiple source with varying trust aspects and their
analysis. In particular, we will address:
• Modeling heterogeneous data (Safecast measurements, IAEA sensors), relation-
ships (location clusters, id clusters), and data sources (collaborative, government)
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Figure 6.2.1: Framework overview for the radiation detection scenario
in our abstract graph model (section 4.1)
• Incorporating location dynamics (mobile vs. stationary sensors) and time variant
information (sensor readings are time series data) throughout knowledge processing
and evaluation (section 5.3.1, 5.4.1)
• Performing complex data transformations (conversion of attribute values, combi-
nation of elements, creation of elements) using graph expressions (section 4.4)
• Formalizing confidence assessments for sensors using time series information, con-
text, and group relationships as belief engines (section 5.3.1)
• Representing decision making as formal decision processes with the option of
whether or not to incorporate confidence assessments (section 5.4.1)
Figure 6.2.1 shows an overview of how the individual components discussed in this
section relate to our TrustKnowOne framework.
Knowledge Extraction We model two types of sensors, one representing coming
from the Safecast [144] the other from the IAEA [75] data set. Note that Safecast [144]
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only provides single measurements which makes it difficult to perform extended trust
assessments that incorporate relationships between data. We retrieved the data using
the their web application interface for the entire year of 2011. The data from IAEA
[75] is based on several sensors which makes correlation is possible. However, while
the number of radiation measurements per sensor is high there are only a few sensors
available. As a result of the framework is able to utilize three static data sources that
provide sensor and radiation level information provided with time and location stamps.
Knowledge Processing In order to perform proper processing and trust assessment
we need to transform the individual measurements from Safecast [144] into sensors. Our
approach incorporates two density-based clustering procedures where we exploit location
and id sequence properties of measurements. Confidence assessments are provided in
two ways. First, each sensor is evaluated based on its attributes individually. Second,
we put the sensor into context by examining its relationship with sensors in the same
location (cluster). Hence, a variety of trust and quality assessments is provided that
allows the detailed evaluation of sensors.
Knowledge Evaluation Based on the individual as well as the location cluster as-
sessments of a sensor we are able to evaluate its trustworthiness. We discuss three
approaches that do not depend on choosing particular confidence assessments over oth-
ers but rather combine them in a variety of ways. First, all assessments are incorporated
which allows absolute (e.g., 0%-100% scale) as well as relative (e.g., top 10% percentile)
ranking. Second, we allow the user to pick thresholds to determine trustworthiness lev-
els. Third, based on ownership we incorporate confidences differently into the decisions.
The next sections will provide a detailed analysis of the scenario aspects and their
relationship to our framework.
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6.2.3 Radiation Detection: Knowledge Extraction
We propose the following approach to modeling the collaborative radiation detection
scenario described. The key components of the abstract graph model are various types
of sensors. Hence, we model each type as an independent element. The two data
sources that we consider are user submitted measurements from Safecast [144] and
official measurements from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [75]. As
such we define elements with attributes that match their properties.
In addition, we provide a Location element that is relevant because it is used to
relate individual Sensor elements to each other. Specifically, Sensor elements represent
derivations from multiple Measurement elements through means of clustering. Since
IAEASensor elements already provide time series information they can be modeled as
is. During this process the Sensor elements will be automatically assigned to a particular
Location whereas IAEASensor elements are assigned to a single Location. We model
relationships accordingly for each of the sensor types and a particular Location. The
abstract graph model for this scenario is shown in figure 6.2.2.
An example of how the element instance graph might look like is shown in figure 6.2.3.
In particular, it displays how three Measurements are transformed into a Sensor that
incorporates their individual values. Note that we left out a number of attributes for
clarity in the figure.
After the density-based clustering process is performed during the knowledge pro-
cessing stage, only Sensor and IAEASensor element nodes are utilized for determining
trustworthiness aspects. In figure 6.2.4 we show two Sensor element nodes as well as
two IAEASensor element nodes. Each is related to a single Location element node using
the Location-Sensor and the Location-IAEASensor relation edges respectively.
An overview of the data sets we use as part of this scenario is given in table 6.2.2. We
chose the data sets based on their diversity. Whereas Safecast [144] contains thousands
of collaboratively collected measurements which are loosely connected, the IAEA [75]
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Figure 6.2.2: Radiation detection element description graph
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data sets comprise of official government sensors and their radiation levels. As such
we are able to apply our framework in a heterogeneous environment of sensors with
radiation levels captured as time series and context such as location and ownership
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Table 6.2.2: Radiation detection data set overview
Data Set Data Points Sensors Time Frame Type
Safecast [144] 2,120,078 ≈ 40,000 2011-04-23–2011-12-31 mobile and
stationary
Fukushima
Daiichi: Fixed
Post gamma
dose rates [75]
311,720 8 2011-04-05–2011-12-31 stationary
Fukushima
Daiichi: Mon-
itoring Car
gamma dose
rates [75]
41,989 12 2011-03-14–2011-12-31 stationary
can be incorporated into the decision process. Note that while the IAEA monitoring
car data set name implies mobile sensors the measurements actually reflect those of
transportable sensors. That is the sensor was transported by car to a specific location,
set up, and measurements taken. Hence, we will refer to the data set transportable
sensors.
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6.2.4 Radiation Detection: Knowledge Processing
In order to assess the trustworthiness of individual measurements, sensors, and data
sources we define metrics that reflect various aspects of confidence in element node
properties. In general, there are two categories of approaches that we will discuss. First,
sensor attributes and metrics computed from these attributes can be used to evaluate
sensors on an individual basis. Second, sensors form various relationships (e.g., sensors
of the same location cluster) that can be exploited to find outliers and anomalies.
However, before we can apply these metrics we need to discuss the how the data
provided by the Safecast [144] can be incorporated into our framework.
6.2.4.1 Deriving Sensor Identities Through Density-based Clustering
We retrieved the collaborative sensing data set from Safecast [144] using their web
application programming interface. The data consists of individual measurements that
were taken and submitted by a variety of users. Specifically, we have information about
time and location of the measurement as well as its radiation value. However, there
are several problems with the data initially provided by Safecast [144]. Some attributes
such as “device id”, “location name”, and “original id” are not set in about 99% of
the cases. Furthermore, the usefulness of other attributes is limited. In particular, all
data from 2011 has the “cpm” which stands for counts per minute and the “user id"
is 1 for about 99% of the measurements. This makes it hard to identify measurements
that were taken by the same sensor or user and model relations between measurements
beyond the basic time (measurements at a similar time) and location (measurements
in a similar location) domains. As such, one of the problems is to transform the “raw”
measurements from the Safecast [144] data set into measurements we can infer came
from specific sensors.
In order to address these problems we employed the following approach. First, we
performed density-based location clustering on the measurements to group measure-
157
location cluster
 37  37.2  37.4  37.6  37.8  38
latitude in degrees
 140
 140.2
 140.4
 140.6
 140.8
 141
lo
n
g
it
u
d
e
 i
n
 d
e
g
re
e
s
Figure 6.2.5: Various location clusters within a specified latitude and
longitude identified by color
ments in the same vicinity of each other to infer the identity of specific sensors. The
reason we used a density-based approach here over distance-based clustering lies in
the fact that we want to model mobile as well as stationary sensors. Distance-based
clustering would have worked well on stationary sensors but would have likely split mea-
surements from the same sensor if it was moving along a path. As shown in figure 6.2.5
stationary sensors still appear as individual clusters forming the expected circle like
coloring but mobile sensors are identified as well forming paths of the same color.
Second, within individual density-based location clusters we inferred the identity of
individual sensors by utilizing a property of the Safecast [144] data set. Most measure-
ments were uploaded in sequence and thus have consecutive ids. This fact was discovered
as many sequential measurements had similar location attributes while being specific
time intervals (e.g., 5 seconds, 10 seconds) apart. Therefore, we performed a second
clustering based on series of consecutive ids. figure 6.2.6 shows one of the density-based
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Figure 6.2.6: Several id clusters within an individual location cluster iden-
tified by color
location clusters where consecutive id clustering has been used to identify clusters. We
can clearly see that many sensors move along paths meaning they are mobile. This
validates our density-based approach to infer sensor ids to a certain degree.
Note that we used this two step approach to avoid the case were measurements were
identified as belonging to the same sensor simply because of sequential ids. However,
we need to point out that we cannot identify cases in which a sensor was used to gather
measurements at one location or path and than later elsewhere. In our approach we
would treat this as two different sensors. Next, we will discuss the clustering approaches
in detail and describe how we integrated them into our framework using flexible graph
expressions.
The first step is to cluster based on location. As described above we make use of a
density-based approach. In particular, we chose DBSCAN by Ester et al. [46]. The basic
idea behind the algorithm is as follows. We iterate over the set of data points where we
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determine neighbors using a region query. This region query performs a neighborhood
search and returns all neighbors within a specified distance ε. If the number of neighbors
exceeds a minimum number of points it is considered a new cluster. All neighbors that
do not already belong to a cluster become members of the new cluster. Furthermore,
these neighbors are used as starting points for expanding the cluster. This means that
we determine their neighbors within distance ε and continue recursively.
Using this approach we are able to deal with measurements that were captured by
mobile sensors since the density-based technique will be able to identify path clusters
whereas a distance-based approach will not. The key component of the algorithm is the
region query. It represents the distance calculation function and needs to be implement
in a scalable manner in order to avoid the O(n2) complexity of pair-wise data point
distance computations. There are several spatial indices available. Here, we employ
R-trees developed by Guttman [66] since they give good performance (O(logn)) for
nearest neighbor searches (see Brinkhoff et al. [21]).
Expression 6.2.1 density-based location cluster
We model the density-based location clustering approach as a DBScan
cluster model expression. In particular, we choose the minimum number
of measurements to form a cluster to be 5 and the neighborhood search
radius (epsilon) to be 0.01 which since the calculation is based on the
Euclidean distance of GPS coordinates is about 1100 meters. As a spatial
index we use an R-tree for the coordinates that are stored in the latitude
and longitude attributes. We also add the cluster id as a new location
cluster id attribute.
Measurement list
apply to
density-based location cluster
DBScanClusterExpression
rtree50.01longitudelatitudelocationClusterId
addAsAttribute
coordinates epsilon minPoints
regionQuery
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Expression 6.2.2 density-based location cluster groups
In order to group the Safecast measurements by their location cluster id
we use a model expression called group by. Note that we have to op-
tions for the result of this expression. First, as a list of groups, such
as {{m1,m2}, {m3,m6}, ...} where mi is a particular measurement ele-
ment node or as a map {l1 → m1,m2}, l2 → {m3,m6}, ...} where lj is a
particular location cluster id.
Measurement list
apply to
density-based location cluster groups
GroupBy
density-based location clusterlocationClusterIdfalse
asMap
groupingExpression
The result of the density-based location cluster groups metric is a list of clusters that
follow the density-based location clustering approach where each element in the group
is a measurement with the additional location cluster id attribute. One option is to stop
here and treat all measurements in the same group as coming from a single sensor.
Expression 6.2.3 fold location clusters
We can transform individual element nodes into new element nodes spec-
ified by the element parameter using the fold model expression. Here, we
apply this transformation to each of the location cluster groups using the
for each model expression. Thus the result of the fold location clusters
metric would be location cluster element nodes containing the combined
time series information of all measurements in a particular location clus-
ter.
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Measurement list
apply to
fold location clusters
ForEach
density-based location cluster groups
FoldElementNodes
LocationCluster
element
evaluatingExpression
In our case, as explained above, we proceed and perform additional clustering
based on the fact that measurements with consecutive ids are likely to come from
the same sensor. We can utilize the same density-based clustering approach DB-
SCAN. The one thing we need to modify is the region query. Here, we describe our
sequential neighborhood search technique. For each data point we return the neighbors
by searching the list of measurements for ids before and after the one of the speci-
fied measurement until there is a break. For example, given the set of measurements
{m1,m2,m3,m7,m8,m9,m10,m11,m15,m16, ...} where i of mi is the id, the sequential
region query would return the neighbors {m7,m9,m10,m11} for m8.
Expression 6.2.4 density-based id cluster
We model the density-based id cluster metric by using the DBScan model
expression again. Here, we specify to perform the neighborhood search
based on the sequential id cluster described above. We set the minimum
number of point for a cluster to 5. Note that the epsilon that is part of
the DBSCAN algorithm is ignored here because of the way our sequential
region query works. The clustering is performed on the measurement id
attribute and we add the resulting id cluster as the cluster id attribute.
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Measurement list
apply to
density-based id cluster
DBScanClusterExpression
sequential50.01idclusterId
addAsAttribute
coordinates epsilon minPoints
regionQuery
Expression 6.2.5 density-based id cluster groups
We can model the cluster of sensors with consecutive ids by using the
group by model expression on the cluster id attribute. As a result we
specify a list of cluster id groups.
Measurement list
apply to
density-based id cluster groups
GroupBy
density-based id clusterclusterIdfalse
asMap
groupingExpression
Now that we discussed both, the density-based location and the density-based id
clustering we apply them in order to derive sensor element nodes. Thus we can transform
the “raw” measurements from the Safecast [144] data set into sensors as follows.
Expression 6.2.6 fold measurements into sensors
The transformation of measurements into sensors consists of several steps.
First, we cluster by location using the density-based location cluster group
metric. Second, using the for each model expression we cluster within
each of the location cluster groups by id employing the density-based id
cluster groups metric. Third in order to derive sensor element nodes we
apply the fold nodes model expression to each of the id cluster groups
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with the location cluster groups. This results in a list of location cluster
groups containing individual sensor element nodes. Finally, we merge
all the groups into one list of clustered sensors using the ungroup model
expression.
Measurement list
apply to
fold measurements into sensors
UnGroup
ForEach
density-based location cluster groups
ForEach
density-based id cluster groups
FoldElementNodes
Sensor
element
evaluatingExpression
evaluatingExpression
In order to allow quick and straightforward management of sensors within a location
cluster we can utilize the fact that each sensor maintains the location cluster id attribute.
Hence, after the clustering process we apply the following metric to all sensor element
nodes to create location element nodes and relation edges to them accordingly.
Expression 6.2.7 create location group nodes
The location element nodes can be derived by applying the create group
node mode expression to the groups of sensors provided by the group by
model expression. Here, the group node being created is of type location
and uses the location cluster id of the group as its id attribute. Note that,
we also implicitly create the appropriate relation edges of the specified
location-sensor type.
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Figure 6.2.7: Safecast [144] heatmap of user submitted radiation measure-
ments for Japan
Sensor list
apply to
create location group nodes
ForEach
GroupBy
locationClusterIdfalse
asMap groupingExpression
CreateGroupNode
Location-SensorlocationClusterIdLocation
element
groupId
relation
evaluatingExpression
Since we have various data sources one thing we need to keep in mind is the unit
of the detected radiation values. While Safecast [144] uses counts per minute (cpm)
the International Atomic Energy Agency [75] uses µSv/h. We employ the following
conversion scheme as provided by Safecast [144] where 1µSievert/hour = 350cpm.
Note that Safecast [144] also provides a color coded chart of radiation severity which is
shown in table 6.2.3 and utilized to display the heatmap in figure 6.2.7.
Expression 6.2.8 convert µSv/h to cpm
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Table 6.2.3: Radiation severity according to Safecast [144]
Severity Color cpm µSv/h
very low blue 10 0.03
low purple 100 0.29
medium red 175 0.50
severe orange 350 1.00
very severe yellow 1000 2.86
most severe bright yellow >3500 >10
We can change attribute values using the set attribute model expression.
Here we convert the dose rate time series given in µSv/h into cpm and
set it as the value time series.
IAEASensor
apply to
convert µSv/h to cpm
SetAttribute
multiply
doseRate series350.0
value series
attribute value
6.2.4.2 Individual Sensors
On the individual sensor level, we propose metrics which are based on the time series
of detected radiation measurements. Hence, some of the metrics we discuss here affect
each other. For example, the number of time series values has a definitive correlation
with trend analysis as more values increase our ability to model trends with higher
confidence.
Number of Sensor Readings It is important to evaluate the number of sensor
measurements. This is particular true for time series analysis.
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Figure 6.2.8: The confidence based on the number of ratings c#values
modeled using the Pareto cumulative distribution function with xmin = 1
and α ranging from 0.1 to 1.0
Expression 6.2.9 number of values
The number of detected radiation values of a sensor can be determined
by a basic count of the number of time series values.2
Sensor
apply to
number of values
count
TimeSeriesValues
value series
Here we utilize the form of the cumulative distribution function of the Pareto dis-
2Note that in general all individual and location cluster sensor metrics can be applied to Sensor and
IAEASensor element nodes.
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tribution to express the confidence in the number of values.
Paretocdf (x) =

1−
(xmin
x
)α if x ≥ xmin
0 if x < xmin
(6.2.1)
where x is the number of values, xmin is the initial value for the function before
which the probability is 0 and α is the rate parameter. We choose this function because
it follows a power law and after an initial phase of low number of values it quickly
approaches 1 (see figure 6.2.8).
Expression 6.2.10 c#values
The c#values metric is expressed using a Pareto model expression with
an initial value xmin and a rate parameter alpha. As the result type we
specify the cumulative distribution function (cdf ).
Sensor
apply to
c#values
Pareto
number of values1cdfrate
alpha
type xmin
Outliers in Data Variance in data and specifically data points that do not align
with a general trend should make us question whether an overall time series of data is
accurate. There exist several techniques for detecting outliers in multidimensional data.
However, here we focus on time series data. As such, we utilize Cook’s distance [35] for
finding “influential” data points. The basic idea of the approach is that we perform a
regression on the available data and compare the sum of the squared residuals of the
regression including all data points with one that leaves one data point out. Hence, the
distance for an individual data point i can be defined as
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distancei =
n∑
j;j 6=i
Ŷall(j)− Ŷwithout i(j)
p×MSE( ˆYall)
(6.2.2)
where Ŷall(j) is the predicted value for j using the regression model for all data
points, Ŷwithout i(j) is the predicted value for j using the regression model without i,
p the number of regression parameters, and MSE( ˆYall) the mean squared error of the
original regression model. Note that, for example, the number of parameters p is two
for a linear regression (i.e., slope and intercept) and n+ 1 for an nth order polynomial
regression (i.e., the factors).
In order to determine the “influential” data points or outliers Cook originally sug-
gested distancei > 1. However, we choose distancei >
4
n
where n is the number of data
points because this criterion has been identified by Bollen and Jackman [18] as being
better suited.
Expression 6.2.11 Cook’s distance outlier percentage
We express outliers in data as the percentage of outliers according to
Cook’s distance for a given time series of detected radiation values. The
Cook’s distance outlier model expression yields a list of all data points
that have a distancei >
4
n
. The requested percentage thus becomes the
ratio of number of Cook’s outliers over the number of values in the time
series.
Sensor
apply to
Cook’s distance outlier percentage
divide
count
TimeSeriesValues
value series
count
CooksDistanceOutlier
value series
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Our confidence in a time series of values considering outliers follows the intuition
that the more outliers there are the less confidence we should have in the time series
being an accurate representation of its true values.
Expression 6.2.12 coutliers
The coutliers metric is modeled as being anti-proportional to the Cook’s
distance outlier percentage metric. This reflects the fact that more outliers
mean less confidence and less outliers mean higher confidence.
Sensor
apply to
coutliers
subtract
Cook’s distance outlier percentage1.0
Time Series Trend Analysis Trend analysis is key in determining whether a time
series follows a specific pattern or not. In the case of the radiation detection we would
like to see either constant or slowly declining radiation values, both can be detected by
analyzing the slope of a linear regression.
However, there are several issues that need to be addressed. First, the slope is
directly related to the time scale begin used. This means that we need to be careful
to use the same time scale (e.g., milliseconds, seconds, minutes) across comparisons.
Second, if the time scale becomes to small (i.e., milliseconds) and the distance between
data points of the time series large (i.e., weeks or months) there are computational
challenges in terms of dealing with floating points. Third, there exist a variety of
approaches to estimating the slope such as
• treating the first time series as the starting point with time t0 = 0 and estimating
the slope relative to that time
• ignoring time intervals between data points completely and thus treating time as
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a discrete sequence t0, t1...tn
• defining a generic start time accross all time series that are being compared and
calculating the slope relative to that time
Finally, one needs to consider the fact that outliers and anomalies often affect statis-
tical trend analysis. This gives rise to robust estimators such as the Theil-Sen estimator
(see Fernandes and G. Leblanc [50]).
Our approach addresses some of these problems while deferring others. For instance,
we perform a linear regression on the time series data using the first data point as time
t0 = 0. Furthermore, by default we use milliseconds as a time unit but also provide the
means to include a time scaling factor. The question of robustness against outliers is
avoided by having a separate confidence metric such as coutliers focus on that aspect.
Expression 6.2.13 time series slope
The slope of a time series is determined using a linear regression model
expression. Note that we treat the first data point of the time series as
having time t0 = 0 and determine the slope relative to that time.
Sensor
apply to
time series slope
LinearRegression
value seriesslopestartAtZero
approach
property
As described above, for the radiation detection the slope of radiation values should
be almost constant or slightly negative. In order to determine the confidence in the time
series trend we utilize a ratio of Normal distribution probability densities such that
cslope =
N(s|0, σ2)
N(0|0, σ2) (6.2.3)
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Figure 6.2.9: The confidence based on the time series slope cslope modeled
using the ratio of Normal distributions probability densities with µ = 0 and
σ ranging from 0.1 to 1.0
where s is the slope of the linear regression and
N(x|µ, σ2) = 1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (6.2.4)
Note that the denominator part N(0|0, σ2) reflects the highest possible probability
density (see figure 6.2.9).
Expression 6.2.14 cslope
The cslope metric is expressed as the ratio of Normal distribution probabil-
ity densities using Gaussian model expressions. Specifically, we determine
density for the time series slope over the maximum possible density. Here,
we factor in the system parameter scale for time scale purposes as well
as ε to allows adjustments to the confidence degradation rate as slopes
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deviate more and more from constant.
Sensor
apply to
cslope
divide
Gaussian
0.0pdf
divide
scaleε
standardDeviation
type
Gaussian
multiply
time series slopescale
pdf
divide
scaleε
standardDeviation
type
Time-Value Correlation The relationship between detected radiation values and
time is important when determining trustworthiness. Linear dependence is one of the
most noteworthy correlation measures as it can be used to predict the behavior of one
variable based on another. We employ a basic approach, the Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient for set of data X and Y defined as
R(X,Y ) =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x̄)(yi − ȳ)
(n− 1)sxsy
(6.2.5)
where x̄ and ȳ are the sample mean and sx and sy are the sample standard deviations.
We want to point out that the sample correlation is used because the radiation time
series values are only complete up to a certain point in time.
Expression 6.2.15 sample correlation coefficient
The sample correlation coefficient according to Pearson can be modeled
as a byproduct of the linear regression model expression
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Figure 6.2.10: The confidence based on the sample correlation ccorrelation
modeled using ratios of Normal distributions probability densities with µ =
0 and σ ranging from 0.1 to 1.0
Sensor
apply to
sample correlation coefficient
LinearRegression
value seriesRstartAtZero
approach
property
Linear correlation ranges from −1 to 1 such that the closer the value is to either the
stronger the correlation. We utilize a similar approach as the for the slope confidence.
However, we are interested in the complement probability. Hence
ccorrelation = 1−
N(r|0, σ2)
N(0|0, σ2) (6.2.6)
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where r is the correlation coefficient and N(x|µ, σ2) the Normal distribution as
defined in equation 6.2.4.
Expression 6.2.16 ccorrelation
The ccorrelation metric is expressed as the ratio of Normal distribution
probability densities using Gaussian model expressions. We determine
density for the time series correlation over the maximum possible density.
In addition, we factor in the system parameter ε to allow adjustments to
the confidence degradation rate as correlations are not as strongs.
Sensor
apply to
ccorrelation
subtract
divide
Gaussian
0.0pdfε
standardDeviation
type
Gaussian
sample correlation coefficientpdfε
standardDeviation
type
1.0
Sensor Radiation Values Distribution The distribution of detected radiation val-
ues can be used to determine calibration accuracy of sensors and as such trustworthiness
in their values. The assumption is that after initial calibration the sensors reading er-
rors should follow a Normal distribution. Here, we base our confidence assessment on
the Anderson-Darling test [5], specifically in the context of testing whether a given
distribution is a Normal distribution. It defines the following test statistic
A2 = −n− 1
n
n∑
i=1
(2i− 1)(ln Φ(Yi) + ln(1− Φ(Yn+1−i))) (6.2.7)
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where n is the number of values, Φ the cumulative distribution function of the
Normal distribution, and Yi = Xi−µ̂σ̂ the standardized radiation values.
However, because of the limited availability of critical values we perform an approx-
imation of the critical values provided by Stephens [161] using a Normal distribution.
Furthermore, the Anderson-Darling test is originally designed as a hypothesis test yield-
ing two outcomes. In order to model confidence we modify the approach and report the
cumulative distribution probability of the test statistic A2 given the Normal distribution
approximating the critical values best.
Expression 6.2.17 cdistribution
The cdistribution metric uses a modified Anderson-Darling test as described
above to determine whether time series values come from a normal distri-
bution with µ = 0 and standard deviation specified by system parameter
ε. This confidence is calculated with the Anderson-Darling model expres-
sion.
Sensor
apply to
cdistribution
AndersonDarlingConfidence
TimeSeriesValues
value series
ε
standardDeviation
Mobile vs. Stationary We need to model two categories of sensors, stationary and
mobile. Earlier, we discussed how our density-based clustering has the ability to identify
both. Another aspect that we need to consider is that detected radiation measurements
from stationary sensor should be trusted more than mobile ones because environmental
changes have a lesser effect on the readings.
In order to factor this aspect into our trustworthiness assessment of sensors, we
need methods to identify sensors whether a sensor is mobile or stationary. We utilize
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the following technique. We designate the first coordinates of a time series of radiation
values as the center. Then we assess how many of the other coordinates in the time
series fall with a certain radius using one of two approaches
• determine the percentage of time series values whose coordinates fall with in the
specified radius, thus treating the radius as a cut-off
• calculate the average probability of the coordinates being part of the sensor based
on ratios of Normal distributions and using the radius as standard deviation
Expression 6.2.18 cstationary
The cstationary metric is modeled using a specific stationary model expres-
sion. It supports both of the approaches discussed above where radius is
expressed as a system parameter. Here, we apply the stationary on the
latitude and longitude attributes.
Sensor
apply to
cstationary
Stationary
radiuslongitude serieslatitude seriesGaussian
approach
coordinates
radius
6.2.4.3 Location Clusters
Given the fact that sensors close to each other should detect similar radiation values
leads us to model relationships between them. In particular, our density-based clustering
results in location clusters. All sensors within the same location cluster are related. We
can exploit these relationships and in this section discuss several approaches to assessing
trustworthiness of individual sensors based on their relationship with others.
First, we need to discuss some of the basic relationship metrics we will use. For
instance, each location element node is related to a collection of sensor and IAEA
sensor element nodes.
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Expression 6.2.19 location cluster nodes
We can retrieve the related sensor and IAEA sensor element nodes us-
ing the neighbors model expression limited to these two types of element
nodes.
Location
apply to
location cluster nodes
Neighbors
ElementNode
or
is IAEASensor typeis Sensor type
includeExpression
Furthermore, from the perspective of an sensor or IAEA sensor element node we
need to be able to fetch related element nodes as in element nodes belonging to the
same location cluster.
Expression 6.2.20 same location cluster nodes
The element nodes related to a particular sensor or IAEA sensor element
node can be retrieved by first getting the according location element node
using the neighbors model expression and then getting all its related el-
ement nodes while excluding itself from the list using the filter model
expression.
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Sensor
apply to
same location cluster nodes
Filter
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Location type
ElementNode
location cluster nodes
evaluatingExpression includeExpressionElementNode
excludeExpression
For most of the location cluster confidence metrics we perform comparisons between
sensor or IAEA sensor element nodes within the cluster. Therefore we need to be able
to express these relationships accordingly.
Expression 6.2.21 same location cluster relations
Relationships can be created temporarily, i.e., as part of the evaluation of
an expression, using the relation model expression which simply specifies
the source and target of a relation edge. In this case, we choose the source
to be the particular element node the metric is applied to and the target
as the list of element nodes from the same location cluster. This will
automatically model a list of relation edges where the source node is fixed
and the target node drawn from the provided list of element nodes.
Sensor
apply to
same location cluster relations
RelationExpression
same location cluster nodesElementNode
source target
As such we can develop several trustworthiness assessments based on the relation-
ships between sensors within the same location cluster.
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Number of Location Cluster Members The number of correlated sensors within
a location cluster directly impacts our trustworthiness. This is due to the fact that we
could view a location cluster as a system of “checks and balances” where it becomes
harder for a sensor to be dishonest given that it will not fare well in comparison to
others. Thus, a low number reduces the number of comparisons possible and therefore
should decrease our trustworthiness in the sensor that are part of the cluster as well.
Expression 6.2.22 number of group members
The number of group members is a straightforward count of the element
nodes in a location cluster. We can reference the appropriate location
cluster using the neighbor model expression. Note that this includes the
sensor itself in the count.
Sensor
apply to
number of group members
count
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Location type
ElementNode
location cluster nodes
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
We utilize the same approach as for the number of detected radiation values in a time
series where the confidence is modeled using the Pareto distribution (see equation 6.2.1
and figure 6.2.8)
Expression 6.2.23 cgroup#members
The cgroup#members metric is expressed using a Pareto model expression with
an initial value xmin and a rate parameter alpha. As the result type we
specify the cumulative distribution function (cdf ).
180
Sensor
apply to
cgroup#members
Pareto
number of group members1cdfrate
alpha
type xmin
Trend/Slope Comparison The trend of sensor values gives an indication of the
overall radiation over time. Here, we are interested in determining whether the trend of
a time series is vastly different from trends in the same location cluster. Note that each
comparison is performed on a pair of time series values. As we have several options to
express the trend of a time series we choose a linear regression to estimate the slopes.
This approach allows us to compute the average degree difference of the slopes of one
sensor compared to all others.
Expression 6.2.24 trend comparison metric
We express trend comparison as a model expression which is performed
pairwise on the time series of the specified sensor and the other sensors
in the same location cluster. We choose the result of each comparison to
be in degree difference based on a linear regression of the time series.
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Sensor
apply to
trend comparison
average
ForEach
same location cluster relations
TrendComparison
List
target node
value series
source node
value series
degrees
LinearRegression
value seriesslopestartAtZero
approach
property
trendRegression
type
evaluatingExpression
The confidence in the average slope difference can then be modeled using the ra-
tio of Normal distribution densities similar to the one used for the cslope metric (see
equation 6.2.3 and figure 6.2.11).
Expression 6.2.25 cgroup
trends
The cgroup
trends
metric is defined as the ratio of two Normal distribution den-
sities represented by Gaussian model expressions. We use the system pa-
rameter ε to allow for confidence adjustments by adjusting the standard
deviation of the distributions.
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Figure 6.2.11: The confidence based on the comparison of time series
slopes cgroup
trends
modeled using the ratio of Normal distributions probability
densities with µ = 0 and σ ranging from 0.01 to 0.1
Sensor
apply to
cgroup
trends
divide
Gaussian
0.0pdfε
standardDeviation
type
Gaussian
trend comparisonpdfε
standardDeviation
type
Recency When comparing measurements one important factor to consider is how old
they are. For instance, recent sensor measurements should be considered more valuable
and more trustworthy than older ones. Here, we incorporate this notion of recency to
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assess the confidence in a particular sensor’s values given sensors in the same location
cluster.
In order to evaluate the time relationship between two time series we need to be
able to refer to the start and end of each. Since we choose to model the comparison
as an expression tree, the two sensors with their respective time series are expressed as
part of a relation. This enables us to define the start and end times of the time series
as follows.
Expression 6.2.26 time series start and end time metrics
The time series values model expressions can be used to retrieve a list
of values as well as a list of time instances reflecting the time series of
a particular sensor. Our framework supports several list expressions of
which first and last refer to the first and last elements of a particular list
respectively. As such we are able to express the start and end of the first
time series using the source node reference.
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
start 1
source node
First
TimeSeriesValues
value seriestime
property
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
end 1
source node
Last
TimeSeriesValues
value seriestime
property
The second time series corresponds to the target node of the relation the
expression is being applied to.
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Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
start 2
target node
First
TimeSeriesValues
value seriestime
property
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
end 2
target node
Last
TimeSeriesValues
value seriestime
property
There exist three cases that we need to evaluate when comparing two time series
A and B with respect to recency. First, time series A occurred strictly before B (i.e.,
no overlap with end1 < start2). Second, the time series are reversed and time series B
occurred strictly before A (i.e., no overlap with end2 < start1). Third there is a partial
or complete overlap of the two time series. Hence, we define recency as follows.
receny(A,B) =

start2 − end1 if end1 < start2
start1 − end2 if end2 < start1
0 otherwise
(6.2.8)
Using the start and end time metrics from above we can model this formula accord-
ingly.
Expression 6.2.27 recency metric
The three cases are modeled using case expressions inside a switch expres-
sion. Here, the replacement expression is only applied to the case where
the pattern expression evaluates to true. Note that this case testing is
done in sequence such that the last case can be seen as the default case
being applied when no pattern matches. By default the result of the re-
cency calculation is in milliseconds. We provide a system parameter scale
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Figure 6.2.12: The confidence based on recency cgrouprecency modeled using
the Pareto survival function with xmin = 10minutes and α ranging from
0.1 to 1.0
that allows conversion into other units of time.
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
recency
divide
scale
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
0true
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
subtract
end 2start 1
less than
start 1end 2
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
subtract
end 1start 2
less than
start 2end 1
pattern replacement
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Here we utilize the survival function of the Pareto distribution to express the confi-
dence in the recency of values.
Paretosurvival(x) =

(xmin
x
)α if x ≥ xmin
1 if x < xmin
(6.2.9)
where xmin is the initial value after which the survival rate (i.e., confidence) decreases
and α is the rate parameter (see figure 6.2.12). This approach is well suited for modeling
a graceful decline in confidence after a certain time threshold has been exceeded.
Expression 6.2.28 cgrouprecency
The cgrouprecency metric can be expressed using the Pareto model expression
of type survival applied to the recency of a particular relation. Here
we average the resulting confidences to provide an aggregate confidence
assessment of a sensor with regards to others.
Sensor
apply to
cgrouprecency
average
ForEach
same location cluster relations
Pareto
recency
multiply
scale10
survivalrate
alpha
type xmin
evaluatingExpression
Forecast Apart from comparing the recency of two time series we can also evaluate
how well one predicts the other. There exist several approaches to forecasting time
series values. In line with other metrics discussed above we perform a linear regression
on the earlier time series and evaluate the percentage of values of the other that fall
within a certain confidence interval (e.g., 99%, 95%, etc.).
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Expression 6.2.29 cgroupforecast
We model the cgroupforecast metric using a forecast comparison model expres-
sion because of the complexity of having to perform a linear regression
and determining time series values that have been correctly forecast. The
overall confidence is then the average of the forecast confidences for all
the relations of a sensor with others in the same location cluster.
Sensor
apply to
cgroup
forecast
average
ForEach
same location cluster relations
ForecastComparison
List
target node
value series
source node
value series
withinConfidenceIntervalPercentage
property
evaluatingExpression
Distribution Comparison In order to evaluate whether time series values of one
sensor follow the same distribution as values of another sensor we can utilize Welch’s t
test Welch [177]. It represents a statistical test that allows us to determine if the means
of two distributions are equal. The advantage here is that this test does not depend
on the distributions having the same standard deviations. As such we can determine
whether sensors generally yield similar results even if their accuracy varies. Welch’s test
statistic for two time series A and B can be defined as
Welch(A,B) = A−B√
s2A
|A|
+ s
2
B
|B|
(6.2.10)
where X is the sample mean, s2 the sample variance, and |X| the number of time
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series values.
The null hypothesis of the two means being equal is evaluated using a two-sided sig-
nificance test with the Student’s t-distribution. The degrees of freedom for the Student’s
t-distribution in this case is specified as
ν =
(
s2A
|A|
+ s
2
B
|B|
)2
(
s2A
|A|
)2
|A| − 1 +
(
s2B
|B|
)2
|B| − 1
(6.2.11)
Note that we normalize the time series values by calculating a linear regression on
them and adjusting the values based on their difference to the trend.
Expression 6.2.30 Welch’s T Test metric
For both time series we apply time series values model expressions with
the type of normalization set to linear regression. The Welch’s T Test
model expression then calculates the t and ν terms (i.e., according to equa-
tion 6.2.10 and 6.2.11) and performs a two-sided test with the specified
significance.
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
Welch’s T Test
WelchsTTest
List
target node
TimeSeriesValues
value serieslinearRegression
normalization
source node
TimeSeriesValues
value serieslinearRegression
normalization
equalMeans0.01
significanceLevel
type
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Since the Welch’s t test only provides a binary decision (i.e., equal means or not)
due to the hypothesis testing approach we need to convert this into a proper confidence
assessment. We chose to compute the average of the test results using 1 for true and 0
for false.
Expression 6.2.31 cgroupdistribution
The cgroupdistribution makes use of several model expressions. For instance,
the for each model expression takes care of evaluating the Welch’s t test
results for every relation that involves the specified sensor element node.
The switch and case model expression then deal with the conversion of
true or false into the appropriate numbers.
Sensor
apply to
cgroup
distribution
average
ForEach
same location
cluster relations
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
nulltrue
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
0.0
equal
falseWelch’s T Test
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
1.0
equal
trueWelch’s T Test
pattern replacement
evaluatingExpression
Outliers in Data As with the outliers in sensor readings of one sensor we can perform
a similar analysis within a location cluster. Our approach here is to combine all time
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series data from the sensors in a particular location and detect possible outliers. We
can utilize the same technique of Cook’s distance [35] applied to individual sensors for
finding “influential” data points.
The following metric can be used to combine the time series’ of all sensors within a
location cluster.
Expression 6.2.32 location cluster time series metric
First, we determine the time series for each of the sensor element nodes
in the location. Second, we use the ungroup model expression to convert
the individual time series into a single time series.
Location
apply to
location cluster time series
UnGroup
ForEach
location cluster nodesvalue series
evaluatingExpression
As such, we are able to calculate the percentage of outliers in a location cluster from
the perspective of a particular sensor.
Expression 6.2.33 location cluster outlier percentage metric
We model outliers within a location cluster as the percentage of outliers
according to Cook’s distance. Here, we utilize the neighbor model expres-
sion to determine the respective location cluster of a sensor element node.
The location cluster outlier percentage is thus the ratio of the outliers to
the overall number of values in the combined time series.
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Sensor
apply to
location cluster outlier percentage
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Location type
ElementNode
divide
count
TimeSeriesValues
location cluster time series
count
CooksDistanceOutlier
location cluster time series
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
We use the same logic as for individual outliers where the more outliers exist the
less confidence we have in a particular sensor.
Expression 6.2.34 cgroupoutliers
The cgroupoutliers metric is expressed as the difference between 1 and the lo-
cation cluster outlier percentage. This reflects the fact that more outliers
mean less confidence and less outliers mean higher confidence.
Sensor
apply to
cgroup
outliers
subtract
location cluster outlier percentage1.0
Table 6.2.4 shows an overview of the metrics we discussed as part of the knowledge
processing phase of the framework. In the following section we will describe how these
metrics can be incorporated into evaluating the trustworthiness of sensors.
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Table 6.2.4: Radiation detection metrics overview
Type Metric Description
individual sensor c#values number of sensor measurements
individual sensor coutliers outliers in data
individual sensor cslope time series trend analysis
individual sensor ccorrelation time-value correlation
individual sensor cdistribution sensor radiation values distribution
individual sensor cstationary sensor being stationary
location cluster cgroup#members number of group members
location cluster cgroup
trends
trend/slope comparison
location cluster cgrouprecency recency of time series values
location cluster cgroupforecast forecast of time series values
location cluster cgroupdistribution distribution of time series values comparison
location cluster cgroupoutliers outliers in data of the group’s time series values
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6.2.5 Radiation Detection: Knowledge Evaluation
Determining the trustworthiness of a particular sensor can be accomplished in a
variety of ways. We propose three approaches that can be easily be extended to more
complex ones in future work. The goal here is not necessarily presenting the best overall
approach but rather discuss how our TrustKnowOne framework is flexible enough to
support a variety of approaches in a uniform way.
First, the metrics of the knowledge processing component provide two types of con-
fidence assessments, sensor attributes on an individual level and relations to sensors
within the same location cluster. The combination of these assessments can then be
used to evaluate the trustworthiness of a sensor overall.
Second, instead of incorporating the continuous values of confidence assessments,
e.g., on a 0 to 1 scale we can put them into class such as low, medium, and high based
on thresholds. This simplification would allow easier decision making as it abstracts the
assessments and presents them in a more user-friendly format.
Third, there are two different authorities (owners) providing the radiation data upon
which our decisions are based. A natural consequence of this is that we are able to weight
assessments differently based on ownership.
6.2.5.1 Individual Sensors
On an individual basis sensors can be assessed in a variety of ways. We described in
detail several approaches as part of the knowledge processing section. Here, we discuss
the results of these metrics from applying them to sensors.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
95.8% and σ = 0.0%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
confidence range
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f s
e
n
s
o
rs
(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
57.4% and σ = 29.0%
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(c) Safecast , µ = 24.1% and σ = 25.5%
Figure 6.2.13: Individual sensors confidence in number of sensor readings
by data source overview
Number of Sensor Readings (expression 6.2.10) As shown in figure 6.2.13 sen-
sors of the fixed monitoring post data set provide constantly high assessments whereas
sensors from the transportable sensor or Safecast data set give mixed results. In par-
ticular, the Safecast data set exhibits a high number of sensors with no confidence in
them. This is may be due to the nature of collaborative filtering where usually only
short bursts of measurements are taken rather than over an extended amount of time.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
94.1% and σ = 1.6%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
91.0% and σ = 8.7%
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(c) Safecast , µ = 85.9% and σ = 16.2%
Figure 6.2.14: Individual sensors confidence in outliers in data by data
source overview
Outliers in Data (expression 6.2.12) Figure 6.2.14 shows that the percentage of
outliers is a potentially useful discriminator for deciding trustworthiness as it determines
a number of sensors with lower confidence values. This is true for the Safecast as well
as the transportable sensor data set. For the fixed monitoring post data set high levels
of confidence are to be expected since the sensors contain a large number of time series
values thus decreasing the overall percentage of potential outliers.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
36.2% and σ = 37.3%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
0.0% and σ = 0.0%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 70.5% and σ = 37.2%
Figure 6.2.15: Individual sensors confidence in time series trend analysis
by data source overview
Time Series Trend Analysis (expression 6.2.14) Analysis of the time series trend
is difficult and yields mixed results as shown in figure 6.2.15. This is due to the fact
that there are a number of parameters affecting the calculation of this confidence such
as start time, time interval, and time scale. As such, it may provide good separation
just for the Safecast data set. However, it is hard to determine whether this kind of
separation is useful.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
92.2% and σ = 5.4%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
74.3% and σ = 35.3%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 60.2% and σ = 47.0%
Figure 6.2.16: Individual sensors confidence in time-value correlation by
data source overview
Time-Value Correlation (expression 6.2.16) Figure 6.2.16 shows the results of
assessing the time-value correlation of a sensor’s radiation time series. This confidence
can be interpreted as a sign of how “stable” a time series is. For instance, the fixed
monitoring post data set displays high confidence because of high linear correlation of
time and values. The Safecast data set shows more of a separation which is useful for
distinguishing between sensors of high and low trustworthiness.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
99.9% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
100.0% and σ = 0.0%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 79.9% and σ = 14.1%
Figure 6.2.17: Individual sensors confidence in sensor radiation values
distribution with ε = 10cpm by data source overview
Sensor Radiation Values Distribution (expression 6.2.17) As shown in fig-
ure 6.2.17 a lot of sensors have radiation values that appear to be drawn from a normal
distribution with a low standard deviation. This metric is in a way similar to the out-
lier percentage as we try to determine if there are any anomalies in the time series
radiation levels. For the Safecast data set it provides a useful distribution of confi-
dence assessments that can be used to identify sensors with low and sensors with high
trustworthiness.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
100.0% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
100.0% and σ = 0.0%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
probability of being stationary
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f s
e
n
s
o
rs
(c) Safecast, µ = 30.3% and σ = 34.4%
Figure 6.2.18: Individual sensors confidence in sensor being stationary
with Gaussian radius = 0.0001 ≈ 100m by data source overview
Mobile vs. Stationary (expression 6.2.18) Distinguishing whether a sensors is
mobile or stationary is difficult. However, our method with a Gaussian radius provides
an approximation that can yield a powerful assessment of confidence in a sensor. As
discussed earlier, mobile sensors are impacted more by environmental changes than
stationary ones. Here, figure 6.2.18 correctly identifies both IAEA data sets to consist
of stationary sensors and provides a wide distribution of confidence for Safecast sensors.
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6.2.5.2 Location Clusters
Trustworthiness assessments can also be derived by comparing a sensor with sensors
in the same location. The assumption is that physically close sensors often exhibit
similar environments and should detect similar radiation values. The sensors in the
Safecast and IAEA data sets already have been associated with the appropriate location
cluster. However, incorporating new sensors requires identifying the closest location
cluster for the particular sensor.
There exist several metrics that can be used to calculate the distance between two
sensors given their coordinates. Here, we use a basic Euclidean distance computation.
Expression 6.2.35 sensor distance metric
The distance metric is applied to two sensor or IAEASensor element
nodes. While the particular distance function may be substituted (e.g.,
Euclidean distance model expresssion) the rest of the metric remains the
same. We retrieve the coordinates for each of the sensors the metric is
applied to and use it as the input for the distance calculation. Note that
here we only calculate the distance give the last/most recent coordinates.
As such the metric could be extended to determine the distances at all
time instances.
Sensor
target node
Sensor
source node
apply to
distance
EuclideanDistance
List
target node
longitudelatitude
source node
longitudelatitude
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This distance metric or another can then be used to determine the sensor’s closest
location cluster. We need to keep in mind that the smallest distance may be greater
than the maximum radius that was used for density-based clustering. In this case the
sensor would not be part of the location. However, we can relax this requirement and
assume that unless the distance is too great, comparisons within location cluster group
members yield useful confidence assessments.
Expression 6.2.36 closest location cluster metric
In order to determine the closest location cluster we need to determine the
closest sensor. Note that while this metric uses the pair-wise comparison
approach to find that sensor an improved version could make use of a
spatial index such as R-trees [66]. First we combine the list of Sensor and
IAEASensor element nodes using the list and ungroup model expressions.
Then we create relation edges to those sensors with the relation model
expression which are then sorted by the result of the distance metric.
Finally, we derive the Location element node respectively.
Sensor
apply to
closest location cluster
Neighbors
target node
First
Sort
RelationExpression
UnGroup
List
IAEASensor listSensor list
ElementNode
source targetdistance
comparisonExpression
is Location typeElementNode
evaluatingExpression
includeExpression
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
46.4% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
52.5% and σ = 0.0%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 70.4% and σ = 10.9%
Figure 6.2.19: Location cluster sensors confidence in number of location
cluster members by data source overview
Number of Location Cluster Members (expression 6.2.23) Figure 6.2.19 shows
a medium confidence for the sensors from the IAEA data set. This is due to the fact that
both data sets contain only a limited number of sensors. On the other hand, Safecast
sensors show a distribution that can be used to categorize sensors into low and high
trustworthiness.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
99.9% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
0.4% and σ = 1.2%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 76.8% and σ = 33.3%
Figure 6.2.20: Location cluster sensors confidence in trend/slope compar-
ison by data source overview
Trend/Slope Comparison (expression 6.2.25) As shown in figure 6.2.20 there
is a vast difference between the data sets. For the fixed monitoring post the trend is
overwhelmingly similar. Hence, the high confidence. In contrast, the transportable sen-
sor data set seems to be the opposite with all trends being almost completely different.
Safecast provides an assessment that ranks the majority of sensors highly while also
establishing a wide distribution for other sensors.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
100.0% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
74.7% and σ = 13.5%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 54.9% and σ = 15.2%
Figure 6.2.21: Location cluster sensors confidence in recency within 10
minutes by data source overview
Recency (expression 6.2.28) The comparison of how recent radiation detection
values were captured, helps us correlate time series. The idea is that sensor readings
that happen close in time to each other should have similar values (given that they
are in the same location cluster as well). As shown in figure 6.2.21 we can use this
confidence assessment effectively to distinguish between low and high trustworthiness.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
0.0% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
18.4% and σ = 15.9%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 60.4% and σ = 29.9%
Figure 6.2.22: Location cluster sensors confidence in forecast within 95%
confidence interval by data source overview
Forecast (expression 6.2.29) In figure 6.2.22 we can see that forecasting can be
problematic since sensors from the fixed monitoring post have very low confidence while
Safecast sensors exhibit confidence assessments in an almost a uniform distribution.
This could indicate that sensors in general do not have have a lot of forecasting power
over other sensors. Note that this metric aligns both time series’ and therefore may not
be as useful as others.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
0.0% and σ = 0.0%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
5.5% and σ = 6.9%
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(c) Safecast, µ = 42.6% and σ = 24.2%
Figure 6.2.23: Location cluster sensors confidence in distribution compar-
ison with linear regression normalized values and significance level of 0.01
by data source overview
Distribution Comparison (expression 6.2.31) The results comparing the means
of two time series’ are shown in figure 6.2.23. It is noticeable that they are similar to
figure 6.2.22. As such, the separation in terms of distribution for the Safecast data set
may prove useful when categorizing sensors by trustworthiness. However, the generally
low level of trustworthiness for the IAEA data set is surprising since they are stationary
and consist of a large number of time series values.
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(a) IAEA fixed monitoring post, µ =
97.6% and σ = 2.1%
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(b) IAEA transportable sensor, µ =
98.8% and σ = 0.0%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
confidence range
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f s
e
n
s
o
rs
(c) Safecast, µ = 95.4% and σ = 2.1%
Figure 6.2.24: Location cluster sensors confidence in outliers in data by
data source overview
Outliers in Data (expression 6.2.34) Figure 6.2.24 shows a metric that essentially
shows a distribution of outlier confidence assessments for an entire location. As such,
sensors from the IAEA data set display high levels of confidence and confidence for
sensors from Safecast is equally high. Note that this metric is primarily impacted by
the number of group members and the number of time series radiation values. The more
non-outliers the smaller the ratio of outliers to non-outliers and thus the percentage is.
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6.2.5.3 Weighted Trustworthiness Assessment
A straightforward approach to assess the overall trustworthiness of a sensor is to
consider the confidence assessments discussed above. Here, we have three options. First,
we only take into consideration metrics that focus on an individual sensor. Second,
we evaluate a sensor with regards to others in the same location cluster. Third, we
model trustworthiness as a combination of individual and location cluster confidence
assessments.
Incorporating individual sensor assessments can be done using a weighted sum ap-
proach.
trustindividualweighted (Sensor) =
∑
wi × ci (6.2.12)
where wi is the assigned weight with
∑
wi = 1 and ci one of the following individual
sensor metrics
c#values the confidence in the number of sensor measurements
coutliers the confidence in the outliers in data
cslope the confidence in the time series trend analysis
ccorrelation the confidence in the time-value correlation
cdistribution the confidence in the sensor radiation values distribution
cstationary the confidence in the sensor being stationary
which can be modeled as follows.
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Expression 6.2.37 trustindividualweighted
We express the trustindividualweighted metric using the weighted sum model ex-
pression.
Sensor
apply to
trustindividualweighted
WeightedSum
List
w6w5w4w3w2w1
List
cstationarycdistributionccorrelationcslopecoutliersc#values
values weights
In a similar way we can model the confidence assessments regarding a sensor’s rela-
tionship with others in the same location cluster.
trustgroupweighted(Sensor) =
∑
wi × cgroupi (6.2.13)
where wi is the assigned weight with
∑
wi = 1 and cgroupi one of the following individual
sensor metrics
cgroup#members the confidence in the number of group members
cgroup
trends
the confidence in the trend/slope comparison
cgrouprecency the confidence in the recency of time series values
cgroupforecast the confidence in the forecast of time series values
cgroupdistribution the confidence in the distribution of time series values comparison
cgroupoutliers the confidence in the outliers in data of the group’s time series values
and can be expressed using the following expression.
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Expression 6.2.38 trustgroupweighted
We can model the trustgroupweighted metric using the weighted sum model
expression.
Sensor
apply to
trustgroup
weighted
WeightedSum
List
w6w5w4w3w2w1
List
cgroup
outliers
cgroup
distribution
cgroup
forecast
cgrouprecencyc
group
trends
cgroup#members
values weights
The combination of both of these assessments can then be captured as follows:
trustweighted(Sensor) = windividual × trustindividualweighted + wgroup × trust
group
weighted (6.2.14)
where windividual + wgroup = 1 is the assigned weight to the respective trustworthiness
assessment.
Expression 6.2.39 trustweighted
The trustweighted metric can be expressed as a simple mathematical weighted
sum of the trust metrics.
Sensor
apply to
trustweighted
add
multiply
trustgroup
weighted
wgroup
multiply
trustindividualweighted
windividual
The results of the individual, group, and weighted evaluation are shown in fig-
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Figure 6.2.25: Weighted trustworthiness assessment by data source
overview
ure 6.2.25. In general, the combined version of our trust assessment ranks between
only using individual metrics and only using location cluster metrics. Note that sensors
from the fixed monitoring post tend exhibit high levels of trust whereas data from the
transportable sensor data set shows reduced trustworthiness. Sensors derived from the
Safecast data source display a mix of trustworthiness. This follows the intuition that
information that is from a non-government, collaborative sensing environment is less
trustworthy than official. Furthermore, this is validated through our analysis which
shows that radiation measurements are more likely to be taken in short bursts (i.e., few
measurements) than over the long term (i.e., many measurements).
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6.2.5.4 Determining Trust Classes Using Thresholds
Another approach to assess the trustworthiness of sensors is by moving away from
specific values to classes. This makes it easier to quickly get an overview of trustwor-
thiness assessments. Here, we categorize the trustworthiness of sensors into the distinct
classes low, medium, and high to represent sensors that fall within specific thresholds.
Hence, we need to define a mapping function such as the following that given a particular
confidence assessment will yield an appropriate class.
trustthreshold(metric) =

low if metric < tlow
medium if metric ≥ tlow and metric < thigh
high if metric ≥ thigh
(6.2.15)
Note that tlow and thigh represent the assessment thresholds used to distinguish
between classes. As part of our framework we are able to transform the confidence
assessments discussed above into classes using a variety of expressions.
Expression 6.2.40 threshold class
We are able to convert values to classes utilizing the switch model expres-
sion where each threshold class represents a case model expression.
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threshold class
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
high
greater
or equal
thighmetric
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
medium
and
less than
thighmetric
greater
or equal
tlowmetric
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
low
less than
tlowmetric
pattern replacement
Applying the threshold class metric to all confidence assessment results in the trust
assessments shown in figure 6.2.26. We can see that there is often a stark contrast
between the results when incorporating only individual metrics versus group metrics.
In particular, for the fixed monitoring post individual metrics generally rate the trust-
worthiness of sensors higher than is the case when considering group metrics. This is
similar for the transportable sensor data set. However, for the Safecast data set group
metrics seem to assess sensor higher. The combination of the individual and group met-
rics represents the average (i.e., arithmetic mean) of the two. Note that these combined
distributions follow our intuition that sensors from the fixed monitoring post data set
rank higher than from the transportable sensor and Safecast data set.
6.2.5.5 Impact of Ownership on Trust
Since there are two distinct authorities providing radiation measurements it is of
interest to evaluate how varying levels of ownership trust affects trustworthiness assess-
ments of sensors. Our framework is able to incorporate different weights based on sensor
ownership through means of lineage of sensor type.
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Figure 6.2.26: Threshold trustworthiness assessment distributions by data
source overview with tlow = 33% and thigh = 66%
Expression 6.2.41 ownership factor metric
We express the factor that is used as a weight in evaluating graph ex-
pression using a switch model expression. The case model expressions
represent the two ownership types which in the abstract graph model of
this scenario is incorporated as the type of an element node.
215
ownership factor metric
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
wIAEASensoris IAEASensor type
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
wSensoris Sensor type
pattern replacement
These weights only factor into a confidence assessment that is based on compar-
ing attributes of a sensor to others. This is the case for the location cluster metrics.
However, two of the metrics, c#values and coutliers are independent of ownership in their
calculation. This leaves four metrics for which we will evaluate the impact of ownership.
In order to derive the respective weights for the location cluster metrics we can use
the following expression.
Expression 6.2.42 ownership weights metric
We can model the list of weights as the result of applying the ownership
factor metric to each of the element nodes in the same location.
ownership weights metric
ForEach
same location cluster nodesownership factor metric
evaluatingExpression
Instead of computing the simple average of the confidences for the location cluster
metric expressions we then need to replace the average math expression with a weighted
by ownership average expression.
Expression 6.2.43 ownership adjusted average metric
The values of the weighted sum model expression reflect the for each model
expression of the location cluster metrics which is then combined with the
ownership weights list. The weighted average is then simply a result of
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Figure 6.2.27: Comparison of location cluster trustworthiness assessment
metrics based on weighting ownership
the weighted sum divided by the sum of the ownership weights.
ownership adjusted metric
divide
sum
ownership weights metric
WeightedSum
ownership weights metricfor each expression
values weights
Because of the limited number of IAEA sensors provided there is only one location
overlap with Safecast sensors. Hence, in figure 6.2.27 we show results of the location
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cluster metrics in that particular location. In order to analyze the impact of different
ownership we compare three cases. First, equal weights between Safecast and IAEA
sensors make no distinction in terms of their trustworthiness based on ownership. Sec-
ond, we discount the trustworthiness of Safecast sensor by 50% in order to favor IAEA
government sensors. Third, the 50% discount of trustworthiness is applied to every
IAEA sensor and the Safecast data is favored.
For trend/slope comparison the different ownership preferences yield mixed results.
In particular, when the Safecast data is favored trustworthiness assessments go up while
favoring IAEA sensors provides a wide distribution of trustworthiness assessments. This
is the quite the opposite for the recency metric where preferring Safecast sensors results
in lower trustworthiness assessments. For the forecast metric as well as the distribution
comparison ownership does not seem to have the impact we hoped for as it does not
provide a clear enough separation for the trust assessments.
In general, incorporating ownership seems to have mixed results. While for some
metrics discounting Safecast improves the average trust assessments, for others it ac-
tually decreases them. This is different from the results that we saw for the threshold
based trust classes approach.
6.2.6 Radiation Detection: Summary
Sensor networks can be used in a variety of applications such as weather monitor-
ing, cargo tracking, and radiation detection. Here we analyzed a collaborative sensing
environment related to the Japan Fukushima nuclear plant incident in 2011. Our Trust-
KnowOne framework is not only able to model the data from various radiation level data
sources but also process and evaluate it in light of several trustworthiness assessment
approaches.
Throughout this section we discussed in detail how heterogeneous data, relationships
and different data sources can be modeled using our abstract graph model. Furthermore,
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we incorporated the fact that sensors depending on whether they are mobile or station-
ary exhibit should be trusted differently. This scenario also shows how time series data
can be stored, managed and processed using graph expressions. We also described a
complex transformation of graph components through the application of density-based
clustering that resulted in sensors being derived from simple radiation measurements.
The assessment of sensor attributes was performed in two ways. First, we presented
several metrics that only incorporate individual attributes of a sensor. Second, we pro-
vided group metrics that take into consideration that sensors within the same location
cluster should be related and have similar attributes (e.g., time series values, trends).
In terms of evaluating the overall trustworthiness of sensors based on the individual
and group metrics derived throughout the knowledge processing phase of our framework,
we discussed three approaches. First, a basic weighting scheme of individual and group
metrics can be used to assess the trustworthiness of a sensor from a pure analytical
standpoint. Second, we proposed a method to transform trustworthiness assessments
into trust classes such that it becomes easier to determine the state of a sensor as well as
groups of sensors. Finally, we discussed what impact ownership can have on the overall
trustworthiness assessment of sensors.
6.3 Trust in Collaborative Intrusion Detection
Networks
Intrusion detection is a growing field in the the area of computer networks. As data
has become more distributed across a diverse set of resources, one faces the challenge
of providing reliable access to data as well as protecting it from a variety of security
threats. Additionally, resources are often diverse in terms of hardware (e.g., network
interfaces, processing capabilities, memory and storage availability), operating systems
(e.g., Windows, MacOS, Linux, etc.) and software (e.g., applications, tools) compo-
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nents. This is due to the fact that systems need to be flexible enough to serve a large
number of users each with their own requirements. However, it is exactly this provided
flexibility that makes it difficult to implement data protection mechanisms and enforce
security policies.
Instead of having to constantly adapt and extend security systems to work across
different platforms and configurations, the focus has shifted towards utilizing agent-
based approaches [9, 68, 82]. In particular, resources are being equipped with sensors
on the hardware or software level that constantly monitor the state of the resource and
possibly connected components. They then often utilize a common security protocol for
event and alert notification. This approach has several advantages such as being easily
extendable and reducing management requirements.
Several collaborative trust modeling and management systems have recently been
proposed [110, 136, 140]. These systems have been shown to be able to deal with a
variety of attacks (e.g., sybil, newcomer, betrayal, collusion, inconsistency [54]). How-
ever, the approaches taken on the hardware, software or protocol layers often differ
drastically. This makes the comparison of their complexity and performance difficult.
Furthermore, it requires significant effort to adapt (i.e., exchange one particular compo-
nent or algorithm for another) and extend (i.e., implement additional monitoring and
management capabilities) these systems.
6.3.1 Intrusion Detection: Framework Modeling Approach
We have developed a framework to model various entities and their relationships in
an abstract graph model on which graph expressions can be evaluated. In particular,
our approach incorporates the trustworthiness and quality of data. This makes it well
suited for the intrusion detection domain. In order to show that it is feasible to use our
framework for the modeling, analysis and evaluation of intrusion detection approaches,
we will discuss a collaborative trust management system for intrusion detection by Fung
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et al. [54] as a case study. The system makes use of several heterogeneous entities and
relationships. Furthermore, it is fully dynamic as new observations are incorporated
over time into the trustworthiness assessment of entities changes.
Here we discuss how our framework can be used to evaluate attacks on the knowledge
derivation process. To test their approach Fung et al. [54] simulate the responses to test
messages probabilistically. To generate sensed intrusion data we also incorporate a
simulator into our framework. There are two distinct options for modeling attacks on
knowledge. First, we can incorporate attacks such as malicious nodes into the data
before the knowledge extraction phase. This is the classical approach which allows
all data to be processed and evaluated in a “static” manner where graph components
do not change after the initial knowledge extraction. Second, the basic scenario can
be described in generic terms for the knowledge extraction phase and attacks can be
modeled as part of the knowledge processing phase. This approach has the advantage
that attacks are formally specified parts of the framework. Hence, graph components
that are part of the element instance graph are “dynamic” and can be added, modified
or removed according to specific types of attacks. For the scenario discussed here, we
choose to incorporate the modeling of attacks into our framework in order to enable a
discussion of the following aspects of the TrustKnowOne framework.
• Modeling dynamic entities (Host-Based Intrusion Detection components, peers,
test messages) and relationships in our abstract graph model (section 4.1)
• Formalizing components of an intrusion detection system as belief engines (sec-
tion 5.3.1)
• Representing trustworthiness assessments as formal decision processes that incor-
porate confidence assessments (section 5.4.1)
• Evaluating the impact of attacks on knowledge derivation using robustness mea-
sures represented by graph expressions (section 5.5)
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Figure 6.3.1: Framework overview for the trust in collaborative intrusion
detection scenario
Figure 6.3.1 shows an overview of how the scenario can be modeled using our frame-
work. As such, we are able to describe in detail how our framework is able to model
the approach by Fung et al. [54].
Knowledge Extraction This phase consists of a general description of the compo-
nents for the collaborative trust management approach of Fung et al. [54]. In par-
ticular, we provide the foundation for adding intrusion detection components such as
hosts, peers, and test messages as well as the relationships between them. As a result,
the element description graph is fully specified and the element instance graph remains
empty.
Knowledge Processing As part of a particular intrusion detection scenario graph
components can be added, modified, and removed from the element instance graph.
Which components and relationships this entails is dependent on system parameters
(e.g., number of satisfaction levels, test message generation rate) and the type of at-
tacks performed. Note that we can assess the trustworthiness and data quality aspects
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proposed by [54] using formal graph expressions dynamically as the system evolves in
time (enabled by simulator) as well as at a specified time or state. This gives us the
ability to evaluate and compare approaches as well as analyze system parameters.
Knowledge Evaluation There are several decisions that can be made using the intru-
sion detection data modeled in our framework. For instance, we can determine which
hosts are trustworthy based on thresholds or other decision processes. Additionally,
given the trustworthiness assessments provided by the knowledge processing phase we
are able to compare patterns against different types of attacks and provide an estimate
of how likely it is that a particular attack occurred.
Model Vulnerabilities Throughout the phases of the knowledge derivation process
we can analyze the impact of particular type of attack. Specifically, given a specific
scenario (i.e., system parameters fully defined) we can decide whether a type of attack
has occurred and determine how it affected specific intrusion detection components.
Furthermore, our framework provides the formal means for performing these robustness
checks and as such can be utilized to improve and optimize intrusion detection ap-
proaches against a variety of attacks. In a similar manner, different approaches can be
compared in terms of their complexity (i.e., graph expressions), performance (i.e., time
and graph components necessary to reach decision), and robustness (i.e., performance
during attacks).
In the next sections we provide a detailed discussion of the individual TrustKnowOne
framework components as the intrusion detection scenario relates them.
6.3.2 Intrusion Detection: Knowledge Extraction
Collaborative intrusion detection systems operate on the basis of building relation-
ships between individual monitoring agents or intrusion detection systems. As such,
Fung et al. [54] propose a system in which individual host-based intrusion detection
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Figure 6.3.2: Intrusion detection element description graph
systems (HIDS) collect information about peers through a series of test messages (i.e.,
challenges which are often in the form of knowledge base questions). Test messages
consist of an associated difficulty (i.e., the ability of a peer responding correctly), ex-
pected answer (i.e., knowledge base classification of alert risk)3, and received answer
(i.e., the actual classification by a peer). Peers then provide feedback (i.e., responses)
based on their respective expertise level. Each HIDS is able to manage its set of peers
dynamically in the form of an acquaintance list for trustworthy peers and a probation
list for those that are less trustworthy. As more information is gathered about the peers
they can be promoted from the probation list to the acquaintance list or discarded.
Using the TrustKnowOne framework we model this intrusion detection system as
shown in figure 6.3.2. The individual hosts are described by the HIDS element. The
main component of information that needs to be modeled is the expertise level which
reflects the HIDS ’ ability to respond to test messages. Fung et al. [54] describe their
collaborative system as potentially fully connected. This means that there exists a
relation between all HIDS without any constraints, i.e., no metric attached.
Each HIDS keeps track of the perceived trustworthiness of its peers. We model this
3Note that Fung et al. [54] use the term alert risk and expected answer interchangeably. However,
most of the formulas refer to expected answer which is why we chose expected answer in our discussion.
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trustworthiness by introducing a separate Peer element that contains a time series of
satisfaction levels. The details of how these satisfaction levels are derived from test
messages is discussed in the next section. The Peer element is a reflection of how a
HIDS perceives other HIDS elements. Hence, we introduce a reference HIDS relation
that correlates each Peer with the HIDS whose trustworthiness is being assessed. A
HIDS manages these Peers in two separate lists, a probation list and an acquaintance
list depending on perceived trustworthiness. We model both of these lists as relations
between a HIDS and a Peer. The reason Fung et al. chose this approach is that it is nec-
essary to bound the complexity of the relationships between HIDS and Peer elements.
Note that the existence of a relation description only implies that there is the potential
for a relation edge to be present in the element instance graph. Thus, without limiting
the number of Peers each HIDS is evaluating, we would see an exponential growth of
relationships (relation edges in our model) that we need to keep track of, specifically
number of relation edges = n× (n− 1) (6.3.1)
compared to a linear bound for the list approach used here that results in
number of relation edges = (|P |+ |A|)× n (6.3.2)
where n is the number of HIDS elements and |P | and |A| the size of the probation
and acquaintance lists respectively. Fung et al. [54] discuss the size limits of these lists
in terms of resource constraints which means that their approach defines a combined
maximum for both, i.e., |P |+ |A| ≤ sizemax.
In order to determine the trustworthiness of HIDS elements, a HIDS will send
out test messages which we describe in our model as TestMessage elements. These
TestMessage elements are associated with a certain level of difficulty which directly
impacts the ability of another HIDS to respond with the expected answer. As we
will see later, Fung et al. [54] actually abstract the generation and response of these
225
expertiseLevel
0.95
HIDS
id
@0 1
id
expertiseLevel
0.5
HIDS
id
@0 2
id
HIDS-HIDS
satisfactionLevel
Peer
id
@0 1
id
probationList
referenceHIDS
difficulty
0.5
TestMessage
id
@1 1
id expectedAnswer
0.6
receivedAnswer
difficulty
0.1
TestMessage
id
@2 2
id expectedAnswer
0.2
receivedAnswer
testMessage
Figure 6.3.3: Intrusion detection element instance graph
test messages for evaluation purposes. As part of this abstraction real world intrusion
detection test messages are replaced by test messages consisting of tuples of numbers
between 0 and 1 for keeping track of a test message’s difficulty, expected answer and
received answer. This also simplifies the modeling process in our framework where
instead of having separate request and response elements we can use one TestMessage
element which includes the received answer as an additional attribute. Because the
trustworthiness of a HIDS is modeled in terms of Peer elements we form a relation
between a Peer and TestMessage elements.
Note that all elements contain an id as well as a time attribute in order to uniquely
identify individual element nodes in our graph model and to allow for dynamic changes
of attribute values as the process evolves.
In figure 6.3.3, we show a small example of a possible element instance graph de-
rived from the element description graph we described. The graph consists of two HIDS
element nodes that are related (HIDS-HIDS relation edge). Both HIDS elements have a
different expertise level for responding the test messages. HIDS 1 models the trustwor-
thiness of HIDS 2 in terms of Peer 1 where Peer 1 is in the probation list (probationList
relation edge) of HIDS 1 and references HIDS 2 (referenceHIDS relation edge). Initially,
the trustworthiness of HIDS 2 is based on some a priori trustworthiness because test
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messages have not been assessed and hence there is no history of satisfaction levels from
which trustworthiness could be derived. We also show in figure 6.3.3 two TestMessage
elements each with varying degrees of difficulty, expected answers and request times.
6.3.3 Intrusion Detection: Knowledge Processing
In this section we will describe in detail how the framework proposed here is used
to determine trustworthiness aspects of a HIDS based on the approach by Fung et al.
[54]. In particular, we will discuss how our framework is able to perform the same
assessments while utilizing a flexible abstract graph model. There are several advantages
of modeling various trust management approaches in a unified framework such as the
ability to compare and evaluate performance of the approach as a whole and on an
individual component level. Furthermore, this framework enables reuse, reconfiguration,
and extension as well as replacement of components across approaches.
6.3.3.1 Evaluating Feedback
One of the primary components of collaborative trust management concerns the
evaluation of the responses to test messages. Fung et al. [54] define a mapping function
Sat(r, a, d) ∈ [0, 1] which determines a satisfaction level based on the difficulty, expected
answer, and the received answer as
Sat(r, a, d) =

1−
(
a− r
max(c1r, 1− r)
) d
c2 a > r
1−
(
c1(r − a)
max(c1r, 1− r)
) d
c2 a ≤ r
(6.3.3)
While r, a, and d represent expected answer, received answer, and difficulty respec-
tively, c1 and c2 are user selected system parameters. Each TestMessage element node
contains these values in the form of attributes. One needs to distinguish between two
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cases. In order to maintain flexibility we model both result terms as separate metrics,
a > r and a ≤ r whose expression trees are as follows.
Expression 6.3.1 a > r replacement
The a > r replacement metric is modeled using basic mathematical ex-
pressions on attributes and system parameters.
TestMessage
apply to
a > r replacement
subtract
power
divide
c2difficulty
divide
max
subtract
expectedAnswer1.0
multiply
expectedAnswerc1
subtract
expectedAnswerreceivedAnswer
1.0
Expression 6.3.2 a ≤ r replacement
The a ≤ r replacement metric can be expressed using basic mathematical
expressions on attributes and system parameters.
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TestMessage
apply to
a ≤ r replacement
subtract
power
divide
c2difficulty
divide
max
subtract
expectedAnswer1.0
multiply
expectedAnswerc1
multiply
subtract
receivedAnswerexpectedAnswer
c1
1.0
Our framework supports a switch model expression that takes case model expres-
sions as parameters. This approach is similar to one that would be used in a regular
programming language. For each case model expression, the pattern parameter is evalu-
ated and if true the current expression is replaced by the replacement parameter. Since
case model expressions are evaluated in sequence, the evaluation stops when one of the
pattern parameters is true. We model the entire process of determining the satisfaction
of a test message as the feedback satisfaction metric.
Expression 6.3.3 feedback satisfaction
The feedback satisfaction metric makes use of the switch model expression
and according case model expressions that reflect the cases as well as the
a > r and a ≤ r replacements defined by equation 6.3.3 .
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TestMessage
apply to
feedback satisfaction
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
a ≤ r replacement
less or equal
expectedAnswerreceivedAnswer
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
a > r replacement
greater than
expectedAnswerreceivedAnswer
pattern replacement
The result is inserted into the satisfaction level attribute of the Peer element node
thus creating a time series of test message feedback satisfaction levels.
6.3.3.2 Probabilistic Representation of Observations
The basis of performing trustworthiness assessments on each of the HIDS used by
Fung et al. [54] is the Dirichlet distribution. It can be used to model the probability of
a set of discrete states S based on concentration parameters α which in this case are
updated as more data becomes available. Fung et al. [54] chose to divide the possible
satisfaction levels defined in equation 6.3.3 into k number of ranges (i.e., 10 by default
ranging from 0.1 to 1.0). Here, the discrete states of the Dirichlet distribution represent
various satisfactions level ranges s1, . . . , sk and the α parameters are modeled as the
combination of initial beliefs and subsequent observations of satisfaction levels −→γ =
γ1, . . . , γk. Given that the probability of pi = P (S = si) from [54] we have
Dirichlet(p1, . . . , pk|γ0, γ1, . . . , γk) =
Γ
(∑k
i=1 γi
)∏k
i=1 Γ(γi)
k∏
i=1
pγi−1i (6.3.4)
where
γ0 =
k∑
i=1
γi (6.3.5)
In order to improve the impact of recent observations, a forgetting factor is in-
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troduced which discounts prior observations based on the time difference between the
previous observations and the newest observation. The combination of the initial belief,
the series of observations, and the forgetting factor results in the observation vector
−→γ (n) at a particular time n which is recursively defined by Fung et al. [54] as
−→γ (n) =

c0
−→
S 0 n = 0
λ4tn ×−→γ (n−1) +−→S n n > 0
(6.3.6)
where c0 is a priori constant used for the initial beliefs represented by
−→
S 0, λ4tn
the discounted forgetting factor4, and −→S n the discretized satisfaction level at time n.
The observation vector yields the basis for modeling the probability distribution of
satisfaction levels at specific times using the Dirichlet distribution. While the time
dynamic observation vector approach could have been implemented using a combination
of basic expressions, we decided to create a separate reusable gamma vector model
expression.
Expression 6.3.4 Observation vector −→γ
The −→γ metric can be represented using the gamma vector model expres-
sion which parameters include the forgetting factor, its unit, the priori
constant and the number of satisfaction levels as system parameters λ,
co, and k respectively as well as a time series of satisfaction levels.
4Note that Fung et al. [54] do not explicitly state the unit of this forgetting factor. As such, we
assume the factor is per day.
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Peer
apply to−→γ
GammaVector
satisfactionLevel serieskc0λ unitλ
forgettingFactor
forgettingFactorUnitInMilliSeconds prioriConstant satisfactionLevels
This is an example which shows that complex techniques and formulas can be ab-
stracted as model expressions with parameters that can be reused more easily and
incorporated into other models.
The combination of initial belief and a time series of satisfaction level observations
adjusted using a forgetting factor forms the basis of the Dirichlet concentration param-
eters. As shown above we model the evolution of the prior for the Dirichlet distribution
from a time series of satisfaction levels as the −→γ metric. This allows us to use a standard
model expression for a Dirichlet distribution where we use the observation vector −→γ in
place of the regular α parameters.
In general, we model probability distributions asmodel expressions with all necessary
parameters (i.e., set of α for Dirichlet, α and β for Beta distributions, etc.) and include
a type parameter that specifies the result of the expression such as probability density
or cumulative probability. As for the probabilistic representation of observations and
satisfaction levels, we define the Dirichlet probability vector metric.
Expression 6.3.5 Dirichlet probability vector
The Dirichlet probability vector metric is modeled as the Dirichlet distri-
bution model expression using the −→γ metric as a basis (α concentration
parameters) for deriving a distribution of satisfaction levels in form of a
probability vector.
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Peer
apply to
Dirichlet probability vector
Dirichlet
probabilityVector−→γ
alphas type
6.3.4 Intrusion Detection: Knowledge Evaluation
Now that we can derive the Dirichlet probability vector representing the distribution
of satisfaction levels for individual Peers, we are able to assess their trustworthiness.
Fung et al. [54] define the trustworthiness of a Peer by utilizing the weighted sum of
this probability vector
T (peer) =
k∑
i=1
wiE[pi] =
1
γ0
k∑
i=1
wiγi (6.3.7)
where k is the number of satisfaction levels, γ0 =
∑
γi, and E[pi] the expected prob-
ability of a particular satisfaction level given the Dirichlet distribution (equation 6.3.4)
for the selected Peer.
Note that the weights used in the trustworthiness assessment are simply the sat-
isfaction level ranges. For example, if k = 10 then the weights vector would be
{0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1.0}. In our framework we can compute these weights by utilizing
a custom model expression.
Expression 6.3.6 weights
The weights metric can be represented using the satisfaction level ranges
model expression which has as parameter the number of satisfaction levels
as system parameter k.
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weights
SatisfactionLevelRanges
k
satisfactionLevels
As such the trustworthiness of a particular Peer can then be determined using the
Dirichlet distribution of satisfaction level observations and the satisfaction level ranges
accordingly.
Expression 6.3.7 trustworthiness of a Peer
The trustworthiness of a Peer metric is modeled based on equation 6.3.7
as the weighted sum of the weights and
−→
λ normalized by λ0 which can
be expressed by the sum of
−→
λ .
Peer
apply to
trustworthiness of a Peer
divide
sum
−→γ
WeightedSum
weights−→γ
values weights
Fung et al. [54] also provide the means to compute a confidence level for this trust-
worthiness assessment based on the same weights and gamma vector
C(peer) = 1− 4√1 + γ0
√√√√√ k∑
i=1
w2i
γi
γ0
−
(
k∑
i=1
wi
γi
γ0
)2
(6.3.8)
We need to point out that in contrast to trustworthiness which ranges from 0 to 1,
the confidence given in equation 6.3.8 ranges from -1 to 1.
Expression 6.3.8 confidence in Peer trustworthiness
The confidence in Peer trustworthiness is more complex than the trust-
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worthiness. However, it is based on the same input, weights and gamma
vector metrics. Thus we defined a Confidence model expression that re-
flects equation 6.3.8.
Peer
apply to
confidence in Peer trustworthiness
Confidence
weights−→γ
gammas weights
6.3.5 Intrusion Detection: Evaluation of Model Vulnera-
bilities
Fung et al. [54] use simulation to generate sensor data (i.e., data for each HIDS)
to evaluate their trust assessment approach. Here, we also use simulation to generate
sensor data dynamically. In addition we show that this simulation can also be modeled
in our framework which enables us to analyze the behavior of the proposed approach in
various types of attack scenarios.
6.3.5.1 Generating Test Messages
An important part of evaluating the system is the ability to probabilistically model
responses to test messages. Fung et al. [54] base this off the expertise level of a Peer
as well as the difficulty and expected answer of a particular test message. As described
above, difficulty and expected answer are attributes of TestMessage elements while the
expertise level can be retrieved using the referenceHIDS relation.
Expression 6.3.9 peer expertise level
The peer expertise level metric utilizes the flexible Neighbors model expres-
sion. This model expression has two parameters. First, an includeExpres-
sion which defines what neighbors should be included in the evaluation
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process. Here, we set up a constraint on the type of relation to refer-
enceHIDS. Second, the evaluatingExpression is evaluated on the resulting
element nodes and relation edges accordingly. Since we are interested in
retrieving the expertise level of a HIDS we reference its expertise level
attribute.
Peer
apply to
peer expertise level
Neighbors
RelationEdge
is referenceHIDS type
ElementNode
expertiseLevel
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
The actual test message feedback is modeled as discussed by [54] using the proba-
bility density function of the Beta distribution
Beta(x|α, β) = Γ(α+ β)Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α−1(1− x)β−1 (6.3.9)
where x ∈ [0, 1] is the response to the test message. In particular, Fung et al. [54]
specify the parameters α and β as follows
α = 1 + l(1− d)
d(1− l)
√
r
1− r
√
2
l
− 1 (6.3.10)
and
β = 1 + l(1− d)
d(1− l)
√
1− r
r
√
2
l
− 1 (6.3.11)
to incorporate the difficulty of the test message d, its expected answer r, and the
expertise level of the HIDS l. While this represents a complex approach, we use this
part to showcase the flexibility of our framework.
Upon closer inspection we can see that both equation 6.3.10 and 6.3.11 are similar
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except for the second factor. Thus, the calculation of α and β is broken down into
individual factors which are represented by metrics as follows.
Expression 6.3.10 Beta distribution first factor
The first factor of the Beta distribution l(1− d)
d(1− l) can be expressed by a
combination of math expressions and attribute references. Note that, we
determine the expertise level by applying the peer expertise level metric
to the Peer element node which is the source node whereas the difficulty
attribute is derived from the target node of the test message relation.
TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
factor 1
divide
multiply
subtract
source node
peer expertise level
1.0
target node
difficulty
multiply
subtract
target node
difficulty
1.0
source node
peer expertise level
Expression 6.3.11 Beta distribution second factor for α
The second factor of the Beta distribution is
√
r
1− r for the α term. We
utilize a series of math expressions on the expected answer r to model
this.
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TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
α factor 2
square root
divide
subtract
target node
expectedAnswer
1.0
target node
expectedAnswer
Expression 6.3.12 Beta distribution second factor for β
The second factor for the Beta distribution is
√
1− r
r
for the β term.
We can express this is similar terms as the factor for α, a combination of
math expressions.
TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
β factor 2
square root
divide
target node
expectedAnswer
subtract
target node
expectedAnswer
1.0
Expression 6.3.13 Beta distribution third factor
The third factor of the Beta distribution
√
2
l
− 1 is a straightforward
computation on the peer expertise level.
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TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
factor 3
square root
subtract
1.0
divide
source node
peer expertise level
2.0
Hence, we can determine the parameters α and β of the Beta distribution accord-
ingly.
Expression 6.3.14 Beta distribution α
The α term 1 + l(1− d)
d(1− l)
√
r
1− r
√
2
l
− 1 becomes a combination of the
previously modeled expressions.
TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
α
add
multiply
factor 3
multiply
α factor 2factor 1
1.0
Expression 6.3.15 Beta distribution β
The β term 1 + l(1− d)
d(1− l)
√
1− r
r
√
2
l
− 1 is modeled using its necessary
factor expressions accordingly.
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TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
β
add
multiply
factor 3
multiply
β factor 2factor 1
1.0
The combined α and β metrics show the advantage of defining generic reusable
expressions and metrics which make modeling less complex and more efficient. In par-
ticular, we utilized the overlapping first and third factors in both expressions.
Expression 6.3.16 response to challenge generation
The simulated answer to a test message is based its difficulty, the ex-
pected answer as well as the expertise level of the peer. We utilize a Beta
model expression which models its probability distribution. The required
parameters are taken from the α and β metrics as defined above.
TestMessage
target node
Peer
source node
apply to
simulated answer
Beta
sampleβα
alpha
beta
type
As such, the simulated answer then simply becomes the result of drawing a value for
the test message feedback from a Beta distribution model expression with the parameters
α and β as discussed above as well as the type sample. As we require information from
both, we apply this metric to a relation between a TestMessage and a Peer.
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6.3.5.2 Evaluating Model Robustness
In order to fully evaluate the impact of various types of attacks on the intrusion
detection approach proposed by Fung et al. [54] we need to define the appropriate met-
rics. In the following we will compare a basic average trustworthiness metric discussed
by Fung et al. [54] and a new robustness index metric proposed here.
In the intrusion detection system proposed by Fung et al. [54] trustworthiness as-
sessments are based on the modeled Dirichlet distribution of satisfaction levels. As
discussed above, each HIDS maintains a probation list and an acquaintance list where
Peers represent the assessment of neighboring HIDS. In order to assess the overall trust-
worthiness of a particular HIDS we therefore need to combine all Peers with the same
reference HIDS accordingly. A straightforward approach is to calculate the average of
these Peer trustworthiness assessments.
T (HIDS) = 1
|peers→HIDS |
∑
peers→HIDS
T (peer) (6.3.12)
In our abstract graph model we can refer to the specific relations shown in figure 6.3.2
and 6.3.3. Specifically, every Peer has a relationship with the HIDS it is assessing and
this can be used to aggregate the trustworthiness assessments.
Expression 6.3.17 average HIDS trustworthiness metric
The average trustworthiness of a particular HIDS can be computed by
first determining all Peer element nodes that have a relation edge of type
reference HIDS with the HIDS. This can be done using the Neighbor model
expression. For each of these Peers we can then apply the trustworthiness
of a Peer metric and compute the respective average.
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HIDS
apply to
HIDS trustworthiness
average
Neighbors
RelationEdge
is referenceHIDS type
ElementNode
trustworthiness of a Peer
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
The overall average trustworthiness can be defined as
T = 1
|HIDS|
∑
HIDS
T (HIDS) (6.3.13)
Note that this average can be computed over any number of HIDS element nodes.
For instance, in the discussion of our simulation results we will apply this metric to
HIDS element nodes with varying expertise levels.
Expression 6.3.18 average trustworthiness metric
The average trustworthiness of a list of HIDS element nodes can be com-
puted by using the for each model expression to determine the trustwor-
thiness of each HIDS and then averaging the results.
average trustworthiness
average
ForEach
HIDS list
HIDS trustworthiness
evaluatingExpression
Our approach to assessing the impact of various attacks on the intrusion detection
system by Fung et al. [54] goes beyond looking at the average trustworthiness. The basic
idea is that the overall system should provide a measure to clearly separate HIDS ele-
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Table 6.3.1: Robustness Score Card
Observed value
True value good normal malicious
good 1 0.5 -1
malicious -1 -0.5 1
ments that are good and ones that are malicious based on trustworthiness assessments.
Therefore, we propose a robustness index that takes into consideration the average trust-
worthiness of the system and determines which HIDS elements have a trustworthiness
assessment significantly higher or lower than the average. During testing we can then
check validate these assessments against the known true values.
In order to compute the robustness index we need to consider the possible cases
shown in table 6.3.1 for each of the HIDS elements.
The true value refers to whether a HIDS is malicious or not. The observed value rep-
resents the assessment of the system where good means significantly higher trustworthi-
ness (i.e., higher than average trustworthiness + threshold), normal reflects uncertainty
(i.e., within the average trustworthiness ± threshold), and malicious significantly lower
trustworthiness (i.e., lower than average trustworthiness - threshold). We can formally
define this robustness index using the following approach.
Note that the robustness assessments for the good HIDS are just opposite of the
HIDS. As such we define a binary function modeling the goodness of a HIDS.
G(HIDS) =

1 if HIDS is good
-1 if HIDS is malicious
(6.3.14)
Expression 6.3.19 goodness metric
The goodness metric is defined by two distinct cases and as such we can
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use the switch model expression and according case model expressions to
determine the value of the metric.
HIDS
apply to
goodness
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
-1.0
equal
truemalicious
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
1.0
equal
falsemalicious
pattern replacement
We can then define the robustness of a particular HIDS according to the cases shown
in table 6.3.1 as
ρ(HIDS) = G(HIDS)×

1 if T (HIDS) > T + ∆T
0.5 if T −∆T ≤ T (HIDS) ≤ T + ∆T
−1 if T (HIDS) < T −∆T
(6.3.15)
where T (HIDS) is the HIDS trustworthiness to be assessed, T the average trust-
worthiness, and ∆T the threshold surrounding the average.
For clarity reasons we will break down the modeling of this robustness metric. The
first case deals with trustworthiness assessments that are significantly above normal.
Expression 6.3.20 above average trustworthiness metric
The above average trustworthiness metric performs basic math, logic and
attribute reference calculations to determine whether the HIDS has an
above normal trustworthiness.
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HIDS
apply to
above
greater than
add
thresholdaverage trustworthiness
HIDS trustworthiness
Second, we need to determine whether the trustworthiness assessment falls within
the range where the system is uncertain about the status of a HIDS.
Expression 6.3.21 within range of average trustworthiness metric
The within range of average trustworthiness metric performs a more com-
plex comparison that involves checking two bounds (i.e., average trust-
worthiness ± threshold).
HIDS
apply to
in range
and
less or equal
add
thresholdaverage trustworthiness
HIDS trustworthiness
less or equal
HIDS trustworthiness
subtract
thresholdaverage trustworthiness
Third, trustworthiness assessments that are significantly below the average need to
be considered.
Expression 6.3.22 below average trustworthiness metric
The below average trustworthiness metric utilizes a straightforward math
and logical expression.
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HIDS
apply to
below
less than
subtract
thresholdaverage trustworthiness
HIDS trustworthiness
The individual robustness of a particular HIDS can then be computed using a com-
bination of the metrics above.
Expression 6.3.23 robustness of a HIDS
The robustness of a HIDS metric implements equation 6.3.15 by multiply-
ing the result of the goodness metric with the results for the appropriate
case of where the particular HIDS trustworthiness assessment falls.
HIDS
apply to
robustness
multiply
SwitchExpression
CaseExpression
-1.0below
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
0.5in range
pattern replacement
CaseExpression
1.0above
pattern replacement
goodness
We define the overall robustness index for the intrusion detection system as the
average of the individual robustness assessments of the HIDS elements.
ρ = 1
|HIDS|
∑
HIDS
ρ(HIDS) (6.3.16)
Expression 6.3.24 robustness index ρ metric
The robustness index ρ metric is computed by averaging the robustness
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assessments of the given list of HIDS elements.
HIDS list
apply to
ρ
average
ForEach
robustness
evaluatingExpression
We show some examples of possible robustness indices in figure 6.3.4. Note that here
we chose a threshold ∆T = 10%. Figure 6.3.4a shows a likely case where some good
and some malicious HIDS are correctly identified while the majority does not deviate
significantly from the average trustworthiness. The other three cases represent special
occurrences that show the extreme values of the robustness index. In figure 6.3.4b there
is not separation between good and malicious HIDS elements because all trustworthiness
assessments are close to the average. As such the robustness index will approach 0.
Figure 6.3.4c show the best case scenario where the trustworthiness assessments of all
good and malicious HIDS elements fall into the right range. The worst case scenario
happens when all HIDS elements are misclassified figure 6.3.4d.
6.3.5.3 Evaluating Attacks
In the following we will discuss how robust the intrusion detection system by Fung
et al. [54] is when facing a variety of attacks. For this purpose we developed a model
that allows us to dynamically evaluate graph expressions even when the abstract graph
model is changing. We will analyze and evaluate the following four different attack
scenarios:
• newcomer attack with constantly joining nodes
• newcomer attack with a sudden flood of nodes
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(a) Normal robustness (ρ = 0.4) with
some good and some malicious HIDS
correctly identified
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(b) No robustness (ρ = 0.0) because
of missing separation between good and
malicious HIDS
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(c) Perfect robustness (ρ = 1.0) with
all good and malicious HIDS correctly
identified
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(d) Worst robustness (ρ = −1.0) with
all good and malicious HIDS misclassi-
fied
Figure 6.3.4: Comparison of example cases for different types of robustness
for 10 HIDS (5 good, 5 malicious) and ∆T = 10%
• betrayal attack with constantly betraying nodes
• betrayal attack with a sudden flood of betrayals
Since a full system trade-off analysis is out of the scope of this research we made a
series of assumptions for our evaluation. Note that the focus of this scenario analysis is
to show the flexibility of our TrustKnowOne framework, provide approaches to formally
measure the impact of attacks on the knowledge derivation process, and deal with
dynamically changing environments.
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Table 6.3.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value Description
R 2/day test message rate
λ 0.9 forgetting factor
λ unit day forgetting factor unit
c0 10 Priori constant
c1 1.5 cost rate
c2 1 satisfaction sensitivity factor
k 10 number of satisfaction levels
Sp 10 probation list size
Difficulty of test messages We select a difficulty level between low (0.1), medium
(0.5), and high (0.9) with equal probability
Expertise level of HIDS The selection of the expertise level will be between low
(0.05), medium (0.5), and high (0.95) with equal probability
Alert risk/ expected answer The expected answer is fixed to 0.5 for all test mes-
sages
Message rate Instead of dynamically increasing or decreasing the rate at which test
messages are being sent, we fix it to 2 per day
Deception strategies A malicious node always evaluates the expected answer of a
test message to 0.0 in order to create maximum harm.
Peer management For our evaluation there exists only a single list to maintain Peers
and after it is filled with random Peers it does not change
Given these adjustments we can evaluate the impact of attacks on knowledge deriva-
tion using the system parameters shown in table 6.3.2 as defined by Fung et al. [54].
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However, we need to discuss what it means for a HIDS to be malicious. There are
three ways a malicious HIDS can behave:
Basic The malicious HIDS downgrades the alert risk of a test message to 0.0
Enhanced In addition to basic, a malicious HIDS reduces the satisfaction levels for
test messages responses sent to other HIDS thus decreasing the trustworthiness of HIDS
elements it is supposed to evaluate
Collaborative In addition to enhanced, the group of malicious HIDS increases the
satisfaction levels for test messages from malicious HIDS elements thus increasing their
trustworthiness
Note that in our results we compare these attacks with a baseline that acts as if
the malicious HIDS element was good. Throughout our evaluation we will discuss the
results for all three malicious behaviors. In general, each of the attack scenarios is
modeled over 75 days. An overview of the number of malicious nodes in the system is
shown in figure 6.3.5.
Newcomer Attack A newcomer attack introduces malicious HIDS elements into the
system that were not there previously. The ideas is to overwhelm the existing HIDS.
Here the system consisted of 30 HIDS elements with evenly distributed expertise levels
exchange test messages for 25 days. Then we add 1 malicious newcomer HIDS join the
system every day for 30 days, followed by 20 days of no change for stabilization.
As shown in figure 6.3.6a the intrusion detection system by Fung et al. [54] ex-
periences a clear decline in average trustworthiness. However, if malicious nodes are
collaborating the system actually behaves incorrectly because it shows a continuous rise
in trustworthiness even as more malicious nodes are introduced.
The same pattern is reflected using the robustness index. Figure 6.3.6b clearly shows
that the robustness index gives a better indication of how the intrusion detection system
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Figure 6.3.5: Intrusion evaluation malicious nodes per scenario overview
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(a) Average trustworthiness
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(b) Robustness index
Figure 6.3.6: Comparison of average trustworthiness assessments of HIDS
nodes and robustness index for the newcomer attack scenario
is affected. We see that there are some robustness measures that are able to counter the
basic and enhanced behaviors of malicious HIDS. However, when they are collaborating
the system is vulnerable.
251
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
41
43
45
47
49
51
53
55
57
59
61
63
65
67
69
71
73
75
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
collaborative enhanced basic baseline
day
tr
u
s
tw
o
rt
h
in
e
s
s
(a) Average trustworthiness
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(b) Robustness index
Figure 6.3.7: Comparison of average trustworthiness assessments of HIDS
nodes and robustness index for the newcomer flooding attack scenario
Newcomer Flooding Attack A variation of the newcomer attack is when instead
of continuously joining the system, an attacker creates a flood of new malicious HIDS
elements. This system consisted of starting off with 30 HIDS elements with evenly
distributed expertise levels sending test messages. After 25 days 30 new malicious
HIDS join the system which then has 50 days of no change to stabilize.
Figure 6.3.7a shows the sudden decrease in trustworthiness across all expertise lev-
els. We can also recognize that for the basic and enhanced malicious behaviors the
system behaves as expected and decreases average trustworthiness. As such, it is an-
other indication that the system does not do well with malicious HIDS elements that
collaborate.
The evolution of the robustness index shown in figure 6.3.7b clearly identifies the
flooding attack and the subsequent recovery. Note that when compared to the aver-
age trustworthiness figure the robustness index seems to be better suited for detecting
certain attack scenarios. We can also notice the impact on the robustness index of
malicious HIDS elements collaborating.
Betrayal Attack A betrayal attack works by malicious HIDS first pretending to be
good to the intrusion detection system. After establishing some trust with neighboring
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Figure 6.3.8: Comparison of average trustworthiness assessments of HIDS
nodes and robustness index for the betrayal attack scenario
HIDS elements we start turning malicious. The system starts with 60 HIDS elements
and evenly distributed expertise levels. After 25 days 1 HIDS turns malicious every day
for 30 days. The remaining 20 days are then used for stabilization.
As shown in figure 6.3.8a the average trustworthiness of the HIDS elements in the
system starts to decline immediately. Interestingly there is hardly a distinction between
the malicious behaviors and their impact on the average trustworthiness. However,
when evaluating figure 6.3.8b there is a clear impact on the robustness index once
HIDS elements start turning malicious. Note that robustness decreases for all types of
malicious behavior which is different from the system facing a newcomer attack that was
fairly robust against basic and enhanced. The robustness terms also approach 0 which
would indicate that the system is unable to clearly separate trustworthiness assessments
(see figure 6.3.4b.
Betrayal Flooding Attack A betrayal flooding attack works by turning multiple
HIDS elements into malicious ones at the same time. In this system we are starting off
with 60 HIDS whose expertise level was evenly distributed until 25 days have passed.
Then we betrayed 30 HIDS elements at once and gave the simulation another 50 days
to stabilize.
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Figure 6.3.9: Comparison of average trustworthiness assessments of HIDS
nodes and robustness index for the betrayal flooding attack scenario
The resulting average trustworthiness assessments are similar to the continuous be-
trayal attack scenario (figure 6.3.9a). However, there is a small difference as the average
diverge slightly after the betrayal flooding. The robustness index shows a drastic drop
off as soon as the flooding started and recovers slightly afterwards (figure 6.3.9b). Nev-
ertheless, the low robustness values indicate that the intrusion detection system is not
able to deal well with betrayal attacks. Note that the robustness index provides a better
assessment of the impact an attack has on the system than the average trustworthiness
approach.
6.3.6 Intrusion Detection: Summary
Intrusion detection is an important field in the area of computer system security.
While there are many proposed approaches they can usually only be broadly classified
into categories (e.g., network-based, host-based, centralized, distributed, etc.). More
detailed analysis and comparison is often difficult due to the lack of a formal way of
describing intrusion detection systems and their performance metrics.
In this section we showed that our framework is capable of modeling a collaborative
trust management approach by Fung et al. [54]. We discussed in detail how individual
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components such as a HIDS, peers and test messages as well as their relationships can
be represented by our abstract graph model. As such, we showcase how our framework
is capable of modeling dynamic environments.
Furthermore, we examined the specific trust assessment methodology of the Fung ap-
proach and demonstrated in this section that they can be formalized using various graph
metrics and expressions. This includes the extensive modeling of deriving trustworthi-
ness and confidence assessments by determining satisfaction levels of test messages. As
such, we showed how our framework is able to express the intrusion detection system
approach by Fung et al. [54] as belief engines and decision processes.
Furthermore, we discussed two approaches to evaluating the system against vari-
ous types of attacks. In particular, we showed that the basic average trustworthiness
metric by Fung et al. [54] is insufficient. Therefore, we developed and evaluated a new
robustness index which is based on how clearly the intrusion detection system is able to
separate good nodes from malicious ones. Here, we provided a detailed analysis of the
both metrics with regards to newcomer and betrayal attack scenarios. Even though our
analysis is not a complete system design and trade-off analysis we demonstrated that
our TrustKnowOne framework is flexible and expressive enough to model a complex
intrusion detection system.
Additional benefits for this scenario of modeling algorithms and approaches using
our generic framework based on the abstract graph model include:
Comparison The formalized nature of the components (i.e., HIDS, Peer, TestMes-
sage) and algorithms (i.e., evaluating feedback, peer trustworthiness, peer confidence,
feedback simulation) allows for the comparison to other intrusion detection approaches
modeled in the same manner. For instance, we introduced a new robustness metric and
successfully compared it to the one suggested by Fung et al. [54]
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Extension New components as well as new algorithms can be introduced simply on
the basis of adding elements and relations to the abstract graph model. The imple-
mentation of new algorithms can be performed using graph expressions (e.g., a different
trustworthiness approach for Peers, a simpler test message feedback formula).
Reusability We showcased how individual graphmetrics and expressions can be com-
bined into more complex ones (e.g., gamma vector, weights, peer expertise level). Com-
mon element and relation descriptions of the graph model could be used across various
trust management approaches such that they can be compared easily.
Performance Since algorithms are described as a combination of graph expressions
we are able to pinpoint cost measures to evaluate them. This allows us to assess aspects
of the particular algorithm as well as potential changes to them in detail.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we showed how our framework can be applied to a variety of scenarios.
Specifically, we discussed three diverse scenarios and how they can be expressed using
the methodology the TrustKnowOne framework. A detailed comparison and evaluation
of these scenarios with regards to other frameworks and approaches will be performed
as part of chapter 8.
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7
Implementation
We developed a reference implementation of the TrustKnowOne framework in Java.
While the choice of Java already provides a certain platform independence for the frame-
work, note that the approaches and processes described in the previous chapters (chap-
ter 4, 5) and applied to several scenarios (chapter 6) can be implemented in other
languages and on a variety of platforms. As such, our TrustKnowOne framework as
discussed throughout this dissertation provides a description of interfaces as well as
processes necessary for implementing knowledge derivation processes that incorporate
trust and quality of data.
As part of our implementation the formal aspects of our approach can be specified
according to respective XML schema definitions which have been developed with a
focus on interoperability. Hence, all graph components (elements, relations, metrics,
etc.), data sources (files, databases, etc.), and mappings (data extraction adapters)
can be described formally using a set of XML tags. Furthermore, we provide a Java
application programming interface (API) that allows future extensions to use visual
tools, domain specific languages, and a wide range of graph formats for the description
of the abstract graph model as well as graph expressions.
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The incorporation of dynamic aspects is central to our framework. Therefore, in our
implementation we timestamp all data instances and can maintain extensive provenance
information. This allows us to deal with changes in meaning (values, data types, etc.)
and structure/topology (relations, connections, etc.) throughout the graph model. We
also differentiate data and data sources using their determined trustworthiness and
incorporate these trustworthiness assessments into decision processes thus improving
them.
Flexibility, one of the key aspects of our approach is reflected in the implementation
of the TrustKnowOne framework. We support various abstract graph model storage
approaches (initially in-memory and graph database) that can be incorporated by im-
plementing an interface accordingly. Additionally, the computational model used for
applying graph expressions to graph components can be exchanged as well to support
additional approaches than the ones currently implemented (sequential, thread-based
parallelization). Note that both storage and computational model are independent from
other parts of the framework as they only need to adhere to formal interface definitions.
Thus, the framework can be adapted to specific application scenarios simply by ex-
changing one implementation for another.
In this chapter we showcase implementation aspects1 by discussing parts of the
Trusting Smartphone Apps scenario (section 6.1) where we applied our framework to
the domain of trustworthiness assessment of Android Apps. In particular, we investi-
gated why basic App attributes such as average rating and a number of positive reviews
are not necessarily good indicators of an App’s trustworthiness. Hence, we considered
three different data sources for the data extraction component: rating information, re-
views, and permissions. As part of the data processing component, we then developed
two metrics for each type of information (ratings, reviews, permissions) that incorpo-
rate a variety of meta and relationship information. Furthermore, in order to derive
1The examples used in this chapter are based on the Trusting Smartphone Apps application sce-
nario described in section 6.1. They are simplified for illustration purposes and do not reflect the full
complexity of the scenario.
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Figure 7.1: Implementation components overview
a trustworthiness assessment for individual Apps we implemented a linear weighting
scheme that functions as the decision engine in our evaluation component.
An overview of the components required for an implementation of our TrustKnowOne
is shown in figure 7.1. In the following sections we will discuss the components and
provide details of our reference implementation.
7.1 Input
Formally specifying the input to our knowledge derivation framework follows the
methodology described in section 5.2.1. As such our implementation provides techniques
to describe the elements and relations of a particular scenario, the respective data
sources, and the mappings from data sources to graph components in the abstract graph
model.
7.1.1 Elements And Relations
We provide a number of options to describe the graph components used to model a
particular application scenario. First, a flexible, interoperable, and extensible technique
involves the use of Extensible Markup Language (XML). As shown in listing 7.1, we can
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name type
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authorName text
id
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id id
name text
numDownloads text
ratingCount number
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id
level number
label text
time date
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id id
id
author text
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app-reviews app-permissions
Figure 7.2: Simplified element description graph
define basic graph components such as elements and relations using tags and attribute
values. In particular, we show three elements where the unique identifier and timestamp
properties are derived from a particular attribute of an element. Furthermore, we specify
an appropriate type for each of the attributes.
Figure 7.2 shows the same simplified version of the abstract graph model in graphical
form. This type of graphical modeling can be used to organize more complex application
scenarios.
In order to provide the most flexibility we also provide an application programming
interface (API) to our framework implementation for describing elements and relations.
As shown in listing 7.2 this approach achieves the same objective of providing a flex-
ible and extensible way to model graph components of the trusting Smartphone Apps
scenario.
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1 <element name="App">
2 <id>
3 <attribute ref="id"/>
4 </id>
5 <time name="datePublished" pattern="yyyy-MM-dd"/>
6 <attribute name="authorName" type="xs:string" />
7 <attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" />
8 <attribute name="name" type="xs:string" />
9 <attribute name="numDownloads" type="xs:string" />
10 <attribute name="ratingCount" type="xs:positiveInteger" />
11 <attribute name="ratingValue" type="xs:double" />
12 </element>
13
14 <element name="Permission">
15 <id>
16 <attribute ref="label"/>
17 </id>
18 <time name="time" pattern="yyyy-MM-dd" />
19 <attribute name="description" type="xs:string" />
20 <attribute name="label" type="xs:string" />
21 <attribute name="level" type="xs:string" />
22 </element>
23
24 <element name="Review">
25 <id>
26 <attribute ref="appId"/>
27 <attribute ref="id"/>
28 </id>
29 <time name="date" pattern="yyyy-MM-dd" />
30 <attribute name="appId" type="xs:ID" />
31 <attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" />
32 <attribute name="author" type="xs:string" />
33 <attribute name="rating" type="xs:positiveInteger" />
34 <attribute name="text" type="xs:string" />
35 <attribute name="title" type="xs:string" />
36 </element>
37
38 <relation name="app-reviews" sourceRef="App" targetRef="Review"
39 type="one-to-many"/>
40 <relation name="app-permissions" sourceRef="App" targetRef="Permission"
41 type="one-to-many"/>
Listing 7.1: Simplified XML Element and Relation description
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1 Element appElement = new Element("App", new IdAttribute("id"));
2 appElement.setTimeAttribute(new TimeAttribute("datePublished");
3 appElement.add(new TypedAttribute<>("id", String.class));
4 appElement.add(new TypedAttribute<>("authorName", String.class));
5 appElement.add(new TypedAttribute<>("ratingValue", Double.class));
6 appElement.add(new TypedAttribute<>("ratingCount", Integer.class));
7
8 Relation relation = new Relation("app-reviews", "App", "Review");
Listing 7.2: Simplified Java Element and Relation description
7.1.2 Data Sources
Formally describing data sources is difficult due the complexity of non-standard
interfaces. Our reference implementation provides an approach that is flexible and
extensible since we only need to specify how to connect to a data source and retrieve
raw data. The actual integration of data into the abstract graph model is performed as
part of the mapping process. This allows us to incorporate a variety of data sources
such as databases and files into the knowledge derivation process.
In addition, by using the API we are able to efficiently deal with the continuous
integration of new data. In case of the trusting Smartphone Apps scenario, we devel-
oped a web crawler that provided a snapshot of the data we wanted to model. While
this allowed us to perform a detailed analysis of trust aspects (see section 6.1), the data
remained static. However, we could have easily extended our scenario to have a dy-
namic web crawler that continuously fed new data into the framework. As discussed in
section 5.2.2, dynamic retrieval of additional data can improve decision processes and is
a necessary step in enable knowledge derivation in real-time and streaming applications.
Hence, we can also model a data source as a process that either continuously provides
data or provide data when requested.
An example of dynamically creating an additional App element node for the appli-
cation scenario is shown in listing 7.3.
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1 ElementNode one = new ElementNode(appElement);
2 ElementInstance oneInstance = one.createInstance();
3 oneInstance.set("id", "com.google.android.maps");
4 oneInstance.set("authorName", "Google");
5 oneInstance.set("ratingValue", "4.6");
6 oneInstance.set("ratingCount", "9020");
7 one.add(oneInstance);
Listing 7.3: Dynamically creating a new element node using the API
7.1.3 Mappings
Given the description of the graph components and the data sources for an appli-
cation scenario, we are able to define a mapping process that will transform raw data
from a data source into a respective graph component. Our reference implementation
provides an approach based on XML in order to perform the mapping. As discussed in
section 5.2.1, we enable incorporating custom adapters for handling application specific
data transformations efficiently.
In listing 7.4, we map data from a comma separated value file onto the abstract graph
model by describing the row format of the file. Note that we split the information found
in a row into an App and a Category element node. In addition, our implementation
automatically adds a relationship accordingly.
An efficient way to store information about which entities in a graph are related is
an adjacency list where a list of neighboring nodes is kept for each node of the graph. As
such, our reference implementation allows the mapping of data onto element nodes and
relationships onto relation edges in a flexible manner. For example, listing 7.5 shows a
mapping in which the number of Permission element nodes per App varies.
7.2 Knowledge Derivation Process
In order to provide an framework implementation that allows knowledge derivation
as described in this dissertation we need to discuss the following. The previous section
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1 <data name="apps">
2 <csv file="apps.csv" header="false" separator=","
3 quoteCharacter="double" >
4 <rowFormat>
5 <element ref="App" number="1">
6 <attribute ref="id" />
7 <attribute ref="name" />
8 </element>
9 <element ref="Category">
10 <attribute ref="name" />
11 </element>
12 <element ref="App" number="1">
13 <attribute ref="authorName" />
14 <attribute ref="datePublished" />
15 <attribute ref="numDownloads" />
16 <attribute ref="softwareVersion" />
17 <attribute ref="ratingCount" />
18 <attribute ref="ratingValue" />
19 </element>
20 </rowFormat>
21 </csv>
22 <relation ref="app-category"/>
23 </data>
Listing 7.4: Simplified XML mapping description
1 <data name="appPermissions">
2 <csv file="appPermissions.csv" header="false">
3 <rowFormat>
4 <element ref="App">
5 <attribute ref="id"/>
6 </element>
7 <group max="unbounded">
8 <element ref="Permission">
9 <attribute ref="label"/>
10 </element>
11 </group>
12 </rowFormat>
13 </csv>
14 <relation ref="app-permissions"/>
15 </data>
Listing 7.5: Variable number of relationships mapping
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discussed in detail how our reference implementation describes graph components, data
sources, and mappings. However, an efficient implementation our framework requires
an efficient abstract graph model backend responsible for storage and retrieval of graph
components. Furthermore, how do we describe graph expressions in a flexible and ex-
tensible manner and more importantly how do we evaluate them on the abstract graph
model. Our reference implementation provides a solution that is flexible yet scalable in
size and performance.
7.2.1 Abstract Graph Model Backends
There exist a variety of data storage approaches. However, we focus on a particular
type that is our abstract graph model. In order to remain flexible and extensible our
implementation performs storage and retrieval operations on an abstract graph model
interface. This allows the underlying storage model to be adapted to specific needs. For
instance, if the amount of data is highly dynamic (e.g. streaming data) then storing
it in memory improves performance since data does not have to be written and read
from disk. On the other hand, relational or graph databases offer advantages in the
retrieval of data because of complex index systems. Furthermore, document mining
usually follows a file based approach. As such, it is important to note that by not
depending on a single type of backend but rather providing the ability to choose our
reference implementation allows for the flexibility necessary to deal with a variety of
applications scenarios. Note that this enables extension to distributed (e.g., Hadoop
[169, 178]) as well as hybrid (e.g., using a database for old data and in-memory for
newer data) backend approaches.
7.2.2 Metrics
Our TrustKnowOne framework performs knowledge derivation by evaluating graph
expressions on the graph components stored in the abstract graph model. Whereas belief
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engines assess aspects such trust and quality of data, metrics and decision processes
are usually utilized to compute values from graph components. These graph expressions
can be implemented using several approaches. Our reference implementation utilizes an
expression interface for which every graph expression needs to provide specific imple-
mentations (listing 7.6). Note that this can easily be extended to include other graph
components or combinations thereof.
1 public interface Expression {
2 public Object evaluate(ElementNode node);
3 public Object evaluate(List<ElementNode> nodes);
4 public Object evaluate(RelationEdge edge);
5 }
Listing 7.6: Java reference implementation expression interface
We then incorporate this interface when defining possible relationships between
graph expressions. For instance, a binary comparison as shown in listing 7.7 requires
two child graph expressions which are then evaluated on a particular graph component.
1 public class Equal implements Expression {
2 protected Expression a;
3 protected Expression b;
4
5 public Equal(Expression a, Expression b) {
6 this.a = a;
7 this.b = b;
8 }
9 public Object evaluate(ElementNode node) {
10 return (a.evaluate(node)).equals(b.evaluate(node));
11 }
12 public Object evaluate(List<ElementNode> nodes) {
13 return (a.evaluate(nodes)).equals(b.evaluate(nodes));
14 }
15 public Object evaluate(RelationEdge edge) {
16 return (a.evaluate(edge)).equals(b.evaluate(edge));
17 }
18 }
Listing 7.7: Java expression example implementation
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The results can then be compared accordingly. This approach maintains great flex-
ibility in terms combining graph expressions of all different types and make it straight-
forward to incorporate additional ones into the framework.
In chapter 4, we already presented an expression tree form to define graph expressions
and in this section we provide two additional methods. As an example, we choose the
following metric from the trusting Smartphone Apps scenario.
Expression 7.1 Scaled average review rating
App
apply to
scaled average review rating
average
Neighbors
ElementNode
is Review type
ElementNode
divide
4.0
subtract
1.0rating
evaluatingExpression includeExpression
Because of its flexibility and interoperability we also chose XML in our reference
implementation to specify metrics. An advantage of XML is its inherent tree structure
which makes the transformation into an expression tree straightforward and efficient
(see listing 7.8).
As discussed earlier, our implementation provides an API that allows for metrics to
be dynamically added (listing 7.9).
7.2.3 Computational Engines
Evaluating graph expressions on the graph components can be done in a variety
of ways. Our reference implementation of the TrustKnowOne framework provides an
267
1 <metric name="scaled average review rating">
2 <element ref="App">
3 <average>
4 <neighbors>
5 <parameter name="includeExpression">
6 <element ref="Review"/>
7 </parameter>
8 <parameter name="evaluatingExpression">
9 <element ref="Review">
10 <divide>
11 <subtract>
12 <attribute ref="rating"/>
13 <value>1.0</value>
14 </subtract>
15 <value>4.0</value>
16 </divide>
17 </element>
18 </parameter>
19 </neighbors>
20 </average>
21 </element>
22 </metric>
Listing 7.8: XML scaled average review rating metric definition
1 Neighbors reviewRatingNeighbors = new Neighbors();
2 reviewRatingNeighbors.set(NeighborsParameter.includeExpression,
3 new ElementReference(new TypeConstraint("Review")));
4 reviewRatingNeighbors.set(NeighborsParameter.evaluatingExpression,
5 new ElementReference(
6 new Divide(
7 new Subtract(
8 new AttributeReference("rating"),
9 new Constant<Double>(1.0)),
10 new Constant<Double>(4.0))));
11
12 Average averageReviewRating = new Average(reviewRatingNeighbors);
13
14 Metric scaledAverageReviewRating =
15 new Metric("scaled average review rating", averageReviewRating);
Listing 7.9: Java scaled average review rating metric definition
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abstraction layer that makes it possible to utilize currently well-known as well as future
computational approaches. In order to maintain scalability our implementation deals
with model keys that consist of the identifier and type instead of the complete graph
component whenever possible. This approach in essence follows the key-value mapping
approaches found in large-scale data processing frameworks (e.g., [39, 42, 103, 109, 139]).
This makes it easy to extend single machine to distributed computations such as Hadoop
[169, 178].
Our reference implementation not only allows for sequential and parallel but also
agent-based processing. In contrast to frameworks such as Hadoop, we are able to per-
form dynamic evaluation and reevaluation on parts of the abstract graph model without
the need for a central control functionality. Essentially, the abstract graph model could
be maintained independently of the entities that perform queries and computations on
it. An advantage of the abstract graph model approach is that clustering becomes more
efficient since relationships are already known. This also makes it easier to coordinate
potential synchronization issues that arise on shared data during parallel processing.
7.3 Output
Providing the results of the knowledge derivation process in a variety of formats
is important because it increases the usefulness of our framework. As such we provide
several mechanisms to retrieve the results of evaluating graph expressions. In particular,
one can utilize the Java API to implement output adapters. This allows the creation
of static results such as tables, files, and charts as well as dynamic ones such as event
notifications and propagation to other systems.
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7.4 Application Programming Interface
While we chose Java for the reference implementation of our TrustKnowOne frame-
work, the approaches and methodologies discussed throughout this dissertation can be
incorporated into other existing or future frameworks. The framework itself is language
agnostic, platform independent, and because of the clearly defined interfaces such as the
ones between knowledge extraction, processing, and evaluation, our framework is flexible.
Our implementation provides an abstract graph model that can be used for managing
data in heterogeneous and dynamic environments. Furthermore, our TrustKnowOne
framework enables the incorporation of trust and quality of data aspects into decision
making process in a formalized manner.
Throughout our reference implementation we have focused on providing the most
flexible and open approach possible. By providing an API in addition to the XML and
graph based formalization of our reference implementation, interfaces could be provided
to other languages such as C++, Python, etc.
7.5 Chapter Summary
In addition to the TrustKnowOne framework discussed throughout this dissertation,
we provide a reference implementation. In this chapter, we described the components
of our implementation including input, knowledge derivation process, and output.
As discussed in section 5.2.2, we need to describe the graph components used in
the respective application scenario. Here we provided three equivalent ways to model
elements and relations (XML, expression tree, and Java). Furthermore, data sources
often lack formal descriptions because of their variety of formats. Here we proposed an
approach where we capture basic information that can be used to connect to a data
source and define mappings that transform raw data into equivalent graph components.
As part of the mappings, relationships can be determined and added automatically.
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In this chapter we also discussed the requirements regarding data management and
processing. Specifically, our reference implementation provides an abstract graph model
interface that allows various backends to be used that range from in-memory to dis-
tributed and hybrid approaches. A similar layer of abstraction is provided for compu-
tational engines such that they can be adjusted depending on the requirements of the
application scenario (e.g., sequential, parallel, distributed, agent-based). Metrics have
been discussed in detail in section 4.4 and 6. However, in this chapter we provided two
additional ways to define them (XML, Java).
The output of the framework can be converted into a variety of formats using the ap-
plication programming interface (API) provided by our implementation. While we have
presented a number of techniques to describe parts of the TrustKnowOne implementa-
tion, our approaches as discussed in this chapter make the overall framework flexible
and extensible.
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8
Evaluation
We discussed the details of our TrustKnowOne framework in previous chapters.
Furthermore, we showed how the framework can be applied in various scenarios. Here,
we build on the related work chapter to evaluate TrustKnowOne within the context of
trust assessment, data modeling, and large-scale processing. We confirm our claims con-
cerning the contributions of our TrustKnowOne framework. In particular, we compare
important aspects of our approach to representative frameworks found in literature. In
order to provide the reader with an accurate assessment of our framework, the literature
representatives were chosen based on the fact that they are best in class, highly utilized
and widely referenced. As such, we evaluate and compare our TrustKnowOne frame-
work with approaches focused on large-scale data processing (i.e., Hadoop [169, 178],
Dryad [76]), graph algorithms (i.e., Pregel [107], Pegasus [86], GraphLab [104]), and
distributed trust approaches (i.e., EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67], PowerTrust [187]).
The main advantage of Hadoop [169, 178] is that it bases large-scale data process-
ing on the abstract MapReduce paradigm [37–39] which allows for a formal yet flexible
approach to “big data” analysis. While Dryad [76] shares the same goal, its approach
is different. Instead of providing an abstract layer where large-scale data processing
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is performed automatically on a distributed set of computing nodes, Dryad represents
a distributed execution engine. In particular, users have to specifically define compu-
tational nodes and their processing relationships. Nevertheless, both frameworks have
weaknesses in areas such as formalization of data and processes. Furthermore, they do
not incorporate trust and quality of data into the knowledge derivation process which
we will discuss in detail as part of this chapter.
There exist a variety of graph frameworks that we can compare our TrustKnowOne
framework against. Specifically, Pregel [107] represents a computational model based
on nodes. Programs are defined as a series of iterations in which nodes send messages
around to other nodes which then modify data stored in nodes, edges, and graph topol-
ogy. In similar fashion, Pegasus [86] provides a collection of graph mining algorithms
that can be implemented using node-based computations. However, instead of message
passing, approaches are modeled as matrix-vector multiplications which limits their
ability to be scaled and distributed. GraphLab [104] provides a parallel abstraction for
machine learning algorithms with a data graph that models computational dependen-
cies. It incorporates a variety of techniques to address issues such as data consistency
and process scheduling. However, most graph frameworks often do not consider hetero-
geneous data and relationships as well as trust assessment aspects.
Approaches that focus on the assessment of trust relationships are often limited in
terms of formalization and flexibility. For instance, EigenTrust [85] provides a technique
for distributed trust assessment of nodes in peer-to-peer systems. It is based on local
trust values (binary positive or negative assessments of transactions) and normalized
local trust value that lead to transitive trust assessments (i.e., trust of peer’s friends
weighted by trust in peer). While this approach works well in a distributed way and is
robust against a variety of attacks, it ignores other trust and quality of data aspects (e.g.,
non-binary, global relationships). Furthermore, it lacks formalization and flexibility.
PowerTrust [187] extends the principles of EigenTrust but instead of using a seed set
of known trust nodes, it relies on historical information to determine power nodes from
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Table 8.1: Comparison of major aspects in knowledge derivation processes
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heterogeneous systems
dynamic systems
formal representations
quality and trust assessments
flexibility in approaches
no support partial support full support
which to propagate trust. TrustRank [67] is similar to PageRank [20] in the way it
incorporates trust dampening and splitting techniques but is still based on the same of
trust derivation from seed nodes. The most notable aspects of these trust approaches
are that they are data agnostic (i.e., only concerned about providing a trust assessment
approach) but often lack flexibility which would allow their reuse in heterogeneous and
dynamic application domains. In contrast, our TrustKnowOne framework provides a
complete knowledge derivation approach with the ability to incorporate various data
processing as well as trust approaches. With regards to trust assessment techniques, we
are able to combine, modify, and evaluate them because of their formalization as belief
engines.
An overview of the major aspects of knowledge derivation supported by our Trust-
KnowOne and confirmed through the implementation of the three scenarios is shown
in table 8.1. Table 8.1 also shows how well these major aspects are supported by the
representative frameworks. In the following, we will discuss these aspects and then
evaluate the frameworks in the context of the research areas outlined in related work
(chapter 3).
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8.1 Major Aspects
When developing our TrustKnowOne framework we identified five major aspects
as requirements for a complete knowledge derivation system: heterogeneous systems,
dynamic systems, formal representations, quality and trust assessments, and flexibility
in approaches. Knowledge derivation in heterogeneous systems is difficult because one
needs to address issues of data integration and conflicting data. However, a framework
should be flexible enough to incorporate various types of data as well as relationships in
order to allow for known information and more importantly information that is not yet
known to be incorporated into decision making. TrustKnowOne provides an abstract
graph model approach that provides this capability in a uniform and formalized way
(see chapter 4,6). In contrast, other approaches often focus on particular applications
which results in them lacking support for true heterogeneous systems. For instance,
trust approaches such as EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67], and PowerTrust [187] assume
a homogeneous system of related peer nodes.
Another aspect that is often disregarded because it increases complexity is dealing
with changes in dynamic systems. In its most basic form this means keeping track of
changes in data over time. However, relationships between data elements may change
as well. Many knowledge derivation approaches only consider snapshots of data which
often does not capture all the context. Our abstract graph model approach provides a
direct methodology to store data in time series.
The formalization of data, data sources, relationships, trust approaches, and deci-
sion processes is important to enable analysis, evaluation and comparison of various
approaches. Nevertheless, most existing frameworks do not address this aspect which
makes it difficult to determine their strengths and weaknesses. In addition, it becomes
problematic to improve or exchange existing techniques as well as apply them in dif-
ferent application domains. As discussed in chapter 4 and chapter 5 TrustKnowOne
provides an approach to knowledge derivation which formalizes all parts of the process.
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The premise of our research is that knowledge derivation can be improved by incor-
porating trust and quality of data. Apart from trust approaches (e.g., EigenTrust [85],
TrustRank [67], PowerTrust [187]) our framework is the only one that provides a formal
approach to incorporating context, expected behavior and other meta information and
deriving trust and quality assessments for data.
Instead of developing a specific quality and trust assessment approach that is limited
to a particular scenario our research provides a generic abstract framework that is
flexible and extensible enough to support existing as well as future knowledge derivation
processes. Note that this includes approaches that only focus on a particular part of the
framework such as large-scale data processing or modeling trust assessment techniques.
8.2 Trust Assessment and Management
In order to model knowledge derivation we need to make sure that we are able
to evaluate the context of a particular piece of data. Specifically, incorporating trust
and quality of data aspects requires a number of features to be supported by frame-
works. First, determining what is fact and what not is based on a framework’s ability
to model heterogeneous and dynamic systems. Second, assessments of the reputation of
data and data sources are crucial in evaluating their usefulness. Third, only full trans-
parency throughout the knowledge derivation process ensures better decision making.
An overview of supported trust assessment and management aspects of our and other
frameworks is shown in table 8.2 and in the following sections we will discuss them in
detail. Table 8.2 also includes references to the most relevant scenario that discusses a
particular aspect.
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8.2.1 Fact Finding and Data Representation
As shown in table 8.2, Hadoop provides the most complete approach to model flexible
fact finding techniques. However, it does not incorporate trust and quality of data
assessment. Heterogeneous systems require the ability to model a diverse set of data
and relationships. Large-scale processing approaches have the advantage here as they
are flexible and designed to be applicable in a variety of applications. In contrast, trust
approaches are often designed for homogeneous systems and deal with relationships
only as part of their trust assessment. We provide an abstract graph model which is able
to model heterogeneous entities as well as relationships in a formal manner as graph
components (chapter 4) and showed its application in chapter 6.
In addition to enabling its application in heterogeneous systems our approach over-
comes the general lack of formal data representations found in other frameworks. For
instance, there exist a number of serialization approaches for Hadoop (e.g., Avro [167],
Thrift [154], Protocol Buffers [60]). However they do not provide a unified way of de-
scribing data and relationships. Another problem found in related approaches such as
DFDL [135] and DSPL [62] is the combination of data source information and data
description. As discussed in chapter 5 during the knowledge extraction our framework
deals with data source and data element descriptions separately and defines a mapping
using adapters which makes this approach more flexible. This flexibility can be seen in
the use of our framework for a variety of scenarios (chapter 6).
The biggest challenge for fact finding is that trust and quality assessments are often
not directly incorporated into knowledge derivation frameworks. Apart from the trust
techniques (i.e., EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67], PowerTrust [187]) our TrustKnowOne
framework is the only one that provides mechanisms to incorporate trust and quality
assessments in the form of formal belief engines (see section 6.1.4, 6.2.4, 6.3.3).
Furthermore, many “big data” analysis frameworks focus on efficient distributed
processing on a static data set. However, many real world applications deal with data
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that is constantly changing. Thus it is necessary to consider time series of data and rela-
tionships. While Hadoop [169, 178] does not directly provide support for dynamic data,
its input format is flexible enough to address this. Pregel [107] is based on computations
perform on graph vertices and message passing between them. As such dynamic aspects
could be implemented into the process directly. Our framework provides the flexible
abstract graph model described in chapter 4 to provide this functionality. We utilized
this aspect extensively in the radiation and intrusion detection scenarios (section 6.2,
6.3).
Note that while fact finding represents one of the foundations of knowledge derivation
we need to ensure that aspects such as quality and trust assessments can be incorporated
from other systems. This means providing a way to query facts as well as annotating
or modifying them which requires a flexible approach such as our abstract graph model
(see chapter 4, section 6.2.4.1) or separate interfaces as in the case of Hadoop [169, 178],
Dryad [76], and Pregel [107].
8.2.2 Reputation Management
Reputation management is an important component of fact finding that allows us
to weight data and resolve conflicting information. Many of the large-scale processing
and graph frameworks do not consider data coming from different sources (e.g., sec-
tion 6.2) but assume a single data set. Distributed trust approaches such as EigenTrust
[85] and PowerTrust [187] incorporate a limited version of reputation of data sources
as part of their peer assessments. Our TrustKnowOne framework provides a formaliza-
tion of “local” assessments through dimension models during knowledge extraction and
“global” assessments through belief engines during knowledge processing (see chapter 5,
section 6.2.5.5).
Furthermore, knowledge derivation frameworks need to be able to deal with objec-
tive and subjective challenges to data. However, most frameworks do not address both
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but focus on one or the other. In particular, large-scale processing approaches often
incorporate techniques that ensure data consistency and fault tolerance and ignore at-
tack models that would introduce malicious or modify existing data. Trust approaches
on the other hand provide the means to identify and often deal with attacks on data.
Note that our TrustKnowOne framework does not specify particular techniques to deal
with either objective or subjective challenges but instead provides a flexible approach
based on belief engines modeled as graph expressions that allows existing and future
techniques to be implemented (see section 4.4, section 6.3)
In addition, this formalization is necessary to enable reuse of trust and quality assess-
ment techniques in other application domains. Most of the representative frameworks
do not provide mechanisms to incorporate other approaches. Furthermore, while the
trust approaches are in some way formally specified their evaluation and comparison
against each other is still difficult because of a missing unified formalization model. By
defining trust approaches as graph expressions that are evaluated on an abstract graph
model storing the data we solve this problem and enable evaluation and comparison of
the approaches (see section 6.2.5, section 6.3.5.3).
8.2.3 Data Lineage
The formalization of the entire knowledge derivation processing as provided by our
TrustKnowOne framework has the advantage of allowing detailed tracing of data and
assessments (chapter 5). In particular, the knowledge extraction phase annotates data
with meta information about its origin while the knowledge processing phase provides
additional information about how it is processed. This approach enables us to assess
why we reach certain decision results and trace back influential data as well as pro-
cesses that shaped the decision making. Furthermore, in contrast to other frameworks
we are able to use this extensive lineage information to evaluate and improve knowl-
edge derivation (e.g., not incorporating data from untrustworthy sources, only using a
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subset of the available data, see section 6.2.5.5). In addition, since we provide lineage
information as additional attributes to element nodes in our abstract graph model this
approach is flexible enough to allow for varying degrees of granularity ranging from cap-
turing straightforward origin meta information to detailed processing and assessment
derivation annotations.
8.3 Data Modeling, Integration, and Fusion
Knowledge derivation is complex because it requires a variety of data processing
problems to be addressed. First, frameworks need to provide capabilities to formalize
aspects of data processing such as data sources, relationships, assessments and decision
processes. This is an important step that is often neglected by existing research resulting
in frameworks that are difficult to evaluate and compare. Second, trust and quality of
data assessments need to be directly incorporated into the overall knowledge derivation
process. Separating data processing from assessments limited our ability to provide the
best possible decision options. Third, in order to enable evaluation and comparison of
approaches as well as improve the knowledge derivation process we need to be able to
define metrics and assess costs. In this section we will discuss data modeling, integration,
and fusion aspects of our and other frameworks (see table 8.3 for an overview). In
addition, table 8.2 indicates the most relevant scenario discussing these aspect.
8.3.1 Formalization
Many data processing frameworks provide mechanisms to describe the data they use
as part of their processing. For instance, there exist a number of serialization frame-
works for Hadoop [169, 178] (e.g., Avro [167], Thrift [154], Protocol Buffers [60]) and
graph frameworks usually allows arbitrary data to be associated with graph nodes. The
problem lies in the fact that without a formal description it becomes difficult to exchange
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data and use it in another application domain. In addition, while our framework di-
rectly incorporates aspects such as different classes of nodes and node identities other
frameworks do not (see section 5.2). Similar formalization problems affect descriptions
of relationships which are often only provided as adjacency lists or matrices. In general,
knowledge derivation frameworks tend to ignore heterogeneous aspects that could prove
useful but increase complexity such as relationship attribute (e.g., time, weights). In
addition, the lack of formalizing data sources, extracting knowledge from them, and
their incorporation into the knowledge derivation process makes it difficult to provide
proper data lineage and “local” assessments for data. As shown in chapter 5 knowledge
extraction is fully formalized in our framework. This includes provisions for adding meta
information and context to the data as part of graph components within the abstract
graph model (chapter 4).
Because many of the frameworks do not incorporate trust aspects there is no for-
mal approach to modeling trust and quality of data assessments. Note that while trust
approaches such as EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67], and PowerTrust [187] provide a for-
malization of their techniques they are not generic enough to describe other assessment
approaches. Approaches for decision making are often not part of frameworks because
they are considered separate from the data processing. However, Hadoop [169, 178]
includes some built-in functionality and there exist several extensions (e.g., Mahout
[121, 171], Giraph [168]) for formalizing decision processes. Our approach allows data
processing, assessment and decision making to be formalized using graph expressions
(section 4.4). This provides a unified approach that is flexible enough for existing and
extensible for future approaches and techniques (see chapter 6).
As discussed earlier, we need to be able to analyze data that is dynamic. Hence,
our data model needs to be able to formally describe dynamic aspects such as time
and location data and relationships (e.g., section 6.2, 6.3). Our abstract graph model
inherently stores keeps track of data as a time series and we provide dimension models
for expressing dynamic data (chapter 4). Hadoop [169, 178] allows processing on ar-
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bitrary data and as such provides limited support for this type of dynamic modeling.
PowerTrust [187] partially addresses the issue in terms of peer nodes joining or leaving
the system.
8.3.2 Trust and Relationship Models
Trust and relation models are often of limited relevance in large-scale data pro-
cessing frameworks. Similarly, trust approaches (e.g., EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67],
PowerTrust [187]) often ignore data processing aspects and focus on trust and rela-
tionship models. In general, it is important to provide support for homogeneous and
heterogeneous systems in order for trust approaches to be applicable to a wide range
of scenarios. This means that trust and relationship model need to be formal in their
description yet flexible enough to support a wide variety of domains. Our approach of
expressing data as graph components and relationships as relation edges between them
achieves this. Furthermore, trust approaches can then be modeled as graph expressions
in a standardized manner (see chapter 6).
As discussed above, providing a formal integration of trust aspects into the knowl-
edge derivation process can improve decision making. In particular, having “local”
(dimension models chapter 4) and “global” (belief engines chapter 5) assessments avail-
able allows us to determine what data is of high quality and trustworthy as well as
provide confidence levels for decision options.
8.3.3 Metrics
Providing cost assessments of individual components in large scale systems is diffi-
cult due to complexity and various interconnecting components being formalized using
different methodologies. Hadoop [169, 178], Dryad [76], and Pegasus [86] utilize a lim-
ited set of predefined counters and computational statistics for monitoring and analysis
of data processing. We allow cost assessments to be attached to data (graph compo-
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nents) as well as processes (graph expressions) which enables evaluation and comparison
of data processing and assessment techniques (section 5.2.6, 5.3.6, 5.4.5).
Furthermore, while optimization is often considered one of the primary reasons for
defining metrics, many frameworks provide only limited capabilities to formally describe
and incorporate them. This means that it is difficult to implement other metrics than
the ones existing in the frameworks. Our TrustKnowOne framework is based on a
flexible abstract graph model on which metrics can be defined and evaluated using graph
expressions (chapter 4). These metrics can then be calculated at each phase (chapter 5)
and thus cover the entire knowledge derivation process.
It is important to provide trust metrics that reflect aspects of trust relationships such
as confidence in data and reputation of data sources. Especially the assessment of data
sources is only factored in in trust approaches and mostly ignored in data processing
frameworks. For instance, as part of our framework meta information such as lineage
can be used in combination with these assessments to improve decision processes by
determining the trustworthiness of data sources (see section 6.2.5.5). This is not possible
in frameworks that do not provide formal trust metrics.
8.4 Large-scale Data Processing
In order to provide the scalability and flexibility necessary to model complex appli-
cation scenarios, frameworks should support a variety of aspects related to “big data”.
In particular, scalability is often closely tied to distributed processing whereas flexibility
in terms of data modeling comes from approaches that are based in graph theory. As
such, large-scale processing requires combination of “big data” and graph framework
aspects that maintains the advantages of both areas. Furthermore, every framework
needs to be able to provide mechanisms for data processing as well as analysis of data,
assessments, and processes in form of a query system. Without the ability to retrieve
additional information such as context, cost assessments, and metrics evaluation and
285
comparison becomes difficult. We provide an overview of the supported large-scale data
processing aspects in table 8.4 and will discuss details as part of this section. Table 8.4
also shows which of scenario is the most relevant regarding the discussion of a specific
aspect or confirmed through reference implementation.
8.4.1 Big Data
There exist a variety of approaches to achieve scalability. However, most important
is the choice of flexible data structures. In particular with regards to storage, data
structures need to be able to deal with being distributed across various entities such
as computing clusters. Furthermore, basic operations such as adding, modifying, or
removing data needs to be bound by the number of data entries and should not be
exponential. For this reason, using matrix data structures with a large number of values
can become problematic. However, most large-scale data processing frameworks have
solved this problem either through efficient data structures or scalable implementation
of processes.
An approach to solve the problem of storage and computational power limitations
of single systems is to perform processing in a distributed manner. Note that this
can be considered a natural evolution from single-threaded sequential processing on a
single machine to multi-threaded parallel processing on a single machine and finally to
parallel processing on multiple machines. Many frameworks have focused on providing
this capability through a variety of abstract programming paradigms (e.g., MapReduce
[37–39] in Hadoop [169, 178], vertex-based iterative computations in Pregel [107]). Our
framework is provides an abstract graph model on which graph expressions are evaluated
(chapter 4). As such nodes as well as edges of the graph can be distributed across
machines.
Note that while platform independence is something that is often not considered a
priority when designing frameworks, it leads to additional flexibility. In particular, it
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allows data processing and assessment approaches to be applicable to more scenarios
because they can be incorporated into other systems more easily. Similarly, maintain-
ing flexibility in input and output formats is important ensures that a framework can
deal not just with existing data sources but future ones as well. Apart from Trust-
KnowOne which uses an adapter approach (chapter 5) general large-scale processing
frameworks (e.g., Hadoop [169, 178], Dryad [76]) support this kind of integration while
trust approaches (e.g., EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67], PowerTrust [187]) do not.
We already discussed the need to flexible data storage options in terms of scalability.
In addition, note that providing multiple storage options through a common abstract
interface frameworks could adapt better to various scenarios (see chapter 6). Specifically,
data for large-scale data analysis could be stored based on how data is used. For
instance, frequently used data can be stored in memory for faster processing while
historic data can be stored in databases. This kind of approach for splitting the data
across multiple storage systems is supported by our framework (chapter 7). Other
frameworks provide a variety of file systems (Hadoop [169, 178]) or process-based storage
(e.g., Dryad [76]) but many simply define their own storage approach that often does
not translate to other domains.
There exist several approaches to perform large-scale data processing, most notably
MapReduce [37–39] (e.g., in Hadoop [169, 178]), user-defined computational topologies
(e.g., in Dryad [76]), and vertex-based iterative computations (e.g., in Pregel [107]).
Our approach does not dictate one specifically but rather provides a framework based
an abstract graph model that is conducive to existing as well as future computational
paradigms (chapter 4, 5, 7). In particular, MapReduce can be modeled as a sequence
of graph expressions that represent “map” and “reduce” functions accordingly. Further-
more, graph expressions can be nested and thus be used to represent computational
dependencies (chapter 4) as in Dryad. Finally, since graph components in our abstract
graph model can be annotated we are able to keep track of information across several it-
erations while evaluating graph expressions in parallel on nodes of the graph like Pregel.
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As such our TrustKnowOne framework provides a flexible approach to large-scale data
processing as compared to the existing frameworks. Note that it is also important to
distinguish between defined and derived knowledge. While it is often straightforward
to define data processing techniques our framework includes the ability to incorporate
meta information and various assessments to derive additional knowledge to be used
during decision making.
One of the premises of our research is the incorporation of trust and quality of data
into the knowledge derivation process. Large-scale data processing and context analysis
such as trust or quality assessments are often seen as diverging interests. The problem
is that in order to allow for the fastest and most efficient large-scale processing one
needs to ignore these aspects in favor of performance because they increase complexity.
However, while providing trust and quality of data assessments decreases performance
it can improve decision processes and in some instances overcome additional compu-
tational costs (see chapter 6). For instance, determining which data sources are less
trustworthy or which data elements are of low quality we could optimize knowledge
derivation and thus decision making processes by only performing computations on
high trustworthy and high quality data (e.g., section 6.2.5.5). Approaches like the one
described would be able to potentially balance out the decrease in performance that is
due to the incorporation of trust and quality of data aspects. However, in contrast to
the general large-scale processing approaches our TrustKnowOne framework is be able
to provide a better assessment of decision options that includes confidence levels and
ranges.
8.4.2 Graph Frameworks
With the growing number of relationships in data that occur in many real world sce-
narios (e.g., social networks, distributed sensing), graph frameworks represent a natural
fit for providing extensive and yet flexible data modeling. However, it is key to maintain
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this flexibility by having a graph framework that is able to incorporate heterogeneous
entities and relationships. Many large-scale processing frameworks do not provide a
graph-based interface which puts the burden of modeling possibly extensive relation-
ships on the developer. In addition, it can lead to custom non-standard representations
of graph concepts that are difficult to evaluate, improve, or adapt to other domains. Our
TrustKnowOne framework uses an abstract graph model which as described in chapter 4
is flexible enough to model current and future application scenarios (see section 6.1.2,
6.2.2, 6.3.1). Note that GraphLab [104] is the only one of the representative frame-
works that is entirely based on graph theoretic constructs and allows arbitrary data to
be stored with graph nodes and edges.
As discussed above another problem with many frameworks is the lack of support for
dynamic aspects. With regards to graph frameworks we need to be able to store data
as time series in nodes and edges. Furthermore, graph topology may change over time
as new nodes are added, nodes are removed, and relationships adjusted. Our abstract
graph model provides an approach where all data is timestamped which means that we
are able to trace back when a relationship was created, adjusted, or removed. This
allows us to incorporate dynamic aspects into the knowledge derivation process (see
section 6.2, 6.3).
Furthermore, being able to provide methods for associating meta information with
nodes and edges in a graph model is important. Without meta information frameworks
are able to perform only limited assessments of data, data sources and processes. In
addition, it makes it difficult to adapt processing and assessment approaches to new
application scenarios. Note that as described in chapter 5 we discuss how we are able
to utilize meta information to derive trust and quality assessments as well as provide
cost assessments and data lineage.
Overall the aspects described here for graph frameworks determine whether or not
a framework is flexible enough to be applicable to multiple domains. Note that of the
representative frameworks some can be considered to support this flexibility through
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the means of graph extensions (e.g., Giraph [168], Mahout [171]). As shown in the
application scenarios (chapter 6), our TrustKnowOne framework with its abstract graph
model can be applied to multiple domains effectively.
8.4.3 Query Systems
The main focus of data processing frameworks is to provide support for mechanisms
that derive knowledge from data. However, as part of evaluating and comparing trust
and quality of data approaches we need to have techniques available that enable metrics
and cost assessments to be determined. In particular, we require a flexible and ex-
tensible approach to retrieve data and assessments. Furthermore, this approach needs
to able to express complex heterogeneous relationships between data. There exist sev-
eral extensions for large-scale data processing frameworks such as Pig [118, 172] and
Hive [170, 173] for Hadoop [169, 178] as well as DryadLINQ [186] and SCOPE [24]
for Dryad. Our TrustKnowOne provides a flexible and expressive approach using the
abstract graph model presented in chapter 4 where graph expressions are evaluated on
graph components.
Furthermore, with the incorporation of trust and quality of data assessments into
the knowledge derivation process one should be able to provide an approach to include
those into the “big data” analysis part as well. This means that instead of treating
assessments as secondary results of knowledge derivation, decision processes can be
improved by utilizing assessments throughout data processing phases (e.g., only utilize
data from trustworthy data sources).
8.5 Chapter Summary
The goal of this chapter is to put our research into context and evaluate how our
TrustKnowOne framework compares to other representative frameworks in a variety of
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aspects. Existing frameworks deal with large-scale data processing (i.e., Hadoop [169,
178], Dryad [76]), graph algorithms (i.e., Pregel [107], Pegasus [86], GraphLab [104]),
and distributed trust approaches (i.e., EigenTrust [85], TrustRank [67], PowerTrust
[187]).
In contrast to our framework none of the existing representative systems are able
to incorporate all major aspects of knowledge derivation. Modeling heterogeneous and
dynamic systems extensively is often dismissed as the focus of many frameworks is
large-scale data processing where performance is most important. Furthermore, the
lack of formal representations of data, data sources, and processes makes it difficult to
improve upon and reuse existing approaches as well as incorporate future techniques.
This is in spite of the flexibility of many existing frameworks with regards to platforms,
programming languages, storage options, and computational engines. However, one
of the main premises of our work is to incorporate trust and quality of data into the
knowledge derivation process. As such, our framework is the only one that fully supports
both large-scale data processing as well as quality and trust assessments.
As part of the evaluation we also provide a more detailed assessment of aspects
in the areas defined by the related work chapter (chapter 3). First, trust assessment
and management deals with fact finding and data representation as well as reputation
management and data lineage. Here it is important to note that we provide formal
approaches to problems such as incorporating reputation and lineage into the knowledge
derivation process. In particular, our TrustKnowOne framework enables the modeling of
various trust and quality aspects in order to determine the value of data for knowledge
derivation.
Second, data modeling, integration, and fusion relates to the topics of formalization,
trust and relationship models, and metrics. As discussed throughout this research,
formalization allows evaluation, comparison, improvement, and exchange of data and
approaches. Our approach consists of a formal abstract graph model Berlin and a formal
framework TrustKnowOne to model the entire knowledge derivation process. Many
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of the other frameworks provide limited formalization that is often focused on their
domain and not able to generalize well. In addition, models for aspects such as meta
information and dynamic systems (e.g., time, location) are missing in many frameworks.
As large-scale data processing frameworks focus on performance and disregard trust
and relationship models the only approaches for formalizing them comes from trust
techniques and frameworks. Furthermore, evaluation and comparison of data processing
and assessment approaches is dependent on the existence of formal metrics. While our
framework enables the definition of various metrics such as cost assessments and lineage
in a flexible manner using graph expressions (chapter 5) other existing frameworks do
not.
Third, large-scale data processing is an important area as the available data that
can be used for analysis and decision making has increased drastically. In the era of “big
data” there are a number of necessary aspects that every data processing framework
needs to address. This is a field in which research has yielded a variety of flexible,
distributed, and high performance frameworks (i.e., Hadoop [169, 178], Dryad [76],
Pregel [107], etc.). The main issue here is the lack of natural support for trust and
quality of data aspects. Furthermore, because there is a growing number of applications
that require extensive relationship modeling, graph frameworks have been identified as
possible solutions. However, combining aspects of high performance while maintaining
flexibility for heterogeneous and dynamic systems is difficult and thus addressed only
partially in many frameworks. Our abstract graph model Berlin provides an approach
that is able to solve this problem (chapter 4). With the amount of data that is analyzed
and processed it also becomes important to enable techniques to be incorporated for
analyzing data processing and assessment approaches. In particular, frameworks should
be able to provide information about how decisions were made and knowledge was
derived. Furthermore, when trust and quality assessments are available one needs to
be able to incorporate them and other meta information into decision making and data
analysis.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation we presented TrustKnowOne, a framework for knowledge deriva-
tion incorporating trust and quality of data. Our framework is based on the Berlin
abstract graph model on which formal graph expressions are evaluated. The combina-
tion of graph expressions in the form of metrics forms the basis of trust and data quality
assessments. Through these metrics we incorporate context, historical behavior, and
other meta information as well as relationships between data elements that can be used
to implement a variety of knowledge processing approaches, belief engines, and decision
processes.
Throughout this dissertation we described in detail our approaches and methods in
developing this novel framework. Furthermore, we applied the TrustKnowOne frame-
work to three diverse and realistic scenarios to showcase its formalization capabilities
as well as its flexibility. As such we demonstrated throughout this dissertation that our
research yields a number of key contributions:
• A new abstract graph modeling approach that allows the management of hetero-
geneous data with dynamic aspects (e.g., time, location) in a variety of application
scenarios while inherently incorporating trustworthiness and data quality assess-
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ments
• A new formalization approach to describing belief engines and decision processes
in the form of graph expressions
• A new framework for knowledge derivation that provides a flexible and extensible
approach using clearly defined extraction, processing, and evaluation components
• The means to evaluate and compare different belief, trustworthiness, and decision
making techniques in a variety of application scenarios using a formal approach
9.1 Future work
We have identified the following areas of our framework for further research.
Computation engines As there exist a number of large-scale data processing ap-
proaches, we need to explore in more depth how our graph expressions can be efficiently
distributed and evaluated in parallel. Furthermore, a computation engine needs to be
able to optimize individual as well as groups of graph expressions in order to achieve
scalability.
Graph model backends While our reference implementation provides two backends
(i.e., in-memory and graph database) there is the need to further evaluate the effi-
cient storage and management of the abstract graph model. Specifically, distributed
approaches such as Hadoop provide inherent benefits that our framework could make
use of.
Objective challenges Our framework and in particular the abstract graph model sup-
ports the notion of objective challenges such environmental factors, calibration issues,
and time variance through dimension models. However, despite the usefulness of provid-
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ing generalized assessments modeling these object challenges it is difficult to construct
a repository for these models such that they can be shared among applications.
Query system Using graph expressions the data stored in the abstract graph model
can be processed, compared and evaluated. However, our approach requires thinking in
a new declarative paradigm which may make it difficult to transform existing knowledge
derivation processes.
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